**Security Kritik — Revised Version — HSS 2016**

### Note

This is a revised version of the original 2016 Security Kritik. There are new blocks as well as new cards. You can entirely replace the original file with this one.

**Negative**

**1NC**

**1NC — Security Critique**

#### [Insert Link]

#### Security discourse constructs threats to justify massive exploitation and oppression. The alternative is anti-Security. Unflinching rejection of security discourse is the only emancipatory political option.

Neocleous and Rigakos 11 — Mark Neocleous, Professor of the Critique of Political Economy at Brunel University London, Editor of the journal *Radical Philosophy*, holds a Ph.D. in Philosophy from Middlesex University London, and George S. Rigakos, Chair of Law and Legal Studies at Carleton University, holds a Ph.D. in Sociology from York University, 2011 (“Anti-Security: A Declaration,” *Anti-Security*, Edited by Mark Neocleous and George S. Rigakos, Published by Red Quill Books, ISBN 9781926958149, p. 15-19)

The purpose of the project, put simply, is to show that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion. Less simply, that security is a dangerous illusion. Why ‘dangerous’? Because it has come to act as a blockage on politics: the more we succumb to the discourse of security, the less we can say about exploitation and alienation; the more we talk about security, the less we talk about the material foundations of emancipation; the more we come to share in the fetish of security, the more we become alienated from one another and the more we become complicit in the exercise of police powers.

Fleshing out how we got here is the first challenge; showing how damaging this has been is an even greater challenge; doing these things in a way that contributes to a radical, critical and emancipatory politics even more so. But it is a challenge that must be made, and must be made collectively. As a start, we therefore offer the following declarations about an Anti-Security politics. [end page 15]

We deny all false binaries that obfuscate and reify the security problematic and serve only to reinforce its power. We therefore reject:

\* Liberty versus Security: In the works of the founders of the liberal tradition - that is, the founders of bourgeois ideology - liberty is security and security is liberty. For the ruling class, security always has and always will triumph over liberty because ‘liberty’ has never been intended as a counter-weight to security. Liberty has always been security’s lawyer.

\* Public versus Private: No post-hoc juridical determination about accountability, legal standing, uniforming, or legitimate use of force can undo the historic inter-operability of public and private police, state and mercenary armies, corporate and government security, or transnational corporations and international relations. The public sphere does the work of the private sphere, civil society the work of the state. The question is therefore not ‘public versus private’ or ‘civil [end page 16] society versus the state’, but the unity of bourgeois violence and the means by which pacification is legitimized in the name of security.

\* Soft versus Hard: Such dichotomous constructions – soft versus hard policing for suppressing dissent; soft versus hard military intervention for stamping out local and indigenous resistance; soft versus hard power to impose global imperial hegemony – are but aspects of the unity of class violence, distracting us from universal pacification carried out in the name of capital.

\* Barbarism versus Civilization: The history of civilization after the Enlightenment is the consolidation of wage labour, the cultural and material imposition of imperial domination, and the violence of class war. In the form of the ‘standard of civilization’ the majesty of the Law was central to this project. To civilize is to project police power. ‘Civilization’ is code for enforcing capitalist relations; which is to say: bourgeois civilization is barbarism. [end page 17]

\* Domestic versus Foreign: The greatest tyranny of security is its insistence on the construction of the ‘other’. Security creates both internal domestic and external foreign threats, generating the fear and division that underpins raison d’état. The colonial pacification of subjects abroad is soon turned into domestic pacification of subjects at home. New international policing initiatives are but a laboratory for the militarization of domestic security. The ‘war on terror’ is a permanent multi-front assault that lumps jihadists with peaceniks, feminists with Islamists, and socialists with assassins. No pretence at a distinction is necessary because the capitalist state is insecure in all directions.

\* Pre- and post-9/11: Let’s be clear: the murder of 3,000 on September 11, 2001 was horrific, but it did not change anything. To believe so is to engage in a deliberate act of forgetting. The security apparatus that revved up in the days after the attack had been in the making for decades as the [end page 18] terrain of the class war shifted. The targets of the new ‘war’ - this time on terror - were not new. The cry of ‘insecurity’ was again answered with two familiar demands: you consume, and we will destroy. Go to Disneyland, and let the state continue the work it had been conducting for generations. If 9/11 accomplished anything, it was to make security all but unassailable.

\* Exception and Normality: This is not a state of exception. The capitalist state riding roughshod over human rights in the name of security is normal. The ruling class carrying out acts of violence in the name of accumulation is normal. The devising of new techniques to discipline and punish recalcitrant subjects is normal. Targeted assassinations, the bombing of civilians, imprisonment without trial… normal, normal, normal. And, lest we forget: liberals falling over themselves justify such things? Normal. [end page 19]

We understand instead that security today:

\* operates as the supreme concept of bourgeois society.

\* colonizes and de-radicalizes discourse: hunger to food security; imperialism to energy security; globalization to supply chain security; welfare to social security; personal safety to private security. Security makes bourgeois all that is inherently communal. It alienates us from solutions that are naturally social and forces us to speak the language of state rationality, corporate interest, and individual egoism. Instead of sharing, we hoard. Instead of helping, we build dependencies. Instead of feeding others, we let them starve… all in the name of security.

\* is a special commodity, playing a pivotal role in the exploitation, alienation and immiseration of workers. It produces its own fetish, embedding itself into all other commodities, producing even more risk and fear while intensifying and distracting us from the material conditions of exploitation that have [end page 20] made us inherently insecure. It makes concrete our ephemeral insecurities under capitalist relations. It attempts to satiate through consumption what can only be achieved through revolution.

The call of this Declaration is that we:

\* name security for what it really is;

\* stand against the securitization of political discourse;

\* challenge the authoritarian and reactionary nature of security;

\* point to the ways in which security politics shifts attention away from material conditions and questions, in the process transforming emancipatory politics into an arm of police;

\* fight for an alternative political language that takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and its police powers…

[This card is the full declaration; it ends with an ellipses.]

**2NC/1NR – Impact**

**Impact – Top Level**

#### 1AC decisions to portray China as a threat result in violent externalization of the Other – the aff’s form of IR necessitates crisis management of risk that results in rampant militarization.

#### Absent the alternative, extinction is inevitable — externalization of security justifies colonialism and oppression of the other. That’s Neocleous and Rigakos.

#### Securitization is the root cause of the AFF’s impacts – [explain].

#### The aff’s focus on large-scale extinction-level events obscures the on-going structural violence committed by the Western drive for military dominance and search for security which is a fundamentally insatiable appetite.

#### The alternative is prior — we are an analysis that accounts for the structural causes of their impacts.

#### The alt doesn’t preclude solving their advantages — they have to prove their method is necessary, not just sufficient, to solve the case. That’s Bruce.

**Structural Violence Outweighs**

#### Security imposes a calculative logic that perpetuates structural violence and destroys Value-To-Life.

Dillon 96 — (Michael, Professor of Politics – University of Lancaster, Politics of Security, p. 26)

**Everything**, for example, **has now become possible**. But what **human being seems most impelled to** do with the power of its actions is to **turn itself into a** species; not merely an animal species, nor even a species of currency or consumption (which amount to the same thing), but a **mere species of calculation**. **For only by reducing itself to an index of calculation does it seem capable of constructing that** oplitical **arithmetic by which it can secure the security**globalised Western thought insists upon, and which **a world made uncreasingly unpredictable** by the very way human being acts into it **now seem to require**. **Yet, the** very rage for **calculability** which securing security incites **is** precisely also **what reduces human freedom, inducing** either **despair or the surrender of what is humanto** the **dehumanising calculative logic** of what seems to be necessary to secure security. I think, then, that Hannah Arendt was right when she saw late modern humankind caught in a dangerous world-destroying cleft between a belief that everything is possible and a willingness to surender itself to so-called laws of necessity (calculability itself) which would make everything possible. That it was, in short, characterized by a combination of reckless omnipotence and reckless despair. But I also think that **things have gone** one stage **further – the surrender to** the necessity of realising everything that is possible- and that this found **its paradigmatic expression** for example **in the** deterrent security policies of the **Cold War; where everything up** to and **including self-immolation** not only **became** possible but **actually necessary in the interests of** (inter)national**security**. The logic persists in the metaphysical core of modern politics- the axiom of Inter-state security relations, popularized for example, through strategic discourse- even if the details have changed.

#### Structural violence outweighs – kills more people

Gilligan 96 —James, Faculty – Department of Psychiatry, Harvard Medical School, Violence: Our Deadly Epidemic and its Causes, p. 191-196)

You cannot work for one day with the violent people who fill our prisons and mental hospitals for the criminally insane without being forcibly and constantly reminded of the extreme poverty and discrimination that characterize their lives. Hearing about their lives, and about their families and friends, you are forced to recognize the truth in Gandhi’s observation that the deadliest form of violence is poverty. Not a day goes by without realizing that trying to understand them and their virulent behavior in purely individual terms is impossible and wrong-headed. Any theory of violence, especially a psychological theory, that evolves from the experience of men in maximum security prisons and hospitals for the criminally insane must begin with the recognition that these institutions are only microcosms. They are not where the major violence of our society takes place, and the perpetrators who fill them are far from being the main causes of most violent deaths. Any approach to a theory of violence needs to begin with a look at the structural violence of this country. Focusing merely on those relatively few men who commit what we define as murder could distract us from examining and learning from those structural causes of violent death that are far more significant from a numerical or public health, or human, standpoint By “structural violence” I mean the increased rates of death and disability suffered by those who occupy the bottom rungs of society, as contrasted with the relatively lower death rates experienced by those who are above them. Those excess deaths (or at least a demonstratably large portion of them) are a function of class structure; and that structure is itself a product of society’s collective human choices, concerning how to distribute the collective wealth of the society. These are not acts of God. I am contrasting “structural” with “behavioral violence,” by which I mean the non-natural deaths and injuries that are caused by specific behavioral actions of individuals against individuals, such as the deaths we attribute to homicide, suicide, soldiers in warfare, capital punishment, and so on. Structural violence differs from behavioral violence in at least three major respects The lethal effects of structural violence operate continuously rather than sporadically, whereas murders, suicides, executions, wars, and other forms of behavioral violence occur one at a time. Structural violence operates more or less independently of individual acs; independent of individuals and groups (politicians, political parties, voters) whose decisions may nevertheless have lethal consequences for others. Structural violence is normally invisible, because it may appear to have had other (natural or violent) causes. Neither the existence, the scope and extent, nor the lethal power of structural violence can be discerned until we shift our focus from a clinical or psychological perspective, which looks at one individual at a time, to the epidemiological perspective of public health and preventative medicine. Examples are all around us. [Continues – Page 195] The 14 to 18 million deaths a year caused by structural violence compare with about 100,000 deaths per year from armed conflict. Comparing this frequency of deaths from structural violence to the frequency of those caused by major military and political violence, such as World War II (an estimated 49 million military and civilian deaths, including those caused by genocide – or about eight million per year, 1939-1945), the Indonesian massacre of 1965-66 (perhaps 575,000 deaths), the Vietnam war (possibly two million, 1954-1973), and even a hypothetical nuclear exchange between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. (232 million), it was clear that even war **cannot begin** to compare with structural violence, which continues year after year. In other words, **every fifteen years**, on the average, **as many people die because of** relative **poverty as would be killed in a nuclear war** that caused 232 deaths, and every single year, two to three times as many people die from poverty throughout the world as were killed by the Nazi genocide of the Jews over a six-year period. This is, in effect, **the equivalent of an ongoing, unending**, in fact **accelerating, thermonuclear war**, or genocide, perpetuated on the week and poor every year of every decade, throughout the world. Structural violence is also the **main cause** of behavioral violence on a socially and epidemiologically significant scale (from homicide and suicide to war and genocide). The question as to which of the two forms of violence—structural or behavioral—is more important, dangerous, or lethal is moot, for they **are inextricably related to each other, as cause to effect.**

### Turns Case – Policies Fail

#### Flawed China threat representations guarantee policy failure. The China threat is used to justify biased policies toward China.

Turner 14 — Oliver Turner, Hallsworth Research Fellow, 2014 (“American Images of China: Identity, Power, Policy”, Routledge Studies in US Foreign Policy, 16/4, accessed 22nd June, CE)

Across the duration of Sino-US relations, powerful societal images of China have always provided truths and realities about that country and its people within the United States. American images of China have always been central to the formulation, enactment and justification of US China policy in Washington. US China policy has always been active in the production and reproduction of imagery and in the reaffirmation of the identities of both China and the United States. With regard to the first argument, in Chapter 2 it was shown that contributors to both the ‘imagery’ and ‘policy’ literatures have most commonly explored American representations of China in broadly superficial terms. Those images have been conceived primarily, or even solely, as temporally specific attitudes and opinions of given moments in response to events ‘out there’. As a result, analyses have largely been restricted to assessments of their relative positivity or negativity at given moments. This was shown to be the primary weakness of the imagery literature. With regard to the second question, and again as outlined in Chapter 2, contributors have largely failed to examine the significance of American images of China to the enactment of US China policy. Where images and policy have been interrogated, authors have almost exclusively privileged material over ideational forces so that the latter is deemed to be of either secondary or no consequence. The result is that policy has been interrogated in the absence of concern for the extent to which representational processes actively create political possibilities while precluding others. 5 This was shown to be the primary weakness of the policy literature. With regard to the third question, Chapter 2 showed that US China policy has been understood to represent the observable actions, or a ‘bridge’, of one given actor towards another. 6 The possibility that it functions within the production of imagery, and in the construction of China’s identity as well as that of the United States, has been almost entirely overlooked. To reaffirm, the conclusions of this book are aimed primarily – though not exclusively – at the policy literature. This is because the majority of contributors to the imagery literature (as historians, area specialists, etc.) have rarely and understandably concerned themselves with explorations of US China policy. A corresponding neglect for imagery throughout the policy literature, however, is considered a weakness in need of more urgent attention because it exposes a salient knowledge gap in how US China policies are enabled. The purpose of this final chapter is to bring together and review the principal findings of each of those which precede it. It does this by revisiting the most powerful societal images of China identified and explored, the role they have played in the advancement of US China policy over time, and the importance of that policy itself in the reproduction of imagery. Ultimately, the aim is to clarify the central messages articulated throughout the book and conclude with some final thoughts on their applicability to twenty-first-century Sino-US relations.

#### China Threat Construction produces serial policy failure and creates racist policies-empirically proven.

Turner 13 — Oliver Turner, Research Associate at the Brooks World Poverty Institute at the University of Manchester. He is the author of American Images of China: Identity, Power, Policy (Routledge, forthcoming). He is interested in US foreign policy especially with regards newly influential global actors, as well as how American-led power steers the dynamics and future of the developing world, 2013 (“‘Threatening’ China and US security: the international politics of identity” British International Studies Association, p.912, accessed 6/24/16, AEC)

As already noted, the United States has always been especially dependent upon representational practices to affirm and reaffirm its identity and in the mid-to-late nineteenth-century China and the Chinese were constructed as a danger to its survival. As such, the frequently cited ‘China Question’ was in fact the ‘America Question’. A policy of restricting or even preventing Chinese immigration was not a foregone conclusion. However, powerful and pervasive representations of a China threat eventually ensured that any alternatives to exclusion were presented as no alternatives at all. Indeed, by the late 1870s political opposition to the anti-Chinese movement was almost non-existent.44 During the presidential campaigns of 1876 and 1880 both main parties ran with anti-Chinese rhetoric so that the range of debate did not extend far.45 In an 1879 referendum 150,000 Californians voted in favour of a total exclusion of Chinese immigrants from the state. Nine hundred voted against.46 In 1880 James Angell wrote to Secretary of State William Evarts: ‘the absolute and formal prohibition of the [Chinese] labourers would be diametrically opposed to all our national traditions’.47 In the Senate George Hoar asserted that a ban would represent a crime against the Declaration of Independence. ‘The flag bears the stars of hope to all nations’, he argued. ‘A hundred thousand Chinese land in California and everything is changed ... The self-evident truth becomes the self- evident lie.’ 48 However, the China ‘threat’ was now a dominant construction within American imaginations. In 1880 the New York Times echoed the sentiments of many when it argued that, Eventually, an emerging crisis of American identity enabled US China policy to act in its protection.This crisis was not caused by China or the Chinese. It was generated by circulating American representations of a (often exaggerated) danger which provoked heightened fears over the vulnerability of the United States’ Cauca- sian foundations. It helped, in turn, to perpetuate the construction of a threatening China so that the advancement of ‘threat’ discourses and the development of the crisis were a mutually constitutive and reinforcing process. As with the China ‘threat’ therefore the crisis was manufactured and, for those complicit within its production, it served the same important purpose: to affirm China’s difference and enable desired courses of foreign policy. Robert McClellan argues that the truth about the Chinese was clouded by hyperbolic claims of their undesirability.51 In fact, truths about the Chinese were a very heavy presence across American society. Their production and establishment ensured that the Chinese Exclusion Act could be voted into law on 23 March 1882.52

#### Serial policy failure: Creating securitized policy results in an endless cycle of threat construction and action based on securitized representations

Turner 14 — Oliver Turner, Research Associate at the Brooks World Poverty Institute at the University of Manchester, 2014 (“American Images of China: Identity, Power, Policy” Rutledge, Available online via Google Books, Accessed 6-22-2016, SAA)

US China policy has always been active in the production and reproduction of imagery and in the reaffirmation of the identities of both China and the United States. Chapter I shows that the key literatures have often neglected to show how US China policy itself is active within the dissemination of imagery. As already established, material forces are always attributed particular meanings and so acts of US China policy inevitably work to reproduce those meanings. Ultimately, they reaffirm the identities of both China and the United States. This was evident during the Cold War, for example, when Washington‘s containment policy continually reinforced understandings of Uncivilized (and Threatening) China in relation to the more civilized United States. The texts of Washington's containment strategy functioned within the production of imagery and in the reconfirmation of China’s foreignness, as the PRC was marginalized beyond the limits of the ‘free‘ and ‘civilized’ world. The argument, then, is that US China policies reproduce the discourses which make China foreign and which operate to enable them in the first place.13 The cycle of separation and difference is perpetuated and American images of China and US China policy are exposed not merely as inextricable, but also as mutually reinforcing The Cold War containment of the PRC is an example of an episode which exposes a second, but interrelated, function of US China policy: the protection of American identity when threatened by that of China. This book shows that at moments when the identity of the United States has appeared most in danger. American foreign policy has worked to shield its most intrinsic values.” China’s Cold War containment was designed primarily in response to the expansion of communism into Asia. However - and to reiterate - communism alone does not represent a physical threat. To a significant extent it was the representation of communist China as an immediate danger which meant that the identity of the United States itself had to be defended. Ultimately, US Cold War policies reproduced imagery of China as a ‘Red‘ communist threat in order to secure the core values of the United States.

China Threat discourse constructs a political myth triggering a strong performance of securitization Song 15- Weiqing, associate professor of political science at the University of Macau, received his Ph.D. in political science from the University of Siena, Italy. His research interests include European politics, Chinese foreign policy, and China's post-socialist regime. His research has appeared in a number of international peer-reviewed journals- *The China Review, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Spring 2015), 145-169 Securitization of the "China Threat " Discourse: A Poststructuralist Account* TMY 6/22/16 an agent securitizes the China threat by talking to the general public, trying to reach out to as many people as possible. This determines the nature of the "myth as reality" discourses that usually exist in popular genres and the mass media. The following is a typical "myth as reality" text: I'm travelling from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean to meet the pioneers of this extraordinary migration. I'll be finding out from Africans what they think about the influx of Chinese. And I'll be hearing some tall tales. You're telling me the Chinese are selling inflatable chickens? I'll be investigating allegations of human right abuses in one of the world's most dangerous countries. And asking just how the rise of China is changing Africa. What will it mean for the rest of the world. ... I'll visit the world's biggest mine, shipping millions of tons of iron ore to China, and see how China's incredible hunger for resources threatens the world's largest rainforest. And I'll be travelling across the Americas to see how China's expansion is devastating America's industrial heartlands. So how is the relentless rise of China upsetting the balance of world power? And what it will mean for us all? A consummate storyteller, the BBC news reporter and presenter Justin Rowlatt asks a number of questions at the beginning of his narra tion of the BBC's widely watched 2011 documentary The Chinese Are Coming. During the documentary, Rowlatt travels across three continents (Africa, South America, and North America) to investigate the world wide expansion of China's influence. The rise of China is shown to have serious consequences, due to the expansion of its economic power, its inexhaustible search for resources, and the exponential growth of its outward migration. The documentary implies that China's precipitate development is posing an unprecedented challenge to both mankind and the planet at large. However, many of the developed states in the West showed a similar scale of expansion at earlier stages in their develop ment, through more direct colonial rule. Why is China, then, perceived to pose such a huge threat to much of the world? This question highlights another kind of speech act involved in identity building. It is interesting for analysts to consider the identity or identities that a particular piece of language is being used to enact (i.e., to persuade an audience to recognize an identity or identities as opera tive). What identity or identities does a particular use of language attri buted to others, and how does this help the speaker or writer to enact his or her own identity?68 It matters little whether the content communicated is factual. The real purpose is to convince an audience of its urgency and consequently persuade them to take action. The mode of securitization here is based on political myth. One cannot falsify political myths because they are not a matter of "scientific hypothesis" but rather the "expression of a determination to act."69 This mode uses rhetoric, visual spectacle and other kinds of art, rituals, and social practices, among other forms of communication. It relies to a large extent on ascriptive factors such as ethnicity, race, culture, and civilization. In contrast to the scientific and analogical modes, the mythical mode of securitization pursues a logic that is psychologically intuitive rather than logically deductive or inductive. In extreme cases, it can be bluntly discriminatory. In the mode of political myth, the China threat issue is structurally incorporated by a group of securitizers into the "basic discourses" of culture and civilization. The issue does not appear to be a question of security because it is assigned to a broader context wherein a country as different as China is expanding its reach throughout the world. However, the real purpose of the mythical mode of securitization is again to construct the China threat as such, and ultimately to call for action against it. Securitizers working in this mode thus promulgate political myths about the issue. A myth is rendered specifically "political" not by its content but by the relationship between a given narrative and the political conditions of a given group.70 China’s increasing capabilities are a central focus of modern day US security concerns. The International Relations literature is a key forum for analyses of the so-called ‘China threat’ and yet it remains relatively quiet on the role of ideas in the construction and perpetuation of the dangers that country is understood to present. This article reveals that throughout history ‘threats’ from China towards the United States, rather than objectively verifiable phenomena, have always been social constructions of American design and thus more than calculations of material forces. Specifically, it argues that powerful and pervasive American representations of China have been repeatedly and purposefully responsible for creating a threatening identity. It also demonstrates that these representations have enabled and justified US China policies which themselves have reaffirmed the identities of both China and the United States, protecting the latter when seemingly threatened by the former. Three case studies from across the full duration of Sino-American relations expose the centrality of ideas to historical and contemporary understandings of China ‘threats’, and to the American foreign policies formulated in response.

### Turns Case – Relations

#### The critique turns the case — "China Threat” language is a social construction used to defend aggressive US foreign policy.

Turner 13 — Oliver Turner, Research Associate at the Brooks World Poverty Institute at the University of Manchester. He is the author of American Images of China: Identity, Power, Policy (Routledge, forthcoming). He is interested in US foreign policy especially with regards newly influential global actors, as well as how American-led power steers the dynamics and future of the developing world, 2013 (“‘Threatening’ China and US security: the international politics of identity” British International Studies Association, p. 902, accessed 6/24/16, AEC)

Abstract. China’s increasing capabilities are a central focus of modern day US security concerns. The International Relations literature is a key forum for analyses of the so-called ‘China threat’ and yet it remains relatively quiet on the role of ideas in the construction and perpetuation of the dangers that country is understood to present. This article reveals that throughout history ‘threats’ from China towards the United States, rather than objectively verifiable phenomena, have always been social constructions of American design and thus more than calculations of material forces. Specifically, it argues that powerful and pervasive American representations of China have been repeatedly and purposefully responsible for creating a threatening identity. It also demonstrates that these representations have enabled and justified US China policies which themselves have reaffirmed the identities of both China and the United States, protect- ing the latter when seemingly threatened by the former. Three case studies from across the full duration of Sino-American relations expose the centrality of ideas to historical and contem- porary understandings of China ‘threats’, and to the American foreign policies formulated in response.

#### The affirmative’s understanding of the “China Threat” is a self self-fulfilling prophecy that turns the case and makes their impacts inevitable.

Turner 13 — Oliver Turner, Research Associate at the Brooks World Poverty Institute at the University of Manchester. He is the author of American Images of China: Identity, Power, Policy (Routledge, forthcoming). He is interested in US foreign policy especially with regards newly influential global actors, as well as how American-led power steers the dynamics and future of the developing world, 2013 (“‘Threatening’ China and US security: the international politics of identity” British International Studies Association, p.924, accessed 6/24/16, AEC)

Most importantly, this article has shown how processes of representation have been complicit at every stage of the formulation, enactment, and justification of US China policy. Their primary purpose has been to dislocate China’s identity from that of the United States and introduce opportunities for action. Further, those policies themselves have reaffirmed the discourses of separation and difference which make China foreign from the United States, protecting American identity from the imagined threat. Ultimately, this analysis has sought to expose the inadequacy of approaches to the study of US China policy which privilege and centralise material forces to the extent that ideas are subordinated or even excluded.Joseph Nye argues that the China Threat Theory has the potential to become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Based upon a crude hypothetical assumption that there exists a 50 per cent chance of China becoming aggressive and a 50 per cent chance of it not, Nye explains, to treat China as an enemy now effectively discounts 50 per cent of the future.123 In such way he emphasises the ideational constitution of material force and the power of discourse to create selected truths about the world so that certain courses of action are enabled while others are precluded. Assessments such as those of Director of National Intelligence James Clapper in March 2011 should therefore not only be considered misguided, but also potentially dangerous. For while they appear to represent authoritative statements of fact they actually rely upon subjective assumptions about China and the material capabilities he describes.

#### Security rhetoric uniquely powerful now — it justifies Washington pushing hardline policies that generate more Chinese aggression.

Swaine 15 — Michael Swaine, PhD, AM, Harvard University, BA, George Washington University, Senior Associate Asia Program @ the Carnegie Endowment, 2015

(“Beyond American Predominance in the Western Pacific: The Need for a Stable U.S.-China Balance of Power”, Carnegie Endowment, April 20th, <http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/04/20/beyond-american-predominance-in-western-pacific-need-for-stable-u.s.-china-balance-of-power/i7gi>, accessed June 24th, CE)

Aside from such obvious self-interest, however, policy communities in both nations genuinely believe that their preferred international distribution of power best reflects the current and future reality of the international system: For most Americans, despite the forces of globalization, which are creating ever more dispersed and interdependent levels of economic, political, social, and military power among nations, peace and stability only results from the unique ability of a single, relatively benign superpower to shape, lead, and deter major threats to global peace and prosperity. For the Chinese, all major industrialized powers seek to control the international order in ways that can and at times do weaken or threaten lesser (and especially developing) powers and to varying degrees diminish the overall stability and prosperity of the system. However, in light of the steady diffusion of power occurring across the international system, many Chinese also believe that even the most powerful states will need to overcome their drive for dominance and cooperate in unprecedented ways. Despite such stark differences, these views coexisted more or less peacefully for many decades after World War II, primarily because Beijing had neither the capacity nor the desire to alter the U.S.-dominated order, both globally and in maritime Asia. From the 1950s through the late 1970s, China was wracked by economically and socially destructive Maoist ideological campaigns and internecine political struggles, and it was threatened by the Soviet Union, its huge, better-armed continental neighbor to the north. Such problems not only distracted China’s leaders for decades but also eventually compelled them to embark on an unprecedented overture to the West, both to counter the Soviet Union and to facilitate the kind of market-driven economic development strategy that was needed to reestablish China as a major regional and possibly global power. In fact, under such conditions, many Chinese viewed American predominance in maritime Asia and the U.S.-led alliance system that sustained it as on balance beneficial to China. It kept the Soviets largely out of the region, kept Japan nonmilitarized and oriented toward peace, and allowed Beijing’s Asian neighbors to concentrate on outward-oriented, beneficial economic growth instead of disruptive arms races or historical rivalries. Washington was only too happy to oblige Beijing in sustaining such an order. All this is now changing, at least in Asia. China’s overseas trade- and investment-driven economic success, the collapse of the Soviet Union and other Communist regimes, and the fear—intensified by the massive Tiananmen demonstrations and bloody crackdown of 1989 as well as the more recent color revolutions—that the Chinese regime could be the next to fall, have vastly increased China’s dependence on and influence over external economic, political, and social forces across Asia and beyond, while deepening its sense of vulnerability and suspicion toward the United States. Prior to the reform era, China’s wealth and power derived largely from domestic sources, many located far from its coastline, and its security relied, by necessity, on a largely peasant-based but massive army and only rudimentary air and naval forces. These factors, along with its acquisition of a small nuclear weapons arsenal in the 1960s, made it possible for Beijing to rely on a security strategy of nuclear deterrence through a modest second-strike capability and attrition through a protracted conventional defense centered on “luring the enemy in deep.”1 This strategy can no longer provide adequate security for China. Beijing must now defend against threats before they can reach the Chinese homeland and vital coastal economic centers. For the first time in its history, Beijing now has both the ability and the motivation to seek to diminish significantly if not eliminate the potential threat to its domestic and growing regional economic interests posed by America’s long-standing predominance in the Western Pacific. Indeed, its ongoing acquisition of military capabilities designed in large part to counter or complicate U.S. and allied air, naval, missile, space, and cyber operations along its maritime periphery, as well as its increasing economic and political-diplomatic initiatives across the Asian littoral and its call for a new, post–Cold War cooperative security architecture for the Asia-Pacific, partly serve such ends. Moreover, the desire to reduce America’s past maritime superiority and economic power has become more achievable and hence more compelling to many Chinese as a result not only of China’s continued economic success but also of the troubles now plaguing America and the West, from anemic economic growth and domestic political dysfunction to image concerns resulting from arguably unjust Middle East wars and apparent egregious human rights abuses. This should not be surprising to anyone who understands modern Chinese history and great power transitions. Beijing has an ongoing and likely long-term and deep incentive to work with the United States and the West to sustain continued, mutually beneficial economic growth and to address a growing array of common global and regional concerns, from pandemics to climate change and terrorism. At the same time, it understandably wishes to reduce its vulnerability to potential future threats from the United States and other politically and militarily strong nations, while increasing its overall influence along its strategically important maritime periphery. As Beijing’s overseas power and influence grow, its foreign interests expand, and its domestic nationalist backers become more assertive, it will naturally become less willing to accept or acquiesce in international political and economic relationships, norms, and power structures that it believes disproportionately and unjustly favor Western powers; put China at a strategic, political, or economic disadvantage; or generally fail to reflect movement toward a more multipolar global and regional power structure. It will also likely become more fearful that a declining (in relative terms) Washington will regard an increasingly influential China as a threat to be countered through ever more forceful or deliberate measures. Indeed, this view is already widespread among many Chinese observers. One does not need to cast Beijing as an evil or predatory entity to understand the forces driving such beliefs. They stem from national self-interest, historical insecurity (and nationalist pride), suspicion, fear, and uncertainty. To some degree, they also stem from a level of opportunism, driven in part by fear, but also in part by the understandable desire to take advantage of China’s growing regional and global influence and America’s apparent relative decline in order to strengthen Chinese leverage in possible future disputes. At the same time, heightened Chinese nationalism, arising from a combination of impressive economic success and a much greater public awareness, through social media and other means, of China’s external policies and influence, has greatly accentuated a self-righteous assertiveness in Chinese foreign and defense policy. Many Chinese observers now believe that Beijing’s past weakness and its need to cooperate with the United States and the West in general had made it too accommodating or passive in dealing with many perceived challenges to China’s vital national interests, from U.S. support for Taiwan and Asian disputants over maritime claims, to close-in U.S. surveillance and intelligence-gathering activities along the Chinese coast. For these analysts, China’s growing capabilities and influence, along with its expanding interests, make it both possible and necessary for Beijing to defend such interests in a more deliberate and in some cases a more forceful manner. Moreover, the intensity of emotion and resolve that usually accompanies such views is often associated with deep resentment of the allegedly sanctimonious arrogance of a hegemonic America. The more extreme variants of this ultranationalist viewpoint threaten to transform China’s long-standing peaceful development policy, keyed to the maintenance of amicable relations with the United States and other powers, into a much more hard-edged approach that is deliberately and perhaps openly calibrated to undermine U.S. influence in Asia. In fact, there have been indications of some possible first steps in this direction, reflected in the so-called bottom-line concept of Xi Jinping’s foreign policy, which stresses the need for China to stand resolute in managing territorial and sovereignty issues, such as the disputes with Japan over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea and with Vietnam, the Philippines, and others over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. Despite a continued stress on the search for “win-win” outcomes with all powers, such trends could eventually weaken existing Chinese support for a cooperative and peace-oriented foreign policy and for movement toward a genuine balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region, favoring instead a more Sino-centric Asian order. On the U.S. side, for an arguably growing number of American and some foreign observers, Beijing’s de facto challenge to American predominance in the Western Pacific is a mere prelude to a larger effort to eject the United States from Asia and eventually replace it as the regional (and for some, global) superpower.

#### The US security strategy perceives insecurities as ontological facts; this justifies drastic measures

Lim 11 —Kean Fan Lim, Assistant Professor in Economic Geography and Faculty of Social Sciences at University of Nottingham, 2011 (‘What You See Is (Not) What You Get? The Taiwan Question, Geo-Economic Realities, and the “China Threat” Imaginary’, Wiley Online Library, September 29, available online at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-8330.2011.00943.x/full, Accessed 06/22/16, JZ)

Gates’ geographical imagination of China in this speech is predicated on two inter-related assumptions that exemplify a political realist “way of seeing”. First, China is not recognized as an “ally” of the US, although it is clear that the US is the key driver of such politics of recognition in the first place. Furthermore, it appears that US military “protection” is a precondition to qualify as an “ally”, a logic which automatically casts states without such “protection” as suspect. Second, China's military-modernization process is ostensibly a “threat” because such efforts could, in Gates’ terms, “disrupt” the “strategic options” of the US in East Asia, even when it is entirely plausible that increased defense spending is to fulfil other valid purposes, such as replacing obsolete military equipment to address new threats by terrorists and maritime pirates, and enhancing remuneration packages for soldiers. Third, America wants to “project power” on its own terms, which is why it becomes “concerned” when so-called non-allies upgrade their defence technologies. This point is further reaffirmed in the Pentagon's 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review: “lack of transparency and the nature of China's military development and decision-making processes raise legitimate questions about its future conduct and intentions within Asia and beyond” (Pentagon 2010:60). However, the extent to which the questions are “legitimate” is clearly a unilateral legal-discursive construction of the US that reflects the enduring effect of political realism in US security thought. These assumptions collectively constitute what Bialasiewicz et al (2007; see also Lott 2004) call America's “performative” security strategy, through which perceived insecurities are constructed as ontological facts so that “mitigation” measures could be justified

**US China threat representations sever ties between the two countries — turns the case.**

**Turner 13** — Oliver Turner, Hallsworth Research Fellow, 2013 (“‘Threatening’ China and US security: the international politics of identity”, Review of international studies, 08 February, http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=1&fid=9021309&jid=RIS&volumeId=39&issueId=04&aid=9021307&bodyId=&membershipNumber=&societyETOCSession=, accessed 22nd June, CE)

The analysis which follows demonstrates that **China ‘threats’ to the United States have to some extent always been established and perpetuated through representation and discourse.** Michel Foucault described discourse as ‘the general domain of all statements’, constituting either a group of individual statements or a regulated practice which accounts for a number of statements.18 **American discourse of China can therefore be manifest as disparate and single statements about that country or as collectives of related statements such as the China Threat Theory.** Ultimately, American representations of China are discursive constructions of truths or realities about its existence. The article draws in part from the work of David Campbell who suggests that **dangers in the international realm are invariably threats to understandings about the self.** ‘**The mere existence of an alternative** mode of being’, argues Campbell, ‘the presence of which exemplifies that different identities are possible ... **is sometimes enough to produce the understanding of a threat**.’19 **As a result, interpretations of global danger can be traced to the processes by which states are made foreign from one another through discourses of separation and difference.**20 In this analysis it is demonstrated that particular **American discourses have historically made the US foreign from China.** Case study one for example demonstrates that nineteenth- century **racial discourses of non-white immigrant Chinese separated China from a United States largely defined by its presumed Caucasian foundations. In case study two we see that Cold War ideological discourses of communism distanced the PRC from the democratic-capitalist US. These types of discourses are shown to have constituted a ‘specific sort of boundary producing political performance’.21**

**US China threat construction formulates an aggressive Chinese identity.**

**Turner 13** — Oliver Turner, Hallsworth Research Fellow, 2013 (“‘Threatening’ China and US security: the international politics of identity”, Review of international studies, 08 February, http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=1&fid=9021309&jid=RIS&volumeId=39&issueId=04&aid=9021307&bodyId=&membershipNumber=&societyETOCSession=, accessed 22nd June, CE)

**China's increasing capabilities are a central focus of modern day US security concerns.** **The International Relations literature is a key forum for analyses of the so-called ‘China threat’** and yet it remains relatively quiet on the role of ideas in the construction and perpetuation of the dangers that country is understood to present. This article reveals that **throughout history ‘threats’ from China towards the United States, rather than objectively verifiable phenomena, have always been social constructions of American design and thus more than calculations of material forces.** Specifically, it arguesthat **powerful and pervasive American representations of China have been repeatedly and purposefully responsible for creating a threatening identity.** It also demonstrates that these representations have enabled and justified US China policies which themselves have reaffirmed the identities of both China and the United States, protecting the latter when seemingly threatened by the former.

**US threat representations of China generates policies that drive a wedge between the two countries – kill relations and turns case.**

**Turner 13** — Oliver Turner, Hallsworth Research Fellow, 2013 (“‘Threatening’ China and US security: the international politics of identity”, Review of international studies, 08 February, http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=1&fid=9021309&jid=RIS&volumeId=39&issueId=04&aid=9021307&bodyId=&membershipNumber=&societyETOCSession=, accessed 22nd June, CE)

Most importantly**, this article has shown how processes of representation have been complicit at every stage of the formulation, enactment, and justification of US China policy**. **Their primary purpose has been to dislocate China’s identity from that of the United States and introduce opportunities for action.** Further, **those policies themselves have reaffirmed the discourses of separation and difference which make China foreign from the United States, protecting American identity from the imagined threat.** Ultimately, this analysis has sought to expose the inadequacy of approaches to the study of US China policy which privilege and centralise material forces to the extent that ideas are subordinated or even excluded.

### Turns Case – War

**US China threat representations inevitably cause military confrontation**

**Turner 13** — Oliver Turner, Hallsworth Research Fellow, 2013 (“‘Threatening’ China and US security: the international politics of identity”, Review of international studies, 08 February, http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=1&fid=9021309&jid=RIS&volumeId=39&issueId=04&aid=9021307&bodyId=&membershipNumber=&societyETOCSession=, accessed 22nd June, CE)

The standard Chinese articles first analyse the offending discourse in terms of military, economic and cultural threats, and then refute these China threat fallacies with counter-arguments.24 Rather than a bellicose great power, **China is a developing country with a long history as a peace-loving nation.** Rather than using Western international relations theory to understand China's rise in terms of the violent rise and fall of great powers in Europe, we are told that China's success needs to be understood in the context of the peace and stability of the East Asian world order. **Hence, the Chinese articles state that 'China threat theory' is the fabrication of Westerners who are clinging to 'Cold War thinking' in a post-Cold War world. They tell us that Americans need to recognise the error of their 'enemy deprivation syndrome' that created a China threat to replace the Soviet threat. Those who see China as a potential threat thus are making both empirical and theoretical errors,** according to Chinese responses.25 **Chinese texts thus conclude that the problem is not China's rise, but how China threat discourse puts obstacles in its way: texts that tarnish China's image risk alienating both China's neighbouring countries and foreign investors.** Hence **correcting the fallacy of China threat theory is part of the greater project of how to understand China correctly**. The solution to the problem of China threat is to understand China differently: in 1999 Chinese premier Zhu Rongji told Americans that they need to think of China as an opportunity.26 Critical discussions of 'China threat theory' argue that China's vociferous rebuttalis a predictable and understandable outgrowth of the Chinese people's frustration with the West's demonisation of China. This rhetorical warfare is important to international relations because in the information age, the security dilemma refers not just to issues of hard security, but to image wars and soft power. **The mutual perception of hostility between China and the US thus could spin out of control in ways analogous to an arms race. Ultimately this mutual estrangement is a serious security issue. It risks producing policy shifts that would facilitate the move from symbolic conflict to actual military conflict - especially over Taiwan.** According to Johnston and Deng, the way out of this rhetorical security dilemma is realise that 'words can hurt'.

**A2: Case Proves Our Impacts True**

#### It’s evil even if it’s true — securitization has led to the worst examples of state-sponsored violence and oppression. That’s Neocleous and Rigakos.

#### It’s also not true — the US produces fears of China to guarantee access to markets and justify aggressive foreign policy. That’s Turner.

**A2: Fear Reps Inspire Action**

#### Security rhetoric fails — people are numbed rather than roused to action.

Sandman and Valenti 86 — Peter M. Sandman, risk communication consultant, JoAnn M. Valenti, Emerita Professor of environment and science journalism and PhD in Natural Resources, 1986 (“Scared stiff – or scared into action,” Peter M. Sandman website, January, Available Online at http://www.psandman.com/articles/scarstif.htm, accessed 06/24/16, JZ)

For ethical as well as methodological reasons, there are virtually no studies of the effects of fear appeals on highly fearful audiences, much less on audiences who have been catapulted beyond fear into numbness. The closest researchers have come is a series of studies showing that while strong fear appeals work best on mellow audiences, milder appeals work just as well, and sometimes better, when the audience is high in overall anxiety.(10) Only a few studies have tried to generate really substantial fear (none, quite properly, has aimed at terror), and their success has been modest. The Boster and Mongeau meta-analysis found only a 0.36 correlation between fear in the message and fear in the audience.(11) It is not so easy to scare people. Dwelling graphically on the horrors and statistics of home fires – scaring the audience as much as possible, which will not be all that much – may persuade people to buy smoke alarms for their homes. But for a person in a burning house, graphic images are beside the point. And if that person denies the fire is raging, further references to the danger can only deepen the numbing. Numerous testimonials indicate that the shock therapy of a fear appeal may sometimes cut through paralysis. But such testimonials are usually from activists who were neither paralyzed nor numb in the first place, whose fear was maintained at reasonable levels by their own activism, and who derived new energy and reinforcement from what people in the adjacent seats may well have found intolerable. Our wager is that the fear speeches revitalize the committed into renewed action, startle the apathetic into fresh attention, and torment the terrorized and the numb into starker terror and deeper numbness.

**A2: Security Good**

#### Security is based on a desire to control and manage – its ontological precepts attempt to render everything knowable and hence predictable – means that random variation in IR ensures aggression and enemy creation – the impact is mass war and violence – vote neg to reprogram our ontological presuppositions

Burke 7 — Associate Professor of Politics and International Relations in the University of New South Wales (Anthony, Theory & Event, Volume 10, Issue 2, 2007, “Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason,” Project MUSE)

This essay develops a theory about the causes of war -- and thus aims to generate lines of action and critique for peace -- that cuts beneath analyses based either on a given sequence of events, threats, insecurities and political manipulation, or the play of institutional, economic or political interests (the 'military-industrial complex'). Such factors are important to be sure, and should not be discounted, but they flow over a deeper bedrock of modern reason that has not only come to form a powerful structure of common sense but the apparently solid ground of the real itself. In this light, the two 'existential' and 'rationalist' discourses of war-making and justification mobilised in the Lebanon war are more than merely arguments, rhetorics or even discourses. Certainly they mobilise forms of knowledge and power together; providing political leaderships, media, citizens, bureaucracies and military forces with organising systems of belief, action, analysis and rationale. But they run deeper than that. They are truth-systems of the most powerful and fundamental kind that we have in modernity: ontologies, statements about truth and being which claim a **rarefied privilege** to state what is and how it must be maintained as it is. I am thinking of ontology in both its senses: ontology as both a statement about the nature and ideality of being (in this case political being, that of the nation-state), and as a statement of epistemological truth and certainty, of methods and processes of arriving at certainty (in this case, the development and application of strategic knowledge for the use of armed force, and the creation and maintenance of geopolitical order, security and national survival). These derive from the classical idea of ontology as a speculative or positivistic inquiry into the fundamental nature of truth, of being, or of some phenomenon; the desire for a solid metaphysical account of things inaugurated by Aristotle, an account of 'being qua being and its essential attributes'.17 In contrast, drawing on Foucauldian theorising about truth and power, I see ontology as a particularly powerful claim to truth itself: a claim to the status of an underlying systemic foundation for truth, identity, existence and action; one that is not essential or timeless, but is thoroughly historical and contingent, that is deployed and mobilised in a fraught and conflictual socio-political context of some kind. In short, ontology is the 'politics of truth'18 in its most sweeping and powerful form. I see such a drive for ontological certainty and completion as particularly problematic for a number of reasons. Firstly, when it takes the form of the existential and rationalist ontologies of war, it amounts to a hard and exclusivist claim: a drive for ideational hegemony and closure that limits debate and questioning, that confines it within the boundaries of a particular, closed system of logic, one that is **grounded in the truth of being**, in the truth of truth as such. The second is its intimate relation with violence: the dual ontologies represent a simultaneously social and conceptual structure that generates violence. Here we are witness to an epistemology of violence (strategy) joined to an ontology of violence (the national security state). When we consider their relation to war, the two ontologies are especially dangerous because each alone (and doubly in combination) tends both to quicken the resort to war and to lead to its escalation either in scale and duration, or in unintended effects. In such a context violence is not so much a tool that can be picked up and used on occasion, at limited cost and with limited impact -- **it permeates being.** This essay describes firstly the ontology of the national security state (by way of the political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes, Carl Schmitt and G. W. F. Hegel) and secondly the rationalist ontology of strategy (by way of the geopolitical thought of Henry Kissinger), showing how they crystallise into a mutually reinforcing system of support and justification, especially in the thought of Clausewitz. This creates both a profound ethical and pragmatic problem. The ethical problem arises because of their militaristic force -- they embody and reinforce a norm of war -- and because they enact what Martin Heidegger calls an 'enframing' image of technology and being in which humans are merely utilitarian instruments for use, control and destruction, and force -- in the words of one famous Cold War strategist -- can be thought of as a 'power to hurt'.19 The pragmatic problem arises because force so often produces neither the linear system of effects imagined in strategic theory nor anything we could meaningfully call security, but rather turns in upon itself in a nihilistic spiral of pain and destruction. In the era of a 'war on terror' dominantly conceived in Schmittian and Clausewitzian terms,20 the arguments of Hannah Arendt (that violence collapses ends into means) and Emmanuel Levinas (that 'every war employs arms that turn against those that wield them') take on added significance. Neither, however, explored what occurs when war and being are made to coincide, other than Levinas' intriguing comment that in war persons 'play roles in which they no longer recognises themselves, making them betray not only commitments but their own substance'. 21 What I am trying to describe in this essay is a complex relation between, and interweaving of, epistemology and ontology. But it is not my view that these are distinct modes of knowledge or levels of truth, because in the social field named by security, statecraft and violence they are made to blur together, continually referring back on each other, like charges darting between electrodes. Rather they are related systems of knowledge with particular systemic roles and intensities of claim about truth, political being and political necessity. Positivistic or scientific claims to epistemological truth supply an air of predictability and reliability to policy and political action, which in turn support larger ontological claims to national being and purpose, drawing them into a common horizon of certainty that is one of the central features of past-Cartesian modernity. Here it may be useful to see ontology as a more totalising and metaphysical set of claims about truth, and epistemology as more pragmatic and instrumental; but while a distinction between epistemology (knowledge as technique) and ontology (knowledge as being) has analytical value, it tends to break down in action. The epistemology of violence I describe here (strategic science and foreign policy doctrine) claims positivistic clarity about techniques of military and geopolitical action which use force and coercion to achieve a desired end, an end that is supplied by the ontological claim to national existence, security, or order. However in practice, technique quickly passes into ontology. This it does in two ways. First, instrumental violence is married to **an ontology of insecure national existence** which itself **admits no questioning**. The nation and its identity are known and essential, prior to any conflict, and the resort to violence becomes an equally essential predicate of its perpetuation. In this way knowledge-as-strategy claims, in a positivistic fashion, to achieve a calculability of effects (power) for an ultimate purpose (securing being) that it must always assume. Second, strategy as a technique not merely becomes an instrument of state power but ontologises itself in a technological image of 'man' as a maker and user of things, including other humans, which have no essence or integrity outside their value as objects. In Heidegger's terms, technology becomes being; epistemology immediately becomes technique, immediately being. This combination could be seen in the aftermath of the 2006 Lebanon war, whose obvious strategic failure for Israelis generated fierce attacks on the army and political leadership and forced the resignation of the IDF chief of staff. Yet in its wake neither ontology was rethought. Consider how a reserve soldier, while on brigade-sized manoeuvres in the Golan Heights in early 2007, was quoted as saying: 'we are ready for the next war'. Uri Avnery quoted Israeli commentators explaining the rationale for such a war as being to 'eradicate the shame and restore to the army the "deterrent power" that was lost on the battlefields of that unfortunate war'. In 'Israeli public discourse', he remarked, 'the next war is seen as a natural phenomenon, like tomorrow's sunrise.' 22 The danger obviously raised here is that these dual ontologies of war link being, means, events and decisions into a single, unbroken chain whose very process of construction cannot be examined. As is clear in the work of Carl Schmitt, being implies action, the action that is war. This chain is also obviously at work in the U.S. neoconservative doctrine that argues, as Bush did in his 2002 West Point speech, that 'the only path to safety is the path of action', which begs the question of whether strategic practice and theory can be detached from strong ontologies of the insecure nation-state.23 This is the direction taken by much realist analysis critical of Israel and the Bush administration's 'war on terror'.24 Reframing such concerns in Foucauldian terms, we could argue that obsessive ontological commitments have led to especially disturbing 'problematizations' of truth.25 However such rationalist critiques rely on a one-sided interpretation of Clausewitz that seeks to disentangle strategic from existential reason, and to open up choice in that way. However without interrogating more deeply how they form a conceptual harmony in Clausewitz's thought -- and thus in our dominant understandings of politics and war -- tragically violent 'choices' will continue to be made. The essay concludes by pondering a normative problem that arises out of its analysis: if the divisive ontology of the national security state and the violent and instrumental vision of 'enframing' have, as Heidegger suggests, come to define being and drive 'out every other possibility of revealing being', how can they be escaped?26 How can other choices and alternatives be found and enacted? How is there any scope for agency and resistance in the face of them? Their social and discursive power -- one that aims to take up the entire space of the political -- needs to be respected and understood. However, we are far from powerless in the face of them. The need is to critique dominant images of political being and dominant ways of securing that being at the same time, and to act and choose such that we bring into the world a more sustainable, peaceful and non-violent global rule of the political. Friend and Enemy: Violent Ontologies of the Nation-State In his Politics Among Nations Hans Morgenthau stated that 'the national interest of a peace-loving nation can only be defined in terms of national security, which is the irreducible minimum that diplomacy must defend with adequate power and without compromise'. While Morgenthau defined security relatively narrowly -- as the 'integrity of the national territory and its institutions' -- in a context where security was in practice defined expansively, as synonymous with a state's broadest geopolitical and economic 'interests', what was revealing about his formulation was not merely the ontological centrality it had, but the sense of urgency and priority he accorded to it: it must be defended 'without compromise'.27 Morgenthau was a thoughtful and complex thinker, and understood well the complexities and dangers of using armed force. However his formulation reflected an influential view about the significance of the political good termed 'security'. When this is combined with the way in which security was conceived in modern political thought as an existential condition -- a sine qua non of life and sovereign political existence -- and then married to war and instrumental action, it provides a basic underpinning for either the limitless resort to strategic violence without effective constraint, or the perseverance of limited war (with its inherent tendencies to escalation) as a permanent feature of politics. While he was no militarist, Morgenthau did say elsewhere (in, of all places, a far-reaching critique of nuclear strategy) that the 'quantitative and qualitative competition for conventional weapons is a rational instrument of international politics'.28 The conceptual template for such an image of national security state can be found in the work of Thomas Hobbes, with his influential conception of the political community as a tight unity of sovereign and people in which their bodies meld with his own to form a 'Leviathan', and which must be defended from enemies within and without. His image of effective security and sovereignty was one that was intolerant of internal difference and dissent, legitimating a strong state with coercive and exceptional powers to preserve order and sameness. This was a vision not merely of political order but of existential identity, set off against a range of existential others who were sources of threat, backwardness, instability or incongruity.29 It also, in a way set out with frightening clarity by the theorist Carl Schmitt and the philosopher Georg Hegel, exchanged internal unity, identity and harmony for permanent alienation from other such communities (states). Hegel presaged Schmitt's thought with his argument that individuality and the state are single moments of 'mind in its freedom' which 'has an infinitely negative relation to itself, and hence its essential character from its own point of view is its singleness': Individuality is awareness of one's existence as a unit in sharp distinction from others. It manifests itself here in the state as a relation to other states, each of which is autonomous vis-a-vis the others...this negative relation of the state to itself is embodied in the world as the relation of one state to another and as if the negative were something external.30 Schmitt is important both for understanding the way in which such alienation is seen as a definitive way of imagining and limiting political communities, and for understanding how such a rigid delineation is linked to the inevitability and perpetuation of war. Schmitt argued that the existence of a state 'presupposes the political', which must be understood through 'the specific political distinction...between friend and enemy'. The enemy is 'the other, the stranger; and it sufficient for his nature that he is, in a specially intense way, existentially something different and alien, so that in an extreme case conflicts with him are possible'.31 The figure of the enemy is constitutive of the state as 'the specific entity of a people'.32 Without it society is not political and a people cannot be said to exist: Only the actual participants can correctly recognise, understand and judge the concrete situation and settle the extreme case of conflict...to judge whether the adversary intends to negate his opponent's way of life and therefore must be repulsed or fought in order to preserve one's own form of existence.33 Schmitt links this stark ontology to war when he states that the political is only authentic 'when a fighting collectivity of people confronts a similar collectivity. The enemy is solely the public enemy, because everything that has a relationship to such a collectivity of men, particularly to the whole nation, becomes public by virtue of such a relationship...in its entirety the state as an organised political entity decides for itself the friend-enemy distinction'.34 War, in short, is an existential condition: the entire life of a human being is a struggle and every human being is symbolically a combatant. The friend, enemy and combat concepts receive their real meaning precisely because they refer to the real possibility of physical killing. War follows from enmity. War is the existential negation of the enemy.35 Schmitt claims that his theory is not biased towards war as a choice ('It is by no means as though the political signifies nothing but devastating war and every political deed a military action...it neither favours war nor militarism, neither imperialism nor pacifism') but it is hard to accept his caveat at face value.36 When such a theory takes the form of a social discourse (which it does in a general form) such an ontology can only support, as a kind of originary ground, the basic Clausewitzian assumption that war can be a rational way of resolving political conflicts -- because the import of Schmitt's argument is that such 'political' conflicts are ultimately expressed through the possibility of war. As he says: 'to the enemy concept belongs the ever-present possibility of combat'.37 Where Schmitt meets Clausewitz, as I explain further below, the existential and rationalistic ontologies of war join into a closed circle of mutual support and justification. This closed circle of existential and strategic reason generates a number of dangers. Firstly, the emergence of conflict can generate military action almost automatically simply because the world is conceived in terms of the distinction between friend and enemy; because the very existence of the other constitutes an unacceptable threat, rather than a chain of actions, judgements and decisions. (As the Israelis insisted of Hezbollah, they 'deny our right to exist'.) This effaces agency, causality and responsibility from policy and political discourse: our actions can be conceived as independent of the conflict or quarantined from critical enquiry, as necessities that achieve an instrumental purpose but do not contribute to a new and unpredictable causal chain. Similarly the Clausewitzian idea of force -- which, by transporting a Newtonian category from the natural into the social sciences, assumes the very effect it seeks -- further encourages the resort to military violence. We ignore the complex history of a conflict, and thus the alternative paths to its resolution that such historical analysis might provide, by portraying conflict as fundamental and existential in nature; as possibly containable or exploitable, but always irresolvable. Dominant portrayals of the war on terror, and the Israeli-Arab conflict, are arguably examples of such ontologies in action. Secondly, the militaristic force of such an ontology is visible, in Schmitt, in the absolute sense of vulnerability whereby a people can judge whether their 'adversary intends to negate his opponent's way of life'.38 Evoking the kind of thinking that would become controversial in the Bush doctrine, Hegel similarly argues thAT: ...a state may regard its infinity and honour as at stake in each of its concerns, however minute, and it is all the more inclined to susceptibility to injury the more its strong individuality is impelled as a result of long domestic peace to seek and create a sphere of activity abroad. ....the state is in essence mind and therefore cannot be prepared to stop at just taking notice of an injury after it has actually occurred. On the contrary, there arises in addition as a cause of strife the idea of such an injury...39 Identity, even more than physical security or autonomy, is put at stake in such thinking and can be defended and redeemed through warfare (or, when taken to a further extreme of an absolute demonisation and dehumanisation of the other, by mass killing, 'ethnic cleansing' or genocide). However anathema to a classical realist like Morgenthau, for whom prudence was a core political virtue, these have been influential ways of defining national security and defence during the twentieth century and persists into the twenty-first. They infused Cold War strategy in the United States (with the key policy document NSC68 stating that 'the Soviet-led assault on free institutions is worldwide now, and ... a defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere')40 and frames dominant Western responses to the threat posed by Al Qaeda and like groups (as Tony Blair admitted in 2006, 'We could have chosen security as the battleground. But we didn't. We chose values.')41 It has also become influential, in a particularly tragic and destructive way, in Israel, where memories of the Holocaust and (all too common) statements by Muslim and Arab leaders rejecting Israel's existence are mobilised by conservatives to justify military adventurism and a rejectionist policy towards the Palestinians. On the reverse side of such ontologies of national insecurity we find pride and hubris, the belief that martial preparedness and action are vital or healthy for the existence of a people. Clausewitz's thought is thoroughly imbued with this conviction. For example, his definition of war as an act of policy does not refer merely to the policy of cabinets, but expresses the objectives and will of peoples: When whole communities go to war -- whole peoples, and especially civilized peoples -- the reason always lies in some political situation and the occasion is always due to some political object. War, therefore, is an act of policy.42 Such a perspective prefigures Schmitt's definition of the 'political' (an earlier translation reads 'war, therefore, is a political act'), and thus creates an inherent tension between its tendency to fuel the escalation of conflict and Clausewitz's declared aim, in defining war as policy, to prevent war becoming 'a complete, untrammelled, absolute manifestation of violence'.43 Likewise his argument that war is a 'trinity' of people (the source of 'primordial violence, hatred and enmity'), the military (who manage the 'play of chance and probability') and government (which achieve war's 'subordination as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone') merges the existential and rationalistic conceptions of war into a theoretical unity.44 The idea that national identities could be built and redeemed through war derived from the 'romantic counter-revolution' in philosophy which opposed the cosmopolitanism of Kant with an emphasis on the absolute state -- as expressed by Hegel's Philosophy of Right, Bismarkian Realpolitik and politicians like Wilhelm Von Humbolt. Humbolt, a Prussian minister of Education, wrote that war 'is one of the most wholesome manifestations that plays a role in the education of the human race', and urged the formation of a national army 'to inspire the citizen with the spirit of true war'. He stated that war 'alone gives the total structure the strength and the diversity without which facility would be weakness and unity would be void'.45 In the Phenomenology of Mind Hegel made similar arguments that to for individuals to find their essence 'Government has from time to time to shake them to the very centre by war'.46 The historian Azar Gat points to the similarity of Clausewitz's arguments that 'a people and a nation can hope for a strong position in the world only if national character and familiarity with war fortify each other by continual interaction' to Hegel's vision of the ethical good of war in his Philosophy of Right.47 Likewise Michael Shapiro sees Clausewitz and Hegel as alike in seeing war 'as an ontological investment in both individual and national completion...Clausewitz figures war as passionate ontological commitment rather than cool political reason...war is a major aspect of being.'48 Hegel's text argues that war is 'a work of freedom' in which 'the individual's substantive duty' merges with the 'independence and sovereignty of the state'.49 Through war, he argues, the ethical health of peoples is preserved in their indifference to the stabilization of finite institutions; just as the blowing of the winds preserves the sea from the foulness which would be the result of a prolonged calm, so the corruption in nations would be the product of a prolonged, let alone 'perpetual' peace.50 Hegel indeed argues that 'sacrifice on behalf of the individuality of the state is a substantial tie between the state and all its members and so is a universal duty...if the state as such, if its autonomy, is in jeopardy, all its citizens are duty bound to answer the summons to its defence'.51 Furthermore, this is not simply a duty, but a form of self-realisation in which the individual dissolves into the higher unity of the state: The intrinsic worth of courage as a disposition of mind is to be found in the genuine, absolute, final end, the sovereignty of the state. The work of courage is to actualise this end, and the means to this end is the sacrifice of personal actuality. This form of experience thus contains the harshness of extreme contradictions: a self-sacrifice which yet is the real existence of one's freedom; the maximum self-subsistence of individuality, yet only a cog playing its part in the mechanism of an external organisation; absolute obedience, renunciation of personal opinions and reasonings, in fact complete absence of mind, coupled with the most intense and comprehensive presence of mind and decision in the moment of acting; the most hostile and so most personal action against individuals, coupled with an attitude of complete indifference or even liking towards them as individuals.52 A more frank statement of the potentially lethal consequences of patriotism -- and its simultaneously physical and conceptual annihilation of the individual human being -- is rarely to be found, one that is repeated today in countless national discourses and the strategic world-view in general. (In contrast, one of Kant's fundamental objections to war was that it involved using men 'as mere machines or instruments'.53) Yet however bizarre and contradictory Hegel's argument, it constitutes a powerful social ontology: an apparently irrefutable discourse of being. It actualises the convergence of war and the social contract in the form of the national security state. Strategic Reason and Scientific Truth By itself, such an account of the nationalist ontology of war and security provides only a general insight into the perseverance of military violence as a core element of politics. It does not explain why so many policymakers think military violence works. As I argued earlier, such an ontology is married to a more rationalistic form of strategic thought that claims to link violent means to political ends predictably and controllably, and which, by doing so, combines military action and national purposes into a common -- and thoroughly modern -- horizon of certainty. Given Hegel's desire to decisively distil and control the dynamic potentials of modernity in thought, it is helpful to focus on the modernity of this ontology -- one that is modern in its adherence to modern scientific models of truth, reality and technological progress, and in its insistence on imposing images of scientific truth from the physical sciences (such as mathematics and physics) onto human behaviour, politics and society. For example, the military theorist and historian Martin van Creveld has argued that one of the reasons Clausewitz was so influential was that his 'ideas seemed to have chimed in with the rationalistic, scientific, and technological outlook associated with the industrial revolution'.54 Set into this epistemological matrix, modern politics and government engages in a sweeping project of mastery and control in which all of the world's resources -- mineral, animal, physical, human -- are made part of a machinic process of which war and violence are viewed as normal features. These are the deeper claims and implications of Clausewitzian strategic reason. One of the most revealing contemporary examples comes from the writings (and actions) of Henry Kissinger, a Harvard professor and later U.S. National Security Adviser and Secretary of State. He wrote during the Vietnam war that after 1945 U.S. foreign policy was based 'on the assumption that technology plus managerial skills gave us the ability to reshape the international system and to bring about domestic transformations in emerging countries'. This 'scientific revolution' had 'for all practical purposes, removed technical limits from the exercise of power in foreign policy'.55 Kissinger's conviction was based not merely in his pride in the vast military and bureaucratic apparatus of the United States, but in a particular epistemology (theory of knowledge). Kissinger asserted that the West is 'deeply committed to the notion that the real world is external to the observer, that knowledge consists of recording and classifying data -- the more accurately the better'. This, he claimed, has since the Renaissance set the West apart from an 'undeveloped' world that contains 'cultures that have escaped the early impact of Newtonian thinking' and remain wedded to the 'essentially pre-Newtonian view that the real world is almost entirely internal to the observer'.56 At the same time, Kissinger's hubris and hunger for control was beset by a corrosive anxiety: that, in an era of nuclear weapons proliferation and constant military modernisation, of geopolitical stalemate in Vietnam, and the emergence and militancy of new post-colonial states, order and mastery were harder to define and impose. He worried over the way 'military bipolarity' between the superpowers had 'encouraged political multipolarity', which 'does not guarantee stability. Rigidity is diminished, but so is manageability...equilibrium is difficult to achieve among states widely divergent in values, goals, expectations and previous experience' (emphasis added). He mourned that 'the greatest need of the contemporary international system is an agreed concept of order'.57 Here were the driving obsessions of the modern rational statesman based around a hunger for stasis and certainty that would entrench U.S. hegemony: For the two decades after 1945, our international activities were based on the assumption that technology plus managerial skills gave us the ability to reshape the international system and to bring about domestic transformations in "emerging countries". This direct "operational" concept of international order has proved too simple. Political multipolarity makes it impossible to impose an American design. Our deepest challenge will be to evoke the creativity of a pluralistic world, to base order on political multipolarity even though overwhelming military strength will remain with the two superpowers.58 Kissinger's statement revealed that such cravings for order and certainty continually confront chaos, resistance and uncertainty: clay that won't be worked, flesh that will not yield, enemies that refuse to surrender. This is one of the most powerful lessons of the Indochina wars, which were to continue in a phenomenally destructive fashion for six years after Kissinger wrote these words. Yet as his sinister, Orwellian exhortation to 'evoke the creativity of a pluralistic world' demonstrated, Kissinger's hubris was undiminished. This is a vicious, historic irony: a desire to control nature, technology, society and human beings that is continually frustrated, but never abandoned or rethought. By 1968 U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, the rationalist policymaker par excellence, had already decided that U.S. power and technology could not prevail in Vietnam; Nixon and Kissinger's refusal to accept this conclusion, to abandon their Cartesian illusions, was to condemn hundreds of thousands more to die in Indochina and the people of Cambodia to two more decades of horror and misery.59 In 2003 there would be a powerful sense of déja vu as another Republican Administration crowned more than decade of failed and destructive policy on Iraq with a deeply controversial and divisive war to remove Saddam Hussein from power. In this struggle with the lessons of Vietnam, revolutionary resistance, and rapid geopolitical transformation, we are witness to an enduring political and cultural theme: of a craving for order, control and certainty in the face of continual uncertainty. Closely related to this anxiety was the way that Kissinger's thinking -- and that of McNamara and earlier imperialists like the British Governor of Egypt Cromer -- was embedded in instrumental images of technology and the machine: the machine as both a tool of power and an image of social and political order. In his essay 'The Government of Subject Races' Cromer envisaged effective imperial rule -- over numerous societies and billions of human beings -- as best achieved by a central authority working 'to ensure the harmonious working of the different parts of the machine'.60 Kissinger analogously invoked the virtues of 'equilibrium', 'manageability' and 'stability' yet, writing some six decades later, was anxious that technological progress no longer brought untroubled control: the Westernising 'spread of technology and its associated rationality...does not inevitably produce a similar concept of reality'.61 We sense the rational policymaker's frustrated desire: the world is supposed to work like a machine, ordered by a form of power and governmental reason which deploys machines and whose desires and processes are meant to run along ordered, rational lines like a machine. Kissinger's desire was little different from that of Cromer who, wrote Edward Said: ...envisions a seat of power in the West and radiating out from it towards the East a great embracing machine, sustaining the central authority yet commanded by it. What the machine's branches feed into it from the East -- human material, material wealth, knowledge, what have you -- is processed by the machine, then converted into more power...the immediate translation of mere Oriental matter into useful substance.62 This desire for order in the shadow of chaos and uncertainty -- the constant war with an intractable and volatile matter -- has deep roots in modern thought, and was a major impetus to the development of technological reason and its supporting theories of knowledge. As Kissinger's claims about the West's Newtonian desire for the 'accurate' gathering and classification of 'data' suggest, modern strategy, foreign policy and Realpolitik have been thrust deep into the apparently stable soil of natural science, in the hope of finding immovable and unchallengeable roots there. While this process has origins in ancient Judaic and Greek thought, it crystallised in philosophical terms most powerfully during and after the Renaissance. The key figures in this process were Francis Bacon, Galileo, Isaac Newton, and René Descartes, who all combined a hunger for political and ontological certainty, a positivist epistemology and a naïve faith in the goodness of invention. Bacon sought to create certainty and order, and with it a new human power over the world, through a new empirical methodology based on a harmonious combination of experiment, the senses and the understanding. With this method, he argued, we can 'derive hope from a purer alliance of the faculties (the experimental and rational) than has yet been attempted'.63 In a similar move, Descartes sought to conjure certainty from uncertainty through the application of a new method that moved progressively out from a few basic certainties (the existence of God, the certitude of individual consciousness and a divinely granted faculty of judgement) in a search for pure fixed truths. Mathematics formed the ideal image of this method, with its strict logical reasoning, its quantifiable results and its uncanny insights into the hidden structure of the cosmos.64 Earlier, Galileo had argued that scientists should privilege 'objective', quantifiable qualities over 'merely perceptible' ones; that 'only by means of an exclusively quantitative analysis could science attain certain knowledge of the world'.65 Such doctrines of mathematically verifiable truth were to have powerful echoes in the 20th Century, in the ascendancy of systems analysis, game theory, cybernetics and computing in defense policy and strategic decisions, and in the awesome scientific breakthroughs of nuclear physics, which unlocked the innermost secrets of matter and energy and applied the most advanced applications of mathematics and computing to create the atomic bomb. Yet this new scientific power was marked by a terrible irony: as even Morgenthau understood, the control over matter afforded by the science could never be translated into the control of the weapons themselves, into political utility and rational strategy.66 Bacon thought of the new scientific method not merely as way of achieving a purer access to truth and epistemological certainty, but as liberating a new power that would enable the creation of a new kind of Man. He opened the Novum Organum with the statement that 'knowledge and human power are synonymous', and later wrote of his 'determination...to lay a firmer foundation, and extend to a greater distance the boundaries of human power and dignity'.67 In a revealing and highly negative comparison between 'men's lives in the most polished countries of Europe and in any wild and barbarous region of the new Indies' -- one that echoes in advance Kissinger's distinction between post-and pre-Newtonian cultures -- Bacon set out what was at stake in the advancement of empirical science: anyone making this comparison, he remarked, 'will think it so great, that man may be said to be a god unto man'.68 We may be forgiven for blinking, but in Bacon's thought 'man' was indeed in the process of stealing a new fire from the heavens and seizing God's power over the world for itself. Not only would the new empirical science lead to 'an improvement of mankind's estate, and an increase in their power over nature', but would reverse the primordial humiliation of the Fall of Adam: For man, by the fall, lost at once his state of innocence, and his empire over creation, both of which can be partially recovered even in this life, the first by religion and faith, the second by the arts and sciences. For creation did not become entirely and utterly rebellious by the curse, but in consequence of the Divine decree, 'in the sweat of thy brow thou shalt eat bread'; she is now compelled by our labours (not assuredly by our disputes or magical ceremonies) at length to afford mankind in some degree his bread...69 There is a breathtaking, world-creating hubris in this statement -- one that, in many ways, came to characterise western modernity itself, and which is easily recognisable in a generation of modern technocrats like Kissinger. The Fall of Adam was the Judeo-Christian West's primal creation myth, one that marked humankind as flawed and humbled before God, condemned to hardship and ambivalence. Bacon forecast here a return to Eden, but one of man's own making. This truly was the death of God, of putting man into God's place, and no pious appeals to the continuity or guidance of faith could disguise the awesome epistemological violence which now subordinated creation to man. Bacon indeed argued that inventions are 'new creations and imitations of divine works'. As such, there is nothing but good in science: 'the introduction of great inventions is the most distinguished of human actions...inventions are a blessing and a benefit without injuring or afflicting any'.70 And what would be mankind's 'bread', the rewards of its new 'empire over creation'? If the new method and invention brought modern medicine, social welfare, sanitation, communications, education and comfort, it also enabled the Armenian genocide, the Holocaust and two world wars; napalm, the B52, the hydrogen bomb, the Kalashnikov rifle and military strategy. Indeed some of the 20th Century's most far-reaching inventions -- radar, television, rocketry, computing, communications, jet aircraft, the Internet -- would be the product of drives for national security and militarisation. Even the inventions Bacon thought so marvellous and transformative -- printing, gunpowder and the compass -- brought in their wake upheaval and tragedy: printing, dogma and bureaucracy; gunpowder, the rifle and the artillery battery; navigation, slavery and the genocide of indigenous peoples. In short, the legacy of the new empirical science would be ambivalence as much as certainty; degradation as much as enlightenment; the destruction of nature as much as its utilisation. Doubts and Fears: Technology as Ontology If Bacon could not reasonably be expected to foresee many of these developments, the idea that scientific and technological progress could be destructive did occur to him. However it was an anxiety he summarily dismissed: ...let none be alarmed at the objection of the arts and sciences becoming depraved to malevolent or luxurious purposes and the like, for the same can be said of every worldly good; talent, courage, strength, beauty, riches, light itself...Only let mankind regain their rights over nature, assigned to them by the gift of God, and obtain that power, whose exercise will be governed by right reason and true religion.71 By the mid-Twentieth Century, after the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, such fears could no longer be so easily wished away, as the physicist and scientific director of the Manhattan Project, J. Robert Oppenheimer recognised. He said in a 1947 lecture: We felt a particularly intimate responsibility for suggesting, for supporting and in the end in large measure achieving the realization of atomic weapons...In some sort of crude sense which no vulgarity, no humor, no over-statement can quite extinguish, the physicists have known sin, and this is a knowledge they cannot lose.72 Adam had fallen once more, but into a world which refused to acknowledge its renewed intimacy with contingency and evil. Man's empire over creation -- his discovery of the innermost secrets of matter and energy, of the fires that fuelled the stars -- had not 'enhanced human power and dignity' as Bacon claimed, but instead brought destruction and horror. Scientific powers that had been consciously applied in the defence of life and in the hope of its betterment now threatened its total and absolute destruction. This would not prevent a legion of scientists, soldiers and national security policymakers later attempting to apply Bacon's faith in invention and Descartes' faith in mathematics to make of the Bomb a rational weapon. Oppenheimer -- who resolutely opposed the development of the hydrogen bomb -- understood what the strategists could not: that the weapons resisted control, resisted utility, that 'with the release of atomic energy quite revolutionary changes had occurred in the techniques of warfare'.73 Yet Bacon's legacy, one deeply imprinted on the strategists, was his view that truth and utility are 'perfectly identical'.74 In 1947 Oppenheimer had clung to the hope that 'knowledge is good...it seems hard to live any other way than thinking it was better to know something than not to know it; and the more you know, the better'; by 1960 he felt that 'terror attaches to new knowledge. It has an unmooring quality; it finds men unprepared to deal with it.'75 Martin Heidegger questioned this mapping of natural science onto the social world in his essays on technology -- which, as 'machine', has been so crucial to modern strategic and geopolitical thought as an image of perfect function and order and a powerful tool of intervention. He commented that, given that modern technology 'employs exact physical science...the deceptive illusion arises that modern technology is applied physical science'.76 Yet as the essays and speeches of Oppenheimer attest, technology and its relation to science, society and war cannot be reduced to a noiseless series of translations of science for politics, knowledge for force, or force for good. Instead, Oppenheimer saw a process frustrated by roadblocks and ruptured by irony; in his view there was no smooth, unproblematic translation of scientific truth into social truth, and technology was not its vehicle. Rather his comments raise profound and painful ethical questions that resonate with terror and uncertainty. Yet this has not prevented technology becoming a potent object of desire, not merely as an instrument of power but as a promise and conduit of certainty itself. In the minds of too many rational soldiers, strategists and policymakers, technology brings with it the truth of its enabling science and spreads it over the world. It turns epistemological certainty into political certainty; it turns control over 'facts' into control over the earth. Heidegger's insights into this phenomena I find especially telling and disturbing -- because they underline the ontological force of the instrumental view of politics. In The Question Concerning Technology, Heidegger's striking argument was that in the modernising West technology is not merely a tool, a 'means to an end'. Rather technology has become a governing image of the modern universe, one that has come to order, limit and define human existence as a 'calculable coherence of forces' and a **'standing reserve' of energy**. Heidegger wrote: 'the threat to man does not come in the first instance from the potentially lethal machines and apparatus of technology. The actual threat has already affected man in his essence.'77 This process Heidegger calls 'Enframing' and through it the scientific mind demands that 'nature reports itself in some way or other that is identifiable through calculation and remains orderable as a system of information'. Man is not a being who makes and uses machines as means, choosing and limiting their impact on the world for his ends; rather man has imagined the world as a machine and humanity everywhere becomes trapped within its logic. Man, he writes, 'comes to the very brink of a precipitous fall...where he himself will have to be taken as standing-reserve. Meanwhile Man, precisely as the one so threatened, exalts himself to the posture of lord of the earth.'78 Technological man not only becomes the name for a project of lordship and mastery over the earth, but incorporates humanity within this project as a calculable resource. In strategy, warfare and geopolitics human bodies, actions and aspirations are caught, transformed and perverted by such calculating, enframing reason: human lives are reduced to tools, obstacles, useful or obstinate matter. This tells us much about the enduring power of crude instrumental versions of strategic thought, which relate not merely to the actual use of force but to broader geopolitical strategies that see, as limited war theorists like Robert Osgood did, force as an 'instrument of policy short of war'. It was from within this strategic ontology that figures like the Nobel prize-winning economist Thomas Schelling theorised the strategic role of threats and coercive diplomacy, and spoke of strategy as 'the power to hurt'.79 In the 2006 Lebanon war we can see such thinking in the remark of a U.S. analyst, a former Ambassador to Israel and Syria, who speculated that by targeting civilians and infrastructure Israel aimed 'to create enough pain on the ground so there would be a local political reaction to Hezbollah's adventurism'.80 Similarly a retired Israeli army colonel told the Washington Post that 'Israel is attempting to create a rift between the Lebanese population and Hezbollah supporters by exacting a heavy price from the elite in Beirut. The message is: If you want your air conditioning to work and if you want to be able to fly to Paris for shopping, you must pull your head out of the sand and take action toward shutting down Hezbollah-land.'81 Conclusion: Violent Ontologies or Peaceful Choices? I was motivated to begin the larger project from which this essay derives by a number of concerns. I felt that the available critical, interpretive or performative languages of war -- realist and liberal international relations theories, just war theories, and various Clausewitzian derivations of strategy -- failed us, because they either perform or refuse to place under suspicion the underlying political ontologies that I have sought to unmask and question here. Many realists have quite nuanced and critical attitudes to the use of force, but ultimately affirm strategic thought and remain embedded within the existential framework of the nation-state. Both liberal internationalist and just war doctrines seek mainly to improve the accountability of decision-making in security affairs and to limit some of the worst moral enormities of war, but (apart from the more radical versions of cosmopolitanism) they fail to question the ontological claims of political community or strategic theory.82 In the case of a theorist like Jean Bethke Elshtain, just war doctrine is in fact allied to a softer, liberalised form of the Hegelian-Schmittian ontology. She dismisses Kant's Perpetual Peace as 'a fantasy of at-oneness...a world in which differences have all been rubbed off' and in which 'politics, which is the way human beings have devised for dealing with their differences, gets eliminated.'83 She remains a committed liberal democrat and espouses a moral community that stretches beyond the nation-state, which strongly contrasts with Schmitt's hostility to liberalism and his claustrophobic distinction between friend and enemy. However her image of politics -- which at its limits, she implies, requires the resort to war as the only existentially satisfying way of resolving deep-seated conflicts -- reflects much of Schmitt's idea of the political and Hegel's ontology of a fundamentally alienated world of nation-states, in which war is a performance of being. She categorically states that any effort to dismantle security dilemmas 'also requires the dismantling of human beings as we know them'.84 Whilst this would not be true of all just war advocates, I suspect that even as they are so concerned with the ought, moral theories of violence grant too much unquestioned power to the is. The problem here lies with the confidence in being -- of 'human beings as we know them' -- which ultimately fails to escape a Schmittian architecture and thus eternally exacerbates (indeed reifies) antagonisms. Yet we know from the work of Deleuze and especially William Connolly that exchanging an ontology of being for one of becoming, where the boundaries and nature of the self contain new possibilities through agonistic relation to others, provides a less destructive and violent way of acknowledging and dealing with conflict and difference.85 My argument here, whilst normatively sympathetic to Kant's moral demand for the eventual abolition of war, militates against excessive optimism.86 Even as I am arguing that war is not an enduring historical or anthropological feature, or a neutral and rational instrument of policy -- that it is rather the product of hegemonic forms of knowledge about political action and community -- my analysis does suggest some sobering conclusions about its power as an idea and formation. Neither the progressive flow of history nor the pacific tendencies of an international society of republican states will save us. The violent ontologies I have described here in fact dominate the conceptual and policy frameworks of modern republican states and have come, against everything Kant hoped for, to stand in for progress, modernity and reason. Indeed what Heidegger argues, I think with some credibility, is that the enframing world view has come to stand in for being itself. Enframing, argues Heidegger, 'does not simply endanger man in his relationship to himself and to everything that is...it drives out every other possibility of revealing...the rule of Enframing threatens man with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal truth.'87 What I take from Heidegger's argument -- one that I have sought to extend by analysing the militaristic power of modern ontologies of political existence and security -- is a view that the challenge is posed not merely by a few varieties of weapon, government, technology or policy, but by an overarching system of thinking and understanding that lays claim to our entire space of truth and existence. Many of the most destructive features of contemporary modernity -- militarism, repression, coercive diplomacy, covert intervention, geopolitics, economic exploitation and ecological destruction -- derive not merely from particular choices by policymakers based on their particular interests, but from calculative, 'empirical' discourses of scientific and political truth rooted in powerful enlightenment images of being. **Confined within such an epistemological and cultural universe, policymakers' choices become necessities, their actions become inevitabilities, and humans suffer and die**. Viewed in this light, 'rationality' is the name we give the chain of reasoning which builds one structure of truth on another until a course of action, however violent or dangerous, becomes preordained through that reasoning's very operation and existence. It creates both discursive constraints -- available choices may simply not be seen as credible or legitimate -- and material constraints that derive from the mutually reinforcing cascade of discourses and events which then preordain militarism and violence as necessary policy responses, however ineffective, dysfunctional or chaotic. The force of my own and Heidegger's analysis does, admittedly, tend towards a deterministic fatalism. On my part this is quite deliberate; it is important to allow this possible conclusion to weigh on us. Large sections of modern societies -- especially parts of the media, political leaderships and national security institutions -- are utterly trapped within the Clausewitzian paradigm, within the instrumental utilitarianism of 'enframing' and the stark ontology of the friend and enemy. They are certainly tremendously aggressive and energetic in continually stating and reinstating its force. But is there a way out? Is there no possibility of agency and choice? Is this not the key normative problem I raised at the outset, of how the modern ontologies of war efface agency, causality and responsibility from decision making; the responsibility that comes with having choices and making decisions, with exercising power? (In this I am much closer to Connolly than Foucault, in Connolly's insistence that, even in the face of the anonymous power of discourse to produce and limit subjects, selves remain capable of agency and thus incur responsibilities.88) There seems no point in following Heidegger in seeking a more 'primal truth' of being -- that is to reinstate ontology and obscure its worldly manifestations and consequences from critique. However we can, while refusing Heidegger's unworldly89 nostalgia, appreciate that he was searching for a way out of the modern system of calculation; that he was searching for a 'questioning', 'free relationship' to technology that would not be immediately recaptured by the strategic, calculating vision of enframing. Yet his path out is somewhat chimerical -- his faith in 'art' and the older Greek attitudes of 'responsibility and indebtedness' offer us valuable clues to the kind of sensibility needed, but little more. When we consider the problem of policy, the force of this analysis suggests that choice and agency can be all too often limited; they can remain confined (sometimes quite wilfully) within the overarching strategic and security paradigms. Or, more hopefully, policy choices could aim to bring into being a more enduringly inclusive, cosmopolitan and peaceful logic of the political. But this cannot be done without seizing alternatives from **outside** the space of enframing and utilitarian strategic thought, by being aware of its presence and weight and activating a very different concept of existence, security and action.90 This would seem to hinge upon 'questioning' as such -- on the questions we put to the real and our efforts to create and act into it. Do security and strategic policies seek to exploit and direct humans as material, as energy, or do they seek to protect and enlarge human dignity and autonomy? Do they seek to impose by force an unjust status quo (as in Palestine), or to remove one injustice only to replace it with others (the U.S. in Iraq or Afghanistan), or do so at an unacceptable human, economic, and environmental price? Do we see our actions within an instrumental, amoral framework (of 'interests') and a linear chain of causes and effects (the idea of force), or do we see them as folding into a complex interplay of languages, norms, events and consequences which are less predictable and controllable?91 And most fundamentally: Are we seeking to coerce or persuade? Are less violent and more sustainable choices available? Will our actions perpetuate or help to end the global rule of insecurity and violence? Will our thought?

#### Security threats are political constructions by experts to justify constant militarism

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Despite such democratic concerns, a large part of what makes today's dominant security concept so compelling are two **purportedly objective** sociological claims about the nature of modern threat. As these claims undergird the current security concept, this conclusion assesses them more directly and, in the process, indicates what they suggest about the prospects for any future reform. The first claim is that global interdependence means that the United States faces near continuous threats from abroad. Just as Pearl Harbor presented a physical attack on the homeland justifying a revised framework, the American position in the world since has been one of permanent insecurity in the face of new, equally objective dangers. Although today these threats no longer come from menacing totalitarian regimes like Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union, they nonetheless create **a world of chaos and instability** in which American domestic peace is imperiled by decentralized terrorists and aggressive rogue states. n310 [\*1486] Second, and relatedly, the objective complexity of modern threats makes it impossible for ordinary citizens to comprehend fully the causes and likely consequences of existing dangers. Thus, the best response is the further entrenchment of the national security state, with the U.S. **military permanently mobilized** to gather intelligence and to combat enemies wherever they strike-at home or abroad. Accordingly, modern legal and political institutions that privilege executive authority and insulated decision-making are simply the **necessary consequence of these externally generated crises**. Regardless of these trade-offs, the security benefits of an empowered presidency-one armed with countless secret and public agencies as well as with a truly global military footprint n311 -greatly outweigh the costs. Yet although these sociological views have become commonplace, the conclusions that Americans should draw about security requirements are not nearly as clear cut as the conventional wisdom assumes. In particular, a closer examination of contemporary arguments about endemic danger suggests that **such claims are not objective empirical judgments**, but rather are socially complex and politically infused interpretations. Indeed, the openness of existing circumstances to multiple interpretations of threat implies that the presumptive need for secrecy and centralization is not self-evident. And as underscored by high profile failures in expert assessment, claims to security expertise are themselves riddled with ideological presuppositions and subjective biases. All this indicates that the gulf between elite knowledge and lay incomprehension in matters of security may be far less extensive than is ordinarily thought. It also means that the question of who decides-and with it the issue of how democratic or insular our institutions should be-remains open as well. Clearly, technological changes, from airpower to biological and chemical weapons, have shifted the nature of America's position in the [\*1487] world and its potential vulnerability. As has been widely remarked for nearly a century, the oceans alone cannot guarantee our permanent safety. Yet in truth, they never fully ensured domestic tranquility. The nineteenth century was one of near continuous violence, especially with indigenous communities fighting to protect their territory from expansionist settlers. n312 But even if technological shifts make doomsday scenarios more chilling than those faced by Hamilton, Jefferson, or Taney, **the mere existence of these scenarios tells us little about their likelihood or how best to address them**. Indeed, these latter security judgments are inevitably permeated with **subjective political assessments**-assessments that carry with them preexisting ideological points of view-such as regarding how much risk constitutional societies should accept or how interventionist states should be in foreign policy. In fact, from its emergence in the 1930s and 1940s, supporters of the modern security concept have-at times unwittingly-reaffirmed the political rather than purely objective nature of interpreting external threats. In particular, commentators have repeatedly noted the link between the idea of insecurity and America's post- World War II position of global primacy, one which today has only expanded following the Cold War. n313 In 1961, none other than Senator James William Fulbright declared, in terms reminiscent of Herring and Frankfurter, that security imperatives meant that "our basic constitutional machinery, admirably suited to the needs of a remote agrarian republic in the 18th century," was no longer "adequate" for the "20th-century nation." n314 For Fulbright, the driving impetus behind the need to jettison antiquated constitutional practices was the importance of sustaining the country's "pre-eminen[ce] in political and military power." n315 Fulbright believed that greater executive action and war- making capacities were essential precisely because the United States found itself "burdened with all the enormous responsibilities that accompany such power." n316 According to Fulbright, the United States had [\*1488] both a right and a duty to suppress those forms of chaos and disorder that existed at the edges of American authority. n317 Thus, rather than being purely objective, the American condition of permanent danger was itself deeply tied to political calculations about the importance of global primacy. What generated the condition of continual crisis was not only technological change, but also the belief that the United States' own national security rested on the successful projection of power into the internal affairs of foreign states. The key point is that **regardless of whether one agrees with such an underlying project**, the value of this project is ultimately an open political question. This suggests that whether distant crises should be viewed as generating insecurity at home is similarly as much an **interpretative judgment as an empirically verifiable** conclusion. n318 To appreciate the open nature of security determinations, one need only look at the presentation of terrorism as a principle and overriding danger facing the country. According to National Counterterrorism Center's 2009 Report on Terrorism, in 2009 there were just twenty-five U.S. noncombatant fatalities from terrorism worldwide-nine abroad and sixteen at home. n319 While the fear of a terrorist attack is a legitimate concern, these numbers-which have been consistent in recent years-place the gravity of the threat in perspective. Rather than a condition of endemic danger-requiring ever-increasing secrecy and centralization-such facts are perfectly consistent with a reading that Americans **do not face an existential crisis** (one presumably comparable to Pearl Harbor) and actually enjoy relative security. Indeed, the disconnect between numbers and resources expended, especially in a time of profound economic insecurity, highlights the political choice of policymakers and citizens to persist in interpreting foreign events through a World War II and early Cold War **lens of permanent threat.** In fact, the continuous alteration of basic constitutional values to fit national security aims emphasizes just how entrenched Herring's old vision of security as pre-political and foundational has become, regardless of whether other interpretations of the present moment may be equally compelling. It also underscores a telling and often ignored point about the nature of [\*1489] modern security expertise, particularly as reproduced by the United States' massive intelligence infrastructure. To the extent that political assumptions-like the centrality of global primacy or the view that instability abroad necessarily implicates security at home-shape the interpretative approach of executive officials, what passes as objective security expertise is itself **intertwined with contested claims about how to view external actors** and their motivations. These assumptions mean that while modern conditions may well be complex, the conclusions of the presumed experts may not be systematically less liable to subjective bias than judgments made by ordinary citizens based on publicly available information. It further underlines that the question of who decides **cannot be foreclosed in advance** by simply asserting deference to elite knowledge. If anything, one can argue that the presumptive gulf between elite awareness and suspect mass opinion has generated its own very dramatic political and legal pathologies. In recent years, the country has witnessed a variety of **security crises built on the basic failure of "expertise**." n320 At present, part of what obscures this fact is the very culture of secret information sustained by the modern security concept. Today, it is commonplace for government officials to leak security material about terrorism or external threats to newspapers as a method of shaping the public debate. n321 These "open" secrets allow greater public access to elite information and embody a central and routine instrument for incorporating mass voice into state decision-making.

**A2: Security Inevitable**

#### False ideology. Security *appears* inevitable because we allow it to constitute our world.

Burke 7 — (Anthony, Senior Lecturer – School of Politics and Professor of International Relations – University of New South Wales, Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence, p. 68-69)

This chapter is thus an exercise in thinking, which challenges the continuing power of political ontologies (forms of truth and being) that connect security, sovereignty, belonging, otherness and violence in ways that for many appear like enduring political facts, inevitable and irrefutable. Conflict, violence and alienation then arise not merely from individual or collective acts whose conditions might be understood and policed; they condition politics as such, forming a permanent ground, a dark substrata underpinning the very possibility of the present. Conflict and alienation seem inevitable because of the way in which the modem political imagination has conceived and thought security, sovereignty and ethics. Israel/ Palestine is chosen here as a particularly urgent and complex example of this problem, but it is a problem with much wider significance. While I hold out the hope that security can be re-visioned away from a permanent dependence on insecurity, exclusion and violence, and I believe it retains normative promise, this analysis takes a deliberate step backward to examine the very real barriers faced by such a project. Security cannot properly be rethought without a deeper understanding of, and challenge to, the political forms and structures it claims to enable and protect. If Ken Booth argues that the state should be a means rather than an end of security, my objective here is to place the continuing power and depth of its status as an end of security, and a fundamental source for political identity, under critical interrogation.' If the state is to become a means of security (one among many) it will have to be fundamentally transformed. The chapter pursues this inquiry in two stages. The first outlines the historic strength and effective redundancy of such an exciusivist vision of security in Israel, wherein Israel not only confronts military and political antagonists with an 'iron wall' of armed force but maps this onto a profound clash of existential narratives, a problem with resonances in the West's confrontation with radical Islamism in the wa**r** on terror. The second, taking up the remainder of the chapter, then explores a series of potential resources in continental philosophy and political theory that might help us to think our way out of a security grounded in violence and alienation. Through a critical engagement with this thought, I aim to construct a political ethics based not in relations between insecure and separated identities mapped solely onto nation-states, but in relations of responsibility and interconnection that can negotiate and recognise both distinct and intertwined histories, identities and needs; an ethics that might underpin a vision of interdependent (national and non-national) existence proper to an integrated world traversed by endless flows of people, commerce, ideas, violence and future potential.

**A2: Util 1st**

#### We control uniqueness — util is impossible because the realist frame presupposes particular friends and enemies and their so-called rational actions. That makes it impossible to calculate possible responses or correctly weigh social goods.

#### Structural violence outweighs — Neocleous and Rigakos say securitization causes every major form of violence.

**A2: War Down**

#### War down relies on bad data manipulation, ignores structural violence, and naturalizes the institutional factors that make war inevitable

Herman 12 — Edwardprofessor emeritus of finance at the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 7/25/12, Reality Denial : Steven Pinker's Apologetics for Western-Imperial Volence, http://www.zcommunications.org/reality-denial-steven-pinkers-apologetics-for-western-imperial-volence-by-edward-s-herman-and-david-peterson-1)

Pinker wants us to believe that the **relative power of warmakers and the institutional forces developing within and between them don’t matter**. After all, was it not the emergence and consolidation of Leviathans that made it possible for our “better angels” to assert themselves and peaceableness to grow? Manchuria was just as likely to invade Japan in 1931 as was Japan to invade Manchuria; Poland just as likely to invade Germany in 1939 as Germany to invade Poland; and Iraq just as likely to invade the United States in 2003 as the United States to invade Iraq. He also wants us to believe that the existence of a military-industrial complex, rooted in the richest and most powerful country to emerge from the ruins of the Second World War, is **irrelevant to the probability that it will engage in wars, and to the deadliness of the wars in which it does**. (At least Richardson could plead that he died in 1952, and was no longer around to analyze the institutions and practices of permanent warmaking.[219]) “Suppose,” Pinker writes, “for the sake of argument, that World War II was the most destructive event in history….What does that tell us about long-term trends in war and peace? The answer is: nothing. The most destructive event in history had to take place in some century, and it could be embedded in any of a large number of very different long-term trends.” (191) With comments such as these, **Pinker is imploring us to ignore major pieces of evidence** **that violence has reached new and more lethal heights in modern times.** **This is the final triumph of ideology.** Concluding Note Steven Pinker’s The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined is a terrible book, both as a technical work of scholarship **and as a moral tract and guide**. **But it is** **extremely well-attuned to the demands of U.S.** and Western **elites** at the start of the 21st century, with its optimistic message that the “better angels” of their nature are taking charge, and its lament over the other peoples of the world, whose “inner demons” and cultural backwardness have prevented them from keeping-up. **With his country engaged in a** record-breaking number of simultaneous wars **and interventions on four continents,** with NATO expanding and asserting its military dominance globally, with Israeli settlement and dispossession policies unabated on the West Bank, with the United States and Israel threatening to attack Iran, and with some critics (not cited by Pinker) expressing profound concern over a deteriorating institutional environment in which it has become “hard to imagine any president or Congress standing up to the powerful vested interests of the Pentagon, the secret intelligence agencies and the military industrial complex,”[220] along comes Pinker bearing his 832-page gift on the declining relevance of war. Pinker’s book also coincides with the surprising emergence of an Occupy Movement that is protesting a wide range of political, economic, and social developments that have **increased human insecurity, inequality, and unemployment**, **filled U.S. prisons, and diminished** the **democratic substance of elections and political power**. This is also a period in which civil liberties have been under serious attack, the right to Habeas Corpus suspended, torture openly employed and given legal sanction by the executive branch, and free speech rights of protest subject to increasing restriction. The convenience of Pinker’s themes and the warm reception of his work reminds us of the similar treatment of Claire Sterling’s book The Terror Network back in 1981,[221] when her stress on an alleged Soviet responsibility for cross-border terrorism fit so well the Reagan administration’s intensified focus on terrorism and the threats posed by the “Evil Empire.” Sterling’s work was ludicrously sourced and biased (e.g., she had the Apartheid regime of South Africa combating the African National Congress’ and Nelson Mandela’s “terrorism,” but not itself engaging in terrorism), and easily shown to be intellectually indefensible,[222] but The Terror Network was given great attention and treated with respect in the media, and excerpts from it were published in establishment journals and presented as credible and authoritative.[223] It is true that Pinker’s book employs a much larger scholarly apparatus, but this is a misleading façade. He relies heavily on the work of the International Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO) as well as the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)—two organizations whose findings largely overlap and, as we have seen, categorize the overwhelming U.S. role in the Afghan and Iraqi theaters of violence over the last decade as “secondary” to internal and “intercommunal” warfare.[224] Pinker also relies on the Vancouver-based Human Security Report Project (HSRP), whose work draws heavily from that of PRIO and UCDP, and whose interrelated themes of a decline in **great-power violence** and the “shrinking costs of war,” reversed in recent years by a surge in “Islamist political violence,”[225] **fit** well **the foreign** and domestic **policies of the Western imperial powers.** Pinker relies also on the work of Matthew White, who in his own book on the worst atrocities in history asserts that the “Western philosophy of war-making tries to avoid killing civilians.” Under this philosophy, White explains, the “1945 atomic bombing of Hiroshima is justified as a legitimate act of war, while the 1983 suicide bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut is condemned as terrorism.” The “key difference,” White adds, was that “one was performed openly against a declared enemy who had the opportunity to fight back or surrender, while the other was sneaky”[226]—that is, not an act of resistance to occupying armies that had just killed some 20,000 people and were still indiscriminately shelling the hills around Beirut. Pinker also relies on Rudolph Rummel’s work, a man who believes that Barack Obama is a left-wing appeaser of global tyrants, and busily engineering a coup d’état in the United States.[227] Rummel’s twin-volumes on “democide” are so badly deformed by bias that he estimated that all but 5,500 Vietnamese civilians killed by U.S. forces during the war were "collateral damage" and thus the unintended victims of a civilian-protective war policy, whereas North Vietnam had deliberately targeted and killed vastly greater numbers, all as a matter of policy.[228] Pinker himself claims that “at least **800,000 civilians died” in Vietnam**, (267) but he also adds that these were “battle deaths,”[229] and that the deaths ultimately were a result of the Vietnamese Communists’ “fanatical dedication to outlasting their opponents”—that is, to their refusal to submit to superior force. (308) Better Angels has been received even more warmly than was Claire Sterling’s book, garnering many positive reviews and its author invited to lecture about it and to appear on numerous radio, television, and Podcast interviews.[230] The New York Times treated the book to at least five prominent mentions prior to the flattering front-page account it received in the Sunday Book Review in early October 2011 by philosopher Peter Singer, in which Singer called it “supremely important“ and a “masterly achievement.”[231] Overall, the Times reviewed, excerpted, discussed, blogged, mentioned, or invited Pinker himself to reiterate its themes in more than 20 different items.[232] That was quite a positive push by the United States’ most prominent newspaper. Even more noteworthy is the fact that so many liberals and leftists have been taken-in by Better Angels. The British philosopher Simon Blackburn praised the “riveting and myth-destroying” book, with its “positive history of humanity” and its “wealth of historical, anthropological and geographical data.”[233] The British political scientist David Runciman called it a “brilliant, mind-altering book,” and swallowed “Pinker’s careful, compelling account of why the 20th century does not invalidate his thesis that violence is in a long decline”—because the “violence of the 20th century is best understood as a series of random spasms,” according to Runciman, and because the “two world wars were essentially freak events, driven by contingency and in some cases lunacy.”[234] Both **reviewers display the same inability** or unwillingness **to engage in serious institutional analysis as does Pinker**. In this country, Stephen Colbert had Pinker as a guest on his popular Comedy Central program, but asked him no serious questions; Pinker himself repeated without challenge his mantra that “we may be living in the most peaceful era in our species’ existence.”[235] Colbert did, however, find the courage to add that “Stalin killed 20 million people. Mao killed 70 million people. Hitler racked-up six million Jews alone and then like a cluster-of-millions of everybody else he didn’t care for….” David Sirota also interviewed Pinker on his Colorado-based radio show. Sirota’s webpage at the KKZN radio station announces that Pinker’s book is “startling and engaging,” and adds in what appears to have been reproduced from the promotional literature of the Pinker camp that “Pinker shows (with the help of more than a hundred graphs and maps)…[that] we may be living in the most peaceful time in our species’ existence.”[236] In introducing Pinker on his MSNBC show, The Nation’s Chris Hayes called Better Angels a “phenomenal book,” and added later that the book is “very persuasive that things are getting better, that humans are actually getting less violent.” Hayes asked no challenging questions about this book during his two-hour show. And in the show’s closing “You should know” segment, Pinker said that the audience should know that “The rate of death in war has been going down since 1946”—to which Hayes added that, yes, all of us “should know that it’s getting better, even in really bad weeks it’s getting better.”[237] But do Colbert, Sirota, and Hayes (et al.) really go along with Pinker’s view that the 1960s was a decade of “decivilization,” and that the mushrooming of the U.S. prison population over the past 35 years is a sign of progress, as it further thinned the ranks of the Uncivilized roaming the streets? Do they accept that what those “overly indulgent” and future-discounting savages had suffered from was a lack of “self-control,” rather than adverse social conditions? And that the “recivilizing” process from the 1990s on—which included intensive policing, mass incarceration, and the reduction of welfare-state pampering—was the key to this improvement? Do they also accept Pinker’s accolades to Charles Murray, Richard Herrnstein, James Q. Wilson, and Daniel Patrick Moynihan for emphasizing the alleged sociobiological roots of the class structure and inequality of U.S. society, and go along with his denunciations of the “hard-left” deniers of human nature whom,[238] in contrast to Pinker and his allies, have “radical” political agendas and want to protect the welfare state’s undermining of “self-control” and reversal of the “Civilizing Process”? Are they not aware that **Pinker completely ignores the** **structural violence of the global class war that has increased inequality and interacted with systems of state violence to enlarge "internal security" operations and prison populations?** That many of the Western so-called “democracies” are really national security states? And that Pinker classifies these as the advanced-guard of the “Civilizing Process”? Do they accept that the post-World War II era was a “Long Peace,” and for Pinker’s reason that the great powers fought no wars among themselves? Do they buy-into Pinker’s view that the role of the United States in this era was merely the “containment” of an expansionist Communist enemy, and had no self-interested purpose or ideological base? Do they agree with his shifting of responsibility for Korean and Vietnamese civilian deaths in those distant wars from the United States to the communist sides? What do they think about Pinker’s citing the peace movements of the 1960s and during the run-up to the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq as evidence of the growth of our “better angels,” while failing to explain why those “angels” neither prevented nor stopped the wars? Could it be that institutional factors—the global interests of transnational corporations and the military-industrial complex, the refusal of the nuclear weapons-states to give up their advantage, a permanent-war system that is more resource-commanding than ever, and **possesses the potential for unprecedented destruction**—**carry more weight in policy decisions than does the sociobiological expansion in** **the powers of reason and empathy speculatively asserted by Pinker**, but impossible to prove? Can they not see the inversion of reality in the notion that it is a “militant Islam” that is the cause of Western intervention in Islamic countries? And that the “Islamic threat” that Pinker elevates to ominous levels is contrived and, like Soviet “containment,” an excuse for a violent and forward-looking policy, necessary to meet Western institutional demands? This critical failure to understand Pinker’s misrepresentations no doubt rests in part on the sheer volume of the purported evidence that he throws at his readers, with more than 1,950 endnotes, some 1,100 references, and roughly one figure for every six pages of text. But **selectivity and ideological bias dominate throughout, and his key evidence does not withstand close scrutiny.** We have shown that Pinker’s most basic idea, that humans moved from a Hobbesian condition of chronic warfare via the growth of civilization and the Leviathan state to a slowly and unevenly developing peaceableness, is not sustained by credible evidence. In fact, the extant archaeological record flatly contradicts it, and in his review of Better Angels, the anthropologist Douglas P. Fry referred to this as “Pinker’s Big Lie.”[239] But without the counter-myth of the Violent Savage, there could be no “Pacification Process,” and his story about the “better angels of our nature” would take on an entirely different cast than the one he gives us, in which “human history contains an arrow” and “violence meanders downward.” (694) Pinker calls the belief that the “twentieth century was the bloodiest in history” a “cliché” and an “illusion.” (193) He deals with the fact that World War II was the historical peak in war-related deaths, and World War I a big-time killer as well, by several tricks. One is to relativize deaths by adjusting the numbers killed in earlier conflicts to later and much larger population bases, so that although the absolute death toll from World War II tops all others, he can depict it as far less deadly than several other wars and conflagrations from centuries long ago. But while Pinker makes violence into a relative matter in order to prove his main theme, he often mentions the long historical diminution in violence without making explicit that he is talking about relative, not absolute, levels of violence. But **increases in absolute levels of violence might well be** independent of the sizes of the population base. **Surely** the U.S. attacks on Korea, Vietnam, and Iraq were rooted in independent factors, not the number of people then living on the planet**.** Nor was there any link between the Nazi holocaust and the population of China. Another Pinker-device is to claim that the great wars of the 20th century were “random” events, and in his book’s many figures where he cannot avoid the deadliness of the First and Second World Wars, he waves-off their magnitude as "statistical illusions”—they are “outliers” and even “apparitions”—and he urges us to forget that they both occurred in the past 100 years. They are unrelated to “modernity,” whose “forces” for the “reduction of violence” remain sacrosanct in spite of these and subsequent wars—and the evident failure of the “better angels” to do their work. Yet another trick is to start the "Long Peace" conveniently at the end of World War II, and to define it as a period in which there have been no wars between the great powers. But the First and especially the Second World War had taught them that with their advancing and life-threatening means of self-destruction, they could not go on playing their favorite game of mutual slaughter any longer. But this didn’t prevent them from carrying out numerous and deadly **wars against the Third World, which filled-in the great-power war-gap nicely**. Thus the “Long Peace”—a brief 67 years through 2012—has been peaceful only in a Pinkerian sense, and it appears to have very shallow or even no roots in our “better angels.” Furthermore, as we have stressed, it is increasingly threatened by a Western elite-instigated **global class war and a permanent-war system fueled by “threats” manufactured by** **institutional structures that continue to overwhelm these “better angels.”** In the final analysis, The Better Angels of Our Nature is an **inflated political tract** that **misuses data and rewrites history** in accord with its author’s **clear ideological biases,** while finding ideology at work only in the actions of his opponents. Pinker fears that readers will find his book “Whiggish and presentist and historically naïve,” (692) but this secular theodicy is animated by the spirit of Dr. Pangloss more than anyone else,[240] and with its deep commitments to an elitist, Western-imperial point of view, it transcends even Voltaire’s character in the fantasy that everything done by the Holy State and its minions is leading to the best of all actual worlds. Small wonder, then, that the message of Better Angels pleases so well the editors of the New York Times and the large U.S. permanent-war establishment. It is regrettable that despite its manifest problems, the book has bamboozled so many other people who should know better.

#### War isn’t down – their argument is cover for imperial and structural violence

Herman 12 — Edward, professor emeritus of finance at the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania (, 7/25/12, Reality Denial : Steven Pinker's Apologetics for Western-Imperial Volence, http://www.zcommunications.org/reality-denial-steven-pinkers-apologetics-for-western-imperial-volence-by-edward-s-herman-and-david-peterson-1)

It is amusing to see how eagerly the establishment media have welcomed Steven Pinker’s 2011 tome, The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined,[1] which explains not only that “violence has been in decline for long stretches of time,” but that “we may be living in the most peaceful era in our species' existence.”[2] A professor in the Department of Psychology at Harvard University since 2002 and a two-time Pulitzer Prize finalist in the general nonfiction category,[3] Pinker’s lovable theme coincides with the Nobel Peace Laureate’s current engagement in wars on at least four separate continents (Asia, Africa, Europe, and South America); his regretful partial withdrawal from invaded and occupied Iraq; his victorious termination of the 2011 war in Libya; his buildup and threats to engage in even larger wars with Syria and Iran, both already underway with aggressive sanctions and an array of covert actions;[4] his semi-secret and ever-widening use of remote-controlled aerial gunships and death squads in **global** **killing operations**;[5] and his declaration of the right to kill any person anywhere for “national security” reasons—**officially making the entire world a U.S. free-fire-zone**.[6] The Barack Obama regime, and before it the Bush-Cheney regime, have also supported and protected Israel’s escalated ethnic cleansing of Palestinians, and the hostile U.S. actions and threats involving Iran and Syria are closely geared with those of Israel. Whereas in Pinker’s view there has been a “Long Peace” since the end of the Second World War,[7] **in the real world there has been a series of long and devastating U.S. wars**: in the Koreas (1950-1953), Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia (1954-1975), Iraq (1990-), Afghanistan (2001- or, arguably, 1979-), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (1996-), with the heavy direct involvement of U.S. clients from Rwanda (Paul Kagame) and Uganda (Yoweri Museveni) in large-scale Congo killings; and Israel’s outbursts in Lebanon (1982 and 2006), to name a few. There were also very deadly wars in Iran, invaded by Saddam Hussein’s Iraq (1980-1988), with Western encouragement and support. And with the stimulus-excuse of 9/11, the U.S. political and “defense” establishment was able to declare a global “War on Terror,” open-ended and still ongoing, to assure that the “Long Peace” would not be interrupted by a conflict that met the Pinkerian standards for a real war. In the same time frame as Pinker’s “New Peace,” alleged to have begun with the dissolution of the Soviet bloc, the Warsaw Pact, and of the Soviet Union itself (1989-1991), we have also witnessed the relentless expansion of the U.S.-led NATO bloc, its 1990s war on and dismantlement of Yugoslavia,[8] its acceptance of new “out of area” responsibilities for “security,”[9] its steadily enlarging membership from 16 to 28 states, including the Baltic and former Eastern European satellites of the Soviet Union, and a growing U.S. and NATO encirclement of and threats to China and Russia.[10] And during the first decade of the 21st century, the United States openly embarked on the systematic use of “enhanced interrogations” (i.e., torture) and the frequent resort to “extraordinary renditions” that send captives to torture-prone clients for some not-so-angelic working over.[11] Pinker’s standard for an interruption of the “Long Peace” would be a war between the “great powers,” and it is true that the major Axis and Allied powers that fought each other during World War II have not made war among themselves since 1945. But Pinker carries this line of thought even further: He contends not only that the “democracies avoid disputes with each other,” but that they “tend to stay out of disputes across the board,” (283) an idea he refers to as the “Democratic Peace.”[12] (278-284) This will surely come as a surprise to the many victims of U.S. assassinations, sanctions, subversions, bombings and invasions since 1945.[13] **For Pinker, no attack on a lesser power by one** or more **of the great democracies counts as a real war** **or confutes the “Democratic Peace**,” no matter how many people die. “Among respectable countries,” Pinker writes, “conquest is no longer a thinkable option. A politician in a democracy today who suggested conquering another country would be met not with counterarguments but with puzzlement, embarrassment, or laughter.” (260) This is an extremely silly assertion. Presumably, when George Bush and Tony Blair sent U.S. and British forces to attack Iraq in 2003, ousted its government, and replaced it with one operating under laws drafted by the Coalition Provisional Authority, this did not count as “conquest,” as these leaders never stated that they launched the war to “conquer” Iraq, but rather “to disarm Iraq, to free its people and to defend the world from grave danger.”[14] **What conqueror has ever pronounced as his goal something other than self-defense** and the protection of life and limb? **It is on the basis of devices such as this that Pinker’s “Long Peace,”** “New Peace,” and “Democratic Peace” **rest**. (See “Massaging the Numbers,” below.) And it is in this kind of context Pinker throws-in his “gentle commerce” theme by advancing the so-called “Golden Arches Peace” idea—that “no two countries with a McDonald’s have ever fought in a war.” The “only unambiguous” exception that he can name occurred in 1999, “when NATO briefly bombed Yugoslavia.” (285) In an endnote he mentions that an “earlier marginal exception was the U.S. attack on Panama in 1989,” but he dismisses this U.S. war as too insignificant to make the grade—“its death count falls short of the minimum required for a war according to the standard definition,”[15] though according to the UN Charter and customary international law, there was nothing sub-standard about this unambiguous U.S. aggression against a sovereign country. **Here as in many other places, Pinker selects the estimated death toll that minimizes the U.S.-inflicted casualties and fits his political agenda**.[16] Pinker mentions in passing that the post-World War II peace among the giants was possibly a result of the immense cost of wars that might involve a nuclear exchange—and it did extend to the Soviet Union during its post-World War II life—but his explanation focuses mainly on the cultural evolution and biological adaptations of the Civilized,[17] in contrast with the Uncivilized of the Third World. Why this new peaceableness of the Civilized does not stop their violent interventions abroad he fails to explain. **The exclusion of wars against the Uncivilized from his definition of a “Long Peace” reflects gross political bias.**  Pinker attributes the sense of increased violence to multiple “illusions,” one of which he believes is caused by the development of media and other advanced forms of communication that allow a rushing to the spot of bloody events, and recording them and transmitting them to the world. As he explained in a guest appearance on CBS TV’s The Early Show in mid-December 2011: “Not only can we send a helicopter with a film crew to any troubled spot in the world but now anyone with a cell phone is an instant reporter. They can broadcast color footage of bloodshed wherever it occurs and so we’re very aware of it.”[18] Apparently Pinker believes that the media cover the world on a non-discriminatory basis, reporting on Guatemalan peasants slaughtered by their army, civilian victims of U.S. drone warfare in Afghanistan, Honduran protesters shot dead by their own military, and dead and injured U.S. soldiers as aggressively as they report on civilian protesters shot dead on the streets of Tehran, or the victims of the Syrian government or of the late Muammar Gaddafi in 2011.[19] The naiveté here is staggering. Pinker’s “Long Peace” and “New Peace” and their alleged declines of violence not only coincide with the **numerous and ongoing attacks by the giants on the midgets, the huge expansion in arms, and the new “burgeoning” of torture**,[20] **but runs parallel with the** **increasing structural violence of a global class war that has resulted in growing inequality within and between countries**, **systematic dispossession of vast numbers**, **a widespread seizure of the commons, major migrations, growing cities of slums, increased ethnic tensions and anti-Islamic fervor,** deliberately stoked in a troubled, receptive environment, **mass incarceration of minority populations**, and more vocal oppositional forces both here and abroad.[21] **These do not constitute “violence” in Pinker’s** accounting **system**. Pinker’s “Cold War” Although Pinker covers a great deal of ground from the earliest humans to the present, with numerous figures and learned citations, **Better Angels is an overwhelmingly ideological work**, with biases that reveal themselves at every level—sourcing, language, framing, historical and political context, and substance—and on all topics. Consider this example: You would think that the disappearance of the gravest threat in the history of humanity [i.e., a NATO-Warsaw Pact nuclear war] would bring a sigh of relief among commentators on world affairs. Contrary to expert predictions, there was no invasion of Western Europe by Soviet tanks, no escalation of a crisis in Cuba or Berlin or the Middle East to a nuclear holocaust. The cities of the world were not vaporized; the atmosphere was not poisoned by radioactive fallout or choked with debris that blacked out the sun and sent Homo sapiens the way of the dinosaurs. Not only that, but a reunited Germany did not turn into the fourth reich, democracy did not go the way of monarchy, and the great powers and developed nations did not fall into a third world war but rather a long peace, which keeps getting longer. (295) This is of course rhetoric, but it is saturated with political bias, straw persons, and literal errors: The nuclear war-threat has not disappeared, and two cities of the world were vaporized, with a quarter of a million civilians killed in two quick strokes, but this was done by Pinker’s home country, just as nuclear war remains “on the table” and nuclear arms continue to be an integral part of the arsenal of the United States, NATO, Israel, and India (the last shielded outside the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons by the new “strategic partnership” between the United States and India since July 2005[22])—and all despite the United States’ and the other four original nuclear weapons-states’ promise in 1968 to work toward the elimination of nuclear weapons.[23]

**2NC/1NR – FW**

**FW – Top Level**

#### Our interpretation is that the judge should be an intellectual grading the foundation upon which the 1AC stems from — if we win the foundations of the Aff are suspect, we should win irrespective of hypothetical enactment of a plan.

#### The net-benefit is state-centrism — Neocleous and Rigakos indicate that working within traditional structures of IR replicates colonial domination of the other. They conclude that this strategy is both less successful and less specific than our critique. We turn specificity and topic knowledge.

#### Our framework is necessary to reclaim the political from state-focused methods that constrict democratic dialogue. Vote negative to reject simplistic yes/no debates and the threat of immediate consequences in favor of intellectual recalibration

Biswas 7 — (Shampa, Professor of Politics at Whitman, “Empire and Global Public Intellectuals: Reading Edward Said as an International Relations Theorist” Millennium 36 (1) p. 117-125)

The recent resuscitation of the project of Empire should give International Relations scholars particular pause.1 For a discipline long premised on a triumphant Westphalian sovereignty, there should be something remarkable about the ease with which the case for brute force, regime change and empire-building is being formulated in widespread commentary spanning the political spectrum. Writing after the 1991 Gulf War, Edward Said notes the US hesitance to use the word ‘empire’ despite its long imperial history.2 This hesitance too is increasingly under attack as even self-designated liberal commentators such as Michael Ignatieff urge the US to overcome its unease with the ‘e-word’ and selfconsciously don the mantle of imperial power, contravening the limits of sovereign authority and remaking the world in its universalist image of ‘democracy’ and ‘freedom’.3 Rashid Khalidi has argued that the US invasion and occupation of Iraq does indeed mark a new stage in American world hegemony, replacing the indirect and proxy forms of Cold War domination with a regime much more reminiscent of European colonial empires in the Middle East.4 The ease with which a **defence of empire has been mounted and a colonial project** so unabashedly **resurrected** makes this a particularly **opportune**, **if not necessary, moment**, as scholars of ‘the global’, to take stock of our disciplinary complicities with power, to account for **colonialist imaginaries** **that are lodged at the heart of a discipline** ostensibly interested in power but perhaps far too deluded by the formal equality of state sovereignty and overly concerned with security and order. Perhaps more than any other scholar, Edward Said’s groundbreaking work in Orientalism has argued and demonstrated the long and deep complicity of academic scholarship with colonial domination.5 In addition to spawning whole new areas of scholarship such as postcolonial studies, Said’s writings have had considerable influence in his own discipline of comparative literature but also in such varied disciplines as anthropology, geography and history, all of which have taken serious and sustained stock of their own participation in imperial projects and in fact regrouped around that consciousness in a way that has simply not happened with International Relations.6 It has been 30 years since Stanley Hoffman accused IR of being an ‘American social science’ and noted its too close connections to US foreign policy elites and US preoccupations of the Cold War to be able to make any universal claims,7 yet there seems to be a curious amnesia and lack of curiosity about the political history of the discipline, and in particular its own complicities in the production of empire.8 Through what discourses the imperial gets reproduced, resurrected and re-energised is a question that should be very much at the heart of a discipline whose task it is to examine the contours of global power. Thinking this failure of IR through some of Edward Said’s critical scholarly work from his long distinguished career as an intellectual and activist, this article is an attempt to politicise and hence render questionable the **disciplinary traps that have**, ironically, **circumscribed the ability of scholars whose** very **business it is to think about** global **politics to actually think globally and politically.** What Edward Said has to offer IR scholars, I believe, is a certain kind of global sensibility, a critical but sympathetic and felt awareness of an inhabited and cohabited world. Furthermore, it is a profoundly political sensibility whose globalism is predicated on a cognisance of the imperial and a firm non-imperial ethic in its formulation. I make this argument by travelling through a couple of Said’s thematic foci in his enormous corpus of writing. Using a lot of Said’s reflections on the role of public intellectuals, I argue in this article that IR scholars need to develop what I call a ‘**global intellectual posture’**. In the 1993 Reith Lectures delivered on BBC channels, Said outlines three positions for public intellectuals to assume – as an outsider/exile/marginal, as an ‘amateur’, and as a disturber of the status quo speaking ‘truth to power’ and self-consciously siding with those who are underrepresented and disadvantaged.9 Beginning with a discussion of Said’s critique of ‘professionalism’ and the ‘cult of expertise’ as it applies to International Relations, I first argue the importance, for scholars of global politics, of taking politics seriously. Second, I turn to Said’s comments on the posture of exile and his critique of identity politics, particularly in its nationalist formulations, to ask what it means for students of global politics to take the global seriously. Finally, I attend to some of Said’s comments on humanism and contrapuntality to examine what IR scholars can learn from Said about feeling and thinking globally concretely, thoroughly and carefully. IR Professionals in an Age of Empire: From ‘International Experts’ to ‘Global Public Intellectuals’ One of the profound effects of the war on terror initiated by the Bush administration has been a significant **constriction of a democratic public sphere**, which has included the active and aggressive curtailment of intellectual and political dissent and a **sharp delineation of** national **boundaries** **along with concentration of state power**. The academy in this context has become a particularly embattled site with some highly disturbing onslaughts on academic freedom. At the most obvious level, this has involved fairly well-calibrated neoconservative attacks on US higher education that have invoked the mantra of ‘liberal bias’ and demanded legislative regulation and reform10, an onslaught supported by a well-funded network of conservative think tanks, centres, institutes and ‘concerned citizen groups’ within and outside the higher education establishment11 and with considerable reach among sitting legislators, jurists and policy-makers as well as the media. But what has in part made possible the encroachment of such nationalist and statist agendas has been a larger history of the corporatisation of the university and the accompanying ‘professionalisation’ that goes with it. Expressing concern with ‘academic acquiescence in the decline of public discourse in the United States’, Herbert Reid has examined the ways in which the university is beginning to operate as another transnational corporation12, and critiqued the consolidation of a ‘culture of professionalism’ where **academic bureaucrats engage in bureaucratic role-playing, minor academic turf battles mask the larger managerial power play** on campuses and the increasing influence of a relatively autonomous administrative elite and the rise of insular ‘expert cultures’ have led to academics **relinquishing their claims to public space** and authority.13 While it is no surprise that the US academy should find itself too at that uneasy confluence of neoliberal globalising dynamics and exclusivist nationalist agendas that is the predicament of many contemporary institutions around the world, there is much reason for concern and an urgent need to rethink the role and place of intellectual labour in the democratic process. This is especially true for scholars of the global writing in this age of globalisation and empire. Edward Said has written extensively on the place of the academy as one of the few and increasingly precarious spaces for democratic deliberation and argued the necessity for public intellectuals immured from the seductions of power.14 Defending the US academy as one of the last remaining utopian spaces, ‘the one public space available to real alternative intellectual practices: no other institution like it on such a scale exists anywhere else in the world today’15, and lauding the remarkable critical theoretical and historical work of many academic intellectuals in a lot of his work, Said also complains that ‘the American University, with its munificence, utopian sanctuary, and remarkable diversity, has defanged (intellectuals)’16. The most serious threat to the ‘intellectual vocation’, he argues, is ‘professionalism’ and mounts a pointed attack on the proliferation of ‘specializations’ and the ‘cult of expertise’ with their focus on ‘relatively narrow areas of knowledge’, ‘technical formalism’, ‘impersonal theories and methodologies’, and most worrisome of all, their ability and willingness to be seduced by power.17 Said mentions in this context the funding of academic programmes and research which came out of the exigencies of the Cold War18, an area in which there was considerable traffic of political scientists (largely trained as IR and comparative politics scholars) with institutions of policy-making. Looking at various influential US academics as ‘organic intellectuals’ involved in a dialectical relationship with foreign policy-makers and examining the institutional relationships at and among numerous think tanks and universities that **create convergent perspectives and interests**, Christopher Clement has studied US intervention in the Third World both during and after the Cold War **made possible and justified through various forms of ‘intellectual articulation’**.19 **This is not simply a matter of scholars working for the state, but** indeed **a larger question of intellectual orientation.** It is not uncommon for IR scholars to feel the need to formulate their scholarly conclusions in terms of its relevance for global politics, where ‘relevance’ is measured entirely in terms of policy wisdom. Edward Said’s searing indictment of US intellectuals – policy-experts and Middle East experts - in the context of the first Gulf War20 is certainly even more resonant in the contemporary context preceding and following the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The space for a critical appraisal of the motivations and conduct of this war has been considerably diminished by the expertise-framed national **debate wherein** certain kinds of **ethical questions irreducible to formulaic ‘for or against’ and ‘costs and benefits’ analysis can simply not be raised.** In effect, what Said argues for, and IR scholars need to pay particular heed to, is an understanding of ‘intellectual relevance’ that is larger and more worthwhile, that is about the posing of critical, historical, ethical and perhaps unanswerable questions rather than the offering of recipes and solutions, **that is about politics (rather than techno-expertise) in the most fundamental and important senses of the vocation**.21

#### Reject the affirmative’s fear-driven politics – critical analysis of the politics of security and resultant militarism gives us a new political vocabulary with which to articulate a truly democratic politics – activating your role as an ethical educator is the only way to avert permanent warfare

Giroux 13 — Henry, Chair in English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University, Violence, USA, monthlyreview.org/2013/05/01/violence-usa

In addition, as the state is hijacked by the financial-military-industrial complex, the “most crucial decisions regarding national policy are not made by representatives, but by the financial and military elites.”53 **Such massive inequality and** the **suffering** **and political corruption** it produces point to the need for **critical analysis** in which the separation of power and politics can be understood. This means **developing terms** that clarify how power becomes global even as politics continues to function largely at the national level, with the effect of reducing the state primarily to custodial, policing, and punishing functions—at least for those populations considered disposable. The state exercises its slavish role in the form of lowering taxes for the rich, deregulating corporations, funding wars for the benefit of the defense industries, and devising other welfare services for the ultra-rich. There is no escaping the global politics of finance capital and the global network of violence it has produced. Resistance must be mobilized globally and politics restored to a level where it can make a difference in fulfilling the promises of a global democracy. But **such a challenge can only take place if the political is made more pedagogical** and matters of education take center stage in the struggle for **desires, subjectivities, and social relations** that refuse the normalizing of violence as a source of gratification, entertainment, identity, and honor. War in its expanded incarnation works in tandem with a state organized around the production of widespread violence. Such a state is necessarily divorced from public values and the formative cultures that make a democracy possible. The result is a weakened civic culture that allows violence and punishment to circulate as part of a culture of commodification, entertainment, distraction, and exclusion. In opposing the emergence of the United States as both a warfare and a punishing state, I am not appealing to a form of left moralism meant simply to mobilize outrage and condemnation. These are not unimportant registers, but they do not constitute an adequate form of resistance. What is needed are **modes of analysis that do the hard work of uncovering** the effects of the merging of institutions of capital, wealth, and power, and how this merger has extended the reach of a military-industrial-carceral and academic complex, especially since the 1980s. **This complex of ideological and institutional elements designed for the production of violence must be addressed** by making visible its vast national and global interests and militarized **networks**, as indicated by the fact that the United States has over 1,000 military bases abroad.54 Equally important is the need to highlight how this military-industrial-carceral and academic complex uses punishment as a structuring force to shape national policy and everyday life. **Challenging the warfare state also has an important educational component**. C. Wright Mills was right in arguing that it is impossible to separate the violence of an authoritarian social order from the cultural apparatuses that nourish it. As Mills put it, the major cultural apparatuses not only “guide experience, they also expropriate the very chance to have an experience rightly called ‘our own.’”55 This narrowing of experience shorn of public values locks people into private interests and the hyper-individualized orbits in which they live. Experience itself is now privatized, instrumentalized, commodified, and increasingly militarized. Social responsibility gives way to organized infantilization and a flight from responsibility. Crucial here is the need to **develop new cultural and political vocabularies** that can foster an engaged mode of citizenship capable of naming the corporate and academic interests that support the warfare state and its apparatuses of violence, while simultaneously mobilizing social movements to challenge and dismantle its vast networks of power. One **central pedagogical and political task** in dismantling the warfare state is, therefore, the challenge of creating the cultural conditions and public spheres that would enable the U.S. public to move from being spectators of war and everyday violence to being informed and engaged citizens. Unfortunately, major cultural apparatuses like public and higher education, which have been historically responsible for educating the public, are becoming little more than market-driven and **militarized** **knowledge factories**. In this particularly insidious role, educational institutions deprive students of the capacities that would enable them not only to assume public responsibilities, but also to actively participate in the process of governing. **Without the public spheres for creating a formative culture equipped to challenge the educational, military,** market, and religious **fundamentalisms that dominate U.S. society, it will be virtually impossible to resist the normalization of war as a matter of domestic and foreign polic**y. **Any viable notion of resistance** to the current authoritarian order must also address the issue of what it means pedagogically to imagine a more **democratically oriented notion of knowledge, subjectivity, and agency** and what it might mean to bring such notions into the public sphere. This is more than what Bernard Harcourt calls “a new grammar of political disobedience.”56 It is a reconfiguring of the nature and substance of the political so that **matters of pedagogy become central to the very definition of what constitutes the political and the practices that make it meaningful**. **Critical understanding motivates transformative action, and the affective investments it demands can only be brought about by breaking into the hardwired forms of common sense that give war and state-supported violence their legitimacy. War does not have to be a permanent social relation,** nor the primary organizing principle of everyday life, society, and foreign policy. The war of all-against-all and the social Darwinian imperative to respond positively only to one’s own self-interest represent the death of politics, civic responsibility, and ethics, and set the stage for a dysfunctional democracy, if not an emergent authoritarianism. The existing neoliberal social order produces individuals who have no commitment, except to profit, disdain social responsibility, and loosen all ties to any viable notion of the public good. This regime of punishment and privatization is organized around the structuring forces of violence and militarization, which produce a **surplus of fear, insecurity**, and a weakened culture of civic engagement—one in which there is little room for reasoned debate, critical dialogue, and informed intellectual exchange. Patricia Clough and Craig Willse are right in arguing that we live in a society “in which **the production and circulation of death functions as political and economic recovery**.”57 The United States understood as a warfare state prompts a new urgency for a collective politics and a social movement capable of negating the current regimes of political and economic power, while imagining a different and more democratic social order. Until the **ideological and structural foundations of violence** that are pushing U.S. society over the abyss are addressed, the current warfare state will be transformed into a full-blown authoritarian state that will shut down any vestige of democratic values, social relations, and public spheres. At the very least, the U.S. public owes it to its children and future generations, if not the future of democracy itself, to **make visible and dismantle this machinery of violence** while also reclaiming the spirit of a future that works for life rather than death—the future of the current authoritarianism, however dressed up they appear in the spectacles of consumerism and celebrity culture. It is time for **educators**, unions, young people, liberals, religious organizations, and other groups to connect the dots, educate themselves, and develop powerful social movements that can restructure the fundamental values and social relations of democracy while establishing the institutions and formative cultures that make it possible. Stanley Aronowitz is right in arguing thAT: **the system survives on the eclipse of the radical imagination**, the absence of a viable political opposition with roots in the general population, and the **conformity of its intellectuals** who, to a large extent, are subjugated by their secure berths in the academy [and though] we can take some solace in 2011, the year of the protester…it would be premature to predict that decades of retreat, defeat and silence can be reversed overnight without a commitment to what may be termed “a long march” through the institutions, the workplaces and the streets of the capitalist metropoles.58 The current protests among young people, workers, the unemployed, students, and others are making clear that this is not—indeed, cannot be—only a short-term project for reform, but must constitute a political and social movement of sustained growth, accompanied by the reclaiming of public spaces, the progressive use of digital technologies, the development of democratic public spheres, new modes of education, and the safeguarding of places where democratic expression, new identities, and collective hope can be nurtured and mobilized. Without broad political and social movements standing behind and uniting the call on the part of young people for democratic transformations, any attempt at radical change will more than likely be cosmetic. Any viable challenge to the new authoritarianism and its **theater of** cruelty and **violence** must include developing a variety of cultural discourses and sites where **new modes of agency can be imagined** and enacted, particularly **as they work to reconfigure a new collective subject, modes of sociality, and “alternative conceptualizations of the self and its relationship to others.”**59 Clearly, if the United States is to make a claim to democracy, it must develop a politics that views violence as a moral monstrosity and war as virulent pathology. How such a claim to politics unfolds remains to be seen. In the meantime, resistance proceeds, especially among the young people who now carry the banner of struggle against an encroaching authoritarianism that is working hard to snuff out all vestiges of democratic life.

**FW – Knowledge Production 1st**

#### The judge should evaluate the debate in terms of competing ways of knowing the world. Voting affirmative meaning creating the judge space as a security intellectual – depoliticizing conflict and making any violence possible in the name of efficiency. The alternative is to reject security as valuable intellectual labour

Neocleous 8 — Prof of Government @ Brunel University; London (Mark, Critique of Security, pg. 184-5)

Anyone well versed in history or with experience of university life will know about the shameful ways in which large numbers of academics have elevated venality into the cardinal academic virtue, complying with the demands of those in power and the wishes of those with money: witness the political scientists, historians, anthropologists, geographers, cartographers, sociologists, linguists and many others who reworked their disciplines according to the principles and myths, and the principle myths, of fascism.' 'Academic life under fascism', notes Christopher Hutton, 'is a dismal ... episode in an unedifying story of relations between the modem academic and the state, and between academics and power both within and outside the university. But this part of the history of fascism is merely the worst moment in the wider and equally unedifying story of relations between academics and the state more generally, merely one way m which intellectuals have kowtowed to the principles and myths, and the principle myths, concerning security and the state. Spouting the jargon of security and enthralled by the trappings of power, their intellectual labour consists of nothing less than attempts to write hand-books for the princes of the new security state. The death of countless numbers in a more 'efficient' bombing of a city, the stationing of troops halfway around the World in order to bring to an end any attempt at collective self-determination, the use of military machines against civilians, the training of police forces in counter-insurgency practices, but more than anything the key concepts and categories used to explain and justify these things - all defended, supported and even ‘improved” by security intellectuals for whom, ultimately, intelIecua1 labour boils down to little more than the question of the most efficient manner. In which to achieve the security demanded by the state and bourgeois order. In rationalizing the political and corporate logic of security, the security intellectual conceals the utter irrationality of the system as a whole. The security intellectual then is nothing less than the security ideologue, peddling the fetish of our time. The only way out of such a dilemma, to escape the fetish, is perhaps to eschew the logic of security altogether - to reject it as so ideologically loaded in favour of the state that any real political thought other than the authoritarian and reactionary should be pressed to give it up, That is clearly something that can not be achieved within the limits of bourgeois thought and thus could never even begin to be imagined by the security intellectual. It is also something that the constant iteration of the refrain ‘this is an insecure world’ and reiteration of one fear, anxiety and insecurity after another will also make it hard to do, but it is something that the critique of security suggests we may have to consider if we want a political way out of the impasse of security. This impasse exists because security has now become so all-encompassing that it marginalizes all else, most notably the constructive conflicts, debates and discussions that animate political life. The constant prioritizing of a mythical security as a political end - as the political end - constitutes a rejection of politics in any meaningful sense of the term. That is, as a mode of action in which differences can be articulated, in which the conflicts and struggles that arise from such differences can be fought for and negotiated, in which people might come to believe that another world is possible - that they might transform the world and in turn be transformed. Security politics simply removes this; worse, it removes it while purportedly addressing it. In so doing it suppresses all issues of power and turns political questions into debates about the most efficient way to achieve ‘security’, despite the fact that we are never quite told - never could be told – what might count as having achieved it. Security politics is, in this sense, an anti-politics,” dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. We therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add yet more ‘sectors to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the state, and legitimizes state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives. Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter asks: if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that’s left behind? But I’m inclined to agree with Dalby: maybe there is no hole. The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever. All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently end up re-affirming the state as the terrain of modem politics, the grounds of security. The real task is not to fill the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but to fight for an alternative political language which takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state. That’s the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths. For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding ‘more security’ (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn’t damage our liberty) is to blind ourselves to the possibility of building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant securitizing of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that ‘security’ helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also allow us to forge another kind of politics centered on a different conception of the good. We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the word. **What this might mean, precisely, must be open to debate. But it certainly requires recognizing that security is an illusion** that has forgotten it is an illusion; it requires recognising that security is not the same as solidarity; it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead learning to tolerate the uncertainties, ambiguities and ‘insecurities’ that come with being human; it requires accepting that securitizing an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but bracketing it out and handing it to the state; it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift.

### FW – Reps 1st

#### Representations must precede policy discussion – they determine what is politically thinkable.

Crawford 02 —Neta, PhD MA MIT, BA Brown, Prof. of poli sci at boston univ. Argument and Change in World Politics, p. 19-21

Coherent arguments are unlikely to take place unless and until actors, at least on some level, agree on what they are arguing about. The at least temporary resolution of meta-arguments- regarding the nature of the good (the content of prescriptive norms); what is out there, the way we know the world, how we decide between competing beliefs (ontology and epistemology); and the nature of the situation at hand( the proper frame or representation)- must occur before specific arguments that could lead to decision and action may take place. Meta-arguments over epistemology and ontology, relatively rare, occur in instances where there is a fundamental clash between belief systems and not simply a debate within a belief system. Such arguments over the nature of the world and how we come to know it are particularly rare in politics though they are more frequent in religion and science. Meta-arguments over the “good” are contests over what it is good and right to do, and even how we know the good and the right. They are about the nature of the good, specifically, defining the qualities of “good” so that we know good when we see it and do it. Ethical arguments are about how to do good in a particular situation. More common are meta-arguments over representations or frames- about how we out to understand a particular situation. Sometimes actors agree on how they see a situation. More often there are different possible interpretations. Thomas Homer-Dixon and Roger karapin suggest, “Argument and debate occur when people try to gain acceptance for their interpretation of the world”. For example, “is the war defensive or aggressive?”. Defining and controlling representations and images, or the frame, affects whether one thinks there is an issue at stake and whether a particular argument applies to the case. An actor fighting a defensive war is within international law; an aggressor may legitimately be subject to sanctions. Framing and reframing involve mimesis or putting forward representations of what is going on. In mimetic meta-arguments, actors who are struggling to characterize or frame the situation accomplish their ends by drawing vivid pictures of the “reality” through exaggeration, analogy, or differentiation. Representations of a situation do not re-produce accurately **so much** as they creatively re-present situations in a way that makes sense. “mimesis is a metaphoric or ‘iconic argumentation of the real.’ Imitating not the effectivity of events but their logical structure and meaning.” Certain features are emphasized and others de-emphasized or completely ignored as their situation is recharacterized or reframed. Representation thus becomes a “constraint on reasoning in that it limits understanding to a specific organization of conceptual knowledge.” The dominant representation delimits which arguments will be considered legitimate, framing how actors see possibities. As Roxanne Doty argues, “the possibility of practices presupposes the ability of an agent to imagine certain courses of action. Certain background meanings, kinds of social actors and relationships, must already be in place.” If, as Donald Sylvan and Stuart Thorson argue, “politics involves the selective privileging of representations, “it may not matter whether one representation or another is true or not. Emphasizing whether frames articulate accurate or inaccurate perceptions misses the rhetorical importof representation- how frames affect what is seen or not seen, and subsequent choices. Meta-arguments over representation are thus crucial elements of political argument because an actor’s arguments about what to do will be more persuasive if their characterization or framing of the situation holds sway. But, as Rodger Payne suggests, “No frame is an omnipotent persuasive tool that can be decisively wielded by norm entrepreneurs without serious political wrangling.” Hence framing is a meta-argument.

#### Representations of China come first — they inevitably shape the policies that result. Aff plan can’t be divorced from the 1AC discourse that supports it.

Turner 11 — Oliver Turner, Hallsworth Research Fellow, 2011 (“Sino-US relations then and now: Discourse, images, policy”, Political Perspectives, <http://s3.amazonaws.com/academia.edu.documents/7893232/sino-us-relations1.pdf?AWSAccessKeyId=AKIAJ56TQJRTWSMTNPEA&Expires=1466627631&Signature=%2FsH5l2JqerSrFnjwvHGSf5Gz0%2F0%3D&response-content-disposition=inline%3B%20filename%3DSino-US_Relations_Then_and_Now_Discourse.pdf>, accessed 22nd June, CE)

David Campbell provides a useful reorientation of traditional assumptions of foreign policy so that analysis shifts from a concern for the relations between states to one for the processes by which states are made foreign in relation to one another. **Societal representations of foreign lands and people, he argues, are more than descriptions of others ‘out there’. They constitute the discursive construction of states at all levels of society and the ubiquitous process by which actors are made foreign in relation to the identity of the self.** When understood in these terms, processes of representation become a ‘specific sort of boundary producing political performance’ (Ashley, 1987, p.51, emphasis in original). **The power inherent to domestic or societal discourse, then, is such that the truths it advances are able to create the necessary reality within which particular policies are not only enabled but justified as logical and proper courses of action.** As Foucault explains, power is understood to be inextricable from knowledge so that one cannot be advanced in the absence of the other (Foucault, 1980: 52). The result is a power/knowledge nexus which precludes the advancement of discourse and the establishment of truth as neutral or dispassionate endeavours (Foucault, 1979). **Discursive representation, then, is unavoidably performative in the sense that ‘it produces the effects that it names’** (Gregory, 1995: 18). Ellingson agrees, noting that the historical construction of non-Europeans as ‘lower’ peoples has been at the heart of the establishment of a global European hegemony (Ellingson, 2001: xiii). **International relations therefore represent an arena of power that is both political and discursive, wherein discourses create** 32 **certain possibilities and preclude others** (Apple, 2003, p.6). **This means that American discourses and imagery about China have never been produced objectively or in the absence of purpose and intent.** Their dissemination must always be acknowledged as a performance of power, however seemingly innocent or benign. **They are able to create the imagined conditions within which** appropriate, and perhaps even ostensibly **unsavoury, action can be enacted while other potential policies are dismissed as inappropriate or impossible.** As Doty confirms, ‘the naturalization of meaning has had consequences ranging from the appropriation of land, labor and recourses to the subjugation and extermination of entire groups of people’ (Doty, 1998: 7). **American threat representations of China formulate an aggressive Chinese identity.**

**FW – Discourse Shapes Reality**

#### China Threat Discourse shapes reality in policymaking

Song 15 — Weiqing, associate professor of political science at the University of Macau, received his Ph.D. in political science from the University of Siena, Italy. His research interests include European politics, Chinese foreign policy, and China's post-socialist regime. His research has appeared in a number of international peer-reviewed journals- *The China Review, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Spring 2015), 145-169 Securitization of the "China Threat " Discourse: A Poststructuralist Account* TMY 6/22/16

In the scientific mode, securitizers reason deductively from scientific theory to the existence of a "China threat." This deductive process entails many instances of "intertextuality,"52 moments at which one spoken or written text alludes to, quotes, or otherwise relates to another. Discussion of the China threat is no longer limited to the world of academia; for instance, the issue has been widely referenced and examined by U.S. journalists in books that have subsequently become bestsellers.53 It is difficult to trace the ways in which academics and policy makers influence each other. However, it is clear that renowned IR scholars like Mearsheimer are influential not only in their own fields but far beyond. Here, knowledge and power mutually reinforce each other. With the increasing popularity of offensive realism and power transition theory, people in many different professions are alluding to or talking at length about the so-called China threat. In scholarly discuss ion, policy analysis, and strategic planning, the issue is often taken as a given.

**FW – Serial Policy Failure**

#### Aff harm and solvency claims are false. Advantages are random factoids politically constructed to make the plan appear to be a good idea. Solvency is a rigged game.

Dillon and Reid 2K — (Michael, Professor of Politics – University of Lancaster, and Julian, Lecturer in International Relations – King’s College, “Global Governance, Liberal Peace, and Complex Emergency”, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, January / March, 25(1))

More specifically, where there is a policy problematic there is expertise, and where there is expertise there, too, a policy problematic will emerge. Such problematics are detailed and elaborated in terms of discrete forms of knowledge as well as interlocking policy domains. Policy domains reify the problematization of life in certain ways by turning these epistemically and politically contestable orderings of life into "problems" that require the continuous attention of policy science and the continuous resolutions of policymakers. Policy "actors" develop and compete on the basis of the expertise that grows up around such problems or clusters of problems and their client populations. Here, too, we may also discover what might be called "epistemic entrepreneurs." Albeit the market for discourse is **prescribed** and **policed** in ways that Foucault indicated, bidding to formulate novel problematizations they seek to "sell" these, or otherwise have them officially adopted. In principle, there is no limit to the ways in which the management of population may be problematized. All aspects of human conduct, any encounter with life, is problematizable. Any problematization is capable of becoming a policy problem. Governmentality thereby creates a **market** for policy, for science and for policy science, in which problematizations go looking for policy sponsors while policy sponsors fiercely compete on behalf of their favored problematizations. Reproblematization of problems is constrained by the institutional and ideological investments surrounding accepted "problems," and by the sheer difficulty of challenging the **inescapable ontological and epistemological assumptions** that go into their very formation. There is nothing so fiercely contested as an epistemological or ontological assumption. And there is nothing so fiercely ridiculed as the suggestion that the real problem with problematizations exists precisely at the level of such assumptions. Such "paralysis of analysis" is precisely what policymakers seek to avoid since they are compelled constantly to respond to circumstances over which they ordinarily have in fact both more and less control than they proclaim. What they do not have is precisely the control that they want. Yet **serial policy failure**--the fate and the fuel of all policy--compels them into a continuous search for the new analysis that will extract them from the aporias in which they constantly find themselves enmeshed.[ 35] Serial policy failure is no simple shortcoming that science and policy--and policy science--will ultimately overcome. Serial policy failure is rooted in the ontological and epistemological assumptions that fashion the ways in which global governance encounters and problematizes life as a process of emergence through fitness landscapes that constantly adaptive and changing ensembles have continuously to negotiate. As a particular kind of intervention into life, global governance promotes the very changes and unintended outcomes that it then serially reproblematizes in terms of policy failure. Thus, global liberal governance is not a linear problem-solving process committed to the resolution of objective policy problems simply by bringing better information and knowledge to bear upon them. A **nonlinear** economy of power/knowledge, it deliberately installs socially specific and radically inequitable distributions of wealth, opportunity, and mortal danger both locally and globally through the very detailed ways in which life is variously (policy) problematized by it.

**A2: Jarvis**

#### Jarvis misreads and essentializes critical scholarship, making his claims worthless

Shapiro 1 — Michael J Shapiro, Professor of Politial Science at the University of Hawaii. International Studies Association review of Books 2001 p. 126-128

D. S. L. Jarvis's International Relations and the Challenge of Postmodern­ism: Defending the Discipline constitutes a radical alternative to Cochran's practice of critique. Manifesting a serious allergy to critique and especially to what he calls "postmodernism,"Jarvis presumes that he must defend tradi­tional, neopositivist IRagainst (in the words of the book jacket) "the various postmodern and poststructuralist theories currently sweeping the discipline of International Relations."To put the matter simply at the outset**,** Jarvis appears to be almost entirely ignorant of the philosophical predicates of the critical IR literature he attacks**.** He invents a model of thought that he finds vulnerableand then proceeds with his method of argumentation, mostly to scoff at the enemy he has invented. **But** Jarvis's scoffing amounts to whistling in the dark**.** He has entered a field of critique with predicates that are mysterious to him, and he shows signs of being genuinely anxious about the consequences of critical work**.**The monster Jarvis creates is a work of fiction**, for** he begins with the pre­sumption that postmodern orientations are "sweeping" and therefore threaten­ing the discipline**.** (I estimate that roughly one percent of the papers at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association reference postructural­ist philosophy.) Returning to the Victorian genre of Gothic fiction in which the constitutive practice involves two primary roles—the monster and the victim—Jarvis portrays Richard Ashley as the Frankenstein monster and the victim as the entire IR discipline. Moreover**,** Jarvis's overwrought style of characteriza­tion of the dangers of postmodern IR fits Gothic fiction's motivational profile as well**.** As is noted in Fred Botting's treatment of the genre: "The terrors and horrors of transgression in Gothic writing become powerful means to reassert the values of society, virtue and propriety. . . . They warn of dangers by putting them in their darkest and most threatening form**" (p. 5).**Why fiction? Jarvis' makes "the postmodern**" (**which he seems to know primarily on the basis of rumor**, for** most of his citations are not to postructur­alist texts but to thinkers hostile to them**)** an elastic category that applies to everything that he perceives to be antagonistic to his pre-Kantian empiricism.It encompasses most of feminist IR and anything that uses interpretive method.Although the use of a deconstructive mode **of critique** is extremely rarein international studies (the major practitioner is David Campbell),Jarvis fre­quently uses the term "deconstruction" as a synonym for postmodernist method**.** He assumes, without showing any evidence that he has read a word of Jacques Derrida's writings, that deconstruction is hostile to theory building and is opposed to all forms of affirmation. This characterization is belied by Derrida's state‑ments and demonstrations and by Campbell's deconstruction-inspired writing on war, security, and the ethics of responsibility. Symptomatic of his woeful ignorance of critical work in general, Jarvis refers at one point to the expression "structure of feeling" as a "postmodern phrase" (p. 32). Structure of feeling is initiated in the work of Raymond Williams, the late (and famous—though not sufficiently to alert Jarvis) Marxist literary critic whose work cannot be remotely related to poststructuralist critique and has inspired such prominent postmod­ernism bashers as Terry Eagleton.Jarvis's ignorance is not confined to contemporary critical interpretive theory (postmodern or otherwise); it even extends to the neoempiricist philosophy of science. For example, he chides postmodernists for holding the outrageous view that theorizing constitutes fact (p. 27), while he wants to uphold a model in which the integrity of theory—in international studies or elsewhere—requires that the domains of theory and fact be understood as radically separate. One need not resort to a Foucauldian treatment of discourse as event or a Deleuzian critique of representational thinking to challenge Jarvis's approach to theory**.** Jarvis's view **of the theory–data relationship** was seriously impeached by enough neoempiricist philosophers by the **19**60s to field a softball team(among the heavy hitters in the starting lineup would be Willard V. Quine, Patrick Suppes, and Norwood Russell Hanson)**.**The critical work for which Jarvis has contempt is not the threat he imag­ines to "the discipline," unless we construct the IR discipline as a trained inat­tention to the problematics, within which the work of theory proceeds**. The** writings of **Michel** Foucault(some of whose work Jarvis seems to have read) have implications for a critical and affirmative perspective that does not com­promise the kind of theory building that IR empiricists do. Itextends the arena**—**in which to theorize while encouraging a historical sensitivity—toregimes of discourse and suggests an ethico-politics of freedom from the impo­sitions of identity**.** Although Foucault's conception of the problematic points to how concepts and the modes of fact assigned to them are historically contin­gent, explicable in contexts of value, and complicit with modes of power and authority**,** this does nottherebyinvalidate theory**. Rather,** it opens the way to work on the ethico-political context of theory and, among other things, to theo­rize with a sensitivity to theory's constituencies (beyond the policymakers that seem to be prized by Jarvis). **As Molly Cochran, whose work is based on knowl­edge and critique rather than rumor and contempt, implies,** an important legacy of contemporary critical work is the expansion of political and moral inclusion. Finally, there is one other genre that is (regrettably) embedded in Jarvis's fable of the dangers of postmodernism, a biographical speculation about a five-year hiatus in Richard Ashley's publishing life. Obsessed with the dangers of postmodernism, Jarvis attributes these years of silence to the "deep resigna­tion" (p. 183) that he thinks Ashley's version of postmodern theorizing invites. Without insisting on a counterspeculation, I want to point out that Ashley's publishing hiatus coincides with the period shortly after an automobile accident claimed the life of his wife and seriously maimed his two sons**.** At a minimum, the information renders Jarvis's biographical fable crass and uninformed—like the rest of the book.

**2NC/1NR – Links**

**Link – Asia War**

#### Predictions of Asian war and instability are based on cultural misunderstandings and have been repeatedly disproven.

Kang 3 — Associate Professor of Government and Adjunct Associate Professor at the Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth College. (David C. Kang, “Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks” International Security, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Spring, 2003), pp. 57-85)

Following the end of the Cold War in 1991, some scholars in the West began to predict that Asia was "ripe for rivalry."'12 They based this prediction on the following factors: wide disparities in the levels of economic and military power among nations in the region; their different political systems, ranging from to totalitarian; historical animosities; and the lack of international institutions. Many scholars thus envisaged a return of power politics after decades when conflict in Asia was dominated by the Cold War tension between the United States and the Soviet Union. In addition, scholars envisaged a re- turn of arms racing and the possibility of major conflict among Asian countries, almost all of which had rapidly changing internal and external environments. More **specific predictions** included the growing possibility of Japanese rearmament;' increased Chinese adventurism spurred by China's rising power and ostensibly revisionist intentions;'4 conflict or war over the status of Taiwan;'5 terrorist or missile attacks from a rogue North Korea against South Korea, Japan, or even the United States;16 and arms racing or even conflict in Southeast Asia, prompted in part by unresolved territorial disputes.7" More than a dozen years have passed since the end of the Cold War, yet none of these pessimistic predictions have come to pass. Indeed there has not been a major war in Asia since the 1978-79 Vietnam-Cambodia-China conflict; and with only a few exceptions (North Korea and Taiwan), Asian countries do not fear for their survival. Japan, though powerful, **has not rearmed** to the extent it could. China seems **no more revisionist** or adventurous now than it was before the end of the Cold War. And **no Asian country appears to be balancing against China**. In contrast to the period 1950-80, the past two decades have witnessed enduring regional stability and minimal conflict. Scholars should directly confront these anomalies, rather than dismissing them. **Social scientists can learn as much from events that do not occur as from those that do.** The case of Asian security provides an **opportunity** to examine the usefulness of accepted **international relations paradigms** and to **determine how the assumptions underlying these theories can become misspecified**. Some scholars have smuggled ancillary and ad hoc hypotheses about preferences into realist, institutionalist, and constructivist theories to make them fit various aspects of the Asian cases, including: assumptions about an irrational North Korean leadership, predictions of an expansionist and revisionist China, and depictions of Japanese foreign policy as "abnormal."' Social science moves forward from the clear statement of a theory, its causal logic, and its predictions. Just as important, however, is the rigorous assessment of the theory, especially if predictions flowing from it fail to materialize. Exploring why scholars have misunderstood Asia is both a fruitful and a necessary theoretical exercise.

#### Realist predictions of wars in Asia have been proven false over and over. It’s time to abandon this problematic framing.

Kang 3 **—** Associate Professor of Government and Adjunct Associate Professor at the Tuck School of Business at Dartmouth College. (David C. Kang “Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks” International Security, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Spring, 2003), pp. 57-85)

Second, pessimistic predictions about Asia's future often suffer from incompletely specified evidentiary standards. Scholars will frequently select evidence that supports their arguments and dismiss contradictory evidence as epiphenomenal. For example, in his most recent book, John Mearsheimer argues that although Japan (and Germany) have "the potential in terms of population and wealth to become great powers ... they depend on the United States for their security, and are effectively semi-sovereign states, not great powers."22 This begs a number of questions: For instance, why define Japan, which has the second largest economy in the world, as "semi-sovereign"? Indeed why would such an economically advanced state ever allow itself to remain "semi- sovereign"? Mearsheimer's book is focused on building a theory of offensive realism, but the logic of offensive realism would lead to the conclusion that Japan should have rearmed long ago. The onus is on those predicting an increase in power politics in Asia to state clearly what evidence would falsify their arguments or challenge their assumptions, not to explain away objections or ignore contradictory evidence. A clearer explication of their hypotheses and the refutable propositions would be a genuine contribution to the field. More than a dozen years after the end of the Cold War, much of Asia bears little resemblance to the picture painted by the pessimists. Although the years 1950-80 saw numerous armed conflicts, since then there has been no major interstate war in either Northeast or Southeast Asia. Countries do not fear for their survival in either area. In Northeast Asia, rivalry and power politics remain muted. Japan has not rearmed, China shows little sign of having revisionist tendencies, and North Korea has neither imploded nor exploded. Southeast Asia, as well, remains free of the kinds of arms races and power politics that some have expected. As Muthiah Alagappa writes, "Viewed through the ahistorical realist lens, the contemporary security challenges could indeed suggest that Asia is a dangerous place. But a comprehensive historical view would suggest otherwise. Although Asia still faces serious internal and inter- national challenges, there are fewer challenges than before and most of the region's disputes and conflicts have stabilized."23 The field of international relations would be better served if the pessimists not only admitted this reality but also asked why this might be the case. Because China has such an important influence on Northeast, Southeast, and even South Asia, I offer the tentative outline of such an explanation in the following section.

**Link – China (General)**

#### China threat discourse is manufactured to justify aggression toward China. This discourse turns the case and makes the aff’s impacts a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Turner 13 — Oliver Turner is a Research Associate at the Brooks World Poverty Institute at the University of Manchester. He is the author of American Images of China: Identity, Power, Policy (Routledge, forthcoming) [“‘Threatening’ China and US security: the international politics of identity,” Review of International Studies, FirstView Articles, pp 1-22, Cambridge University Press 2013]

The modern day China ‘threat’ to the United States is not an unproblematic, neutrally verifiable phenomenon. It is an imagined construction of American design and the product of societal representations which, to a significant extent, have established the truth that a ‘rising’ China endangers US security. This is an increasingly acknowledged, but still relatively under-developed, concept within the literature.121 The purpose of this article has been to expose how ‘threats’ from China towards the United States have always been contingent upon subjective interpretation. The three case studies chosen represent those moments across the lifetime of Sino-US relations at which China has been perceived as most threatening to American security. The ‘threats’ emerged in highly contrasting eras. The nature of each was very different and they emerged from varying sources (broadly speaking, from immigration in the nineteenth century and from ‘great power’ rivalry in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries). Yet in this way they most effectively demonstrate how China ‘threats’ have repeatedly existed as socially constructed phenomenon. Collectively they reveal the consistent centrality of understandings about the United States in perceptions of external danger. They demonstrate that, regardless of China's ability to assert material force or of the manner in which it has been seen to impose itself upon the United States, the **reality of danger can be manufactured** and made real. China ‘threats’ have always been threats to American identity so that the individual sources of ‘danger’— whether a nuclear capability or an influx of (relatively few) foreign immigrants— have never been the sole determining factors. As James Der Derian notes, danger can be ascribed to otherness wherever it may be found.122 During the mid-to-late nineteenth century and throughout the early Cold War, perceptions of China ‘threats’ provoked crises of American identity. The twenty-first-century China ‘threat’ is yet to be understood in this way but it remains inexplicable in simple material terms. As ever, the physical realities of China are important but they are **interpreted in such a way to make them threatening**, regardless of Beijing's intentions. Most importantly, this article has shown how processes of representation have been **complicit at every stage** of the formulation, enactment, and justification of **US China policy**. Their primary purpose has been to dislocate China's identity from that of the United States and introduce opportunities for action. Further, those policies themselves have reaffirmed the discourses of separation and difference which make China foreign from the United States, protecting American identity from the imagined threat. Ultimately, this analysis has sought to expose the inadequacy of approaches to the study of US China policy which privilege and centralise material forces to the extent that ideas are subordinated or even excluded. Joseph Nye argues that the China Threat Theory has the potential to become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Based upon a crude hypothetical assumption that there exists a 50 per cent chance of China becoming aggressive and a 50 per cent chance of it not, Nye explains, to treat China as an enemy now effectively discounts 50 per cent of the future.123 In such way he emphasises the ideational constitution of material forces and the power of discourse to create selected truths about the world so that certain courses of action are enabled while others are precluded. Assessments such as those of Director of National Intelligence James Clapper in March 2011 should therefore not only be considered misguided, but also potentially **dangerous**. For while they appear to represent authoritative statements of fact they actually **rely upon subjective assumptions** about China and the material capabilities he describes. In late 2010 President Obama informed Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao that ‘the American people [want] to continue to build a growing friendship and strong relationship between the peoples of China and the United States’.124 The hope, of course, is that a peaceful and cooperative future can be secured. Following the announcement that the Asia Pacific is to constitute the primary focus of Washington's early twenty-first-century foreign policy strategy, American interpretations of China must be acknowledged as a central force within an increasingly pertinent relationship. The basis of their relations will always be fundamentally constituted by ideas and history informs us that particular American discourses of China have repeatedly served to construct vivid and sometimes regrettable realities about that country and its people. Crucially, it tells us that they have always been inextricable from the potentialities of US China policy. As Sino-US relations become increasingly consequential the intention must be for American representations of the PRC— and indeed Chinese representations of the United States— to become the focus of more concerted scholarly attention. Only in this way can the contours of those relations be more satisfactorily understood, so that the types of historical episodes explored in this analysis might somehow be avoided in the future.

#### “China Threat” representations are rooted in fear and fantasy, not objective reality.

Pan 12 — Chengxin Pan, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at Deakin University, former visiting professor at the University of Melbourne, the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, and Peking University, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science and International Relations from the Australian National University and an LL.B. and LL.M. from Peking University, 2012 (“China Watching and Contemporary Geopolitics of Fear and Fantasy,” *Elgarblog*—Edward Elgar Publishing’s social sciences blog, December 12th, Available Online at <http://elgarblog.wordpress.com/2012/12/12/china-watching-and-contemporary-geopolitics-of-fear-and-fantasy-by-chengxin-pan/>, Accessed 10-03-2014)

In The Geopolitics of Emotion (2009), the French author Dominique Moïse describes how the world is being shaped and transformed by a host of emotions: fear, humiliation and hope, to name but a few. While the world has always been emotion-laden, the geopolitics of emotion has been particularly on vivid display in the twenty-first century. Climate change, the ‘September 11’ attacks, the lingering global financial crisis, the perceived unstoppable power shift from West to East, refugee and humanitarian crises, ethnic conflict and popular uprisings have together brought into sharp relief a mixture of anxiety, anger, frustration, disillusionment, hatred and fear in many parts of the globe. In the West in general, and the US in particular, a key source of anxiety has been China’s seemingly relentless rise. There is now ‘a cauldron of anxiety’ about this emerging giant, former Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick proclaimed in 2005.

To many Western observers, this fear, based on objective knowledge of China’s rise, is warranted. As an authoritarian state with the world’s fastest growing economy and one of the largest military forces, China seems to be nothing but a frightening giant on the horizon. Clearly, one cannot deny China’s vast size, enormous economic power and military potential. But the fact that the almost equally impressive rise of India has not attracted the same level of anxiety is revealing. If anything, India has been embraced with much enthusiasm and affection of late. In this sense, ‘objective’ knowledge, empirically grounded though it may seem, is nevertheless inseparable from emotion and desire. One might even say that what we know is often what we want to know. Thus, a significant portion of Western knowledge on China, gained apparently through the respected intellectual activity of China watching, has less to do with China and more with Western desire (a subject which has thus far attracted little attention).

The familiar ‘China threat’ argument, for instance, is not so much an objectively verified fact as it is a fear-inspired speculation disguised as ‘knowledge’. To substitute for the lack of positive certainty about China’s trajectory, this knowledge is produced through fear, which helps provide a negative form of certainty, namely, threat. During the Cold War, an Australian China observer commented that ‘What we do not know we fear’. That habit did not disappear with the end of the Cold War. Today, the Australian government vows to boost its China literacy in the Asian Century, but all the while it is acutely wary of China’s intention and military might, citing the usual reason that China is not yet transparent. Sharing this China anxiety with US policy-makers, Canberra has recently beefed up its military ties with Washington, as exemplified by allowing 2 500 US marines to train in Darwin and passing the US-Australian Defence Trade Treaty.

There is nothing wrong with feeling anxious about China. After all, the Chinese themselves may have been caught by surprise by the speed of their country’s ascendancy on the world stage, and many are grappling with the meanings and implications of China’s new global role. Meanwhile, aware of unease felt by neighbouring countries, the Chinese leadership has tried to reassure the rest of the world that China’s rise will be peaceful. Yet, this ‘reassurance’ policy has done little to ease that fear, for the latter has become interwoven with the expert knowledge of the ‘China threat’ offered by some quarters of the China watching community. This fear-induced China knowledge, now compounded by the widespread anxiety about impending US/Western decline, has in part given impetus to the Obama administration’s ‘Rebalancing’ to Asia. Although the US constantly denies that this strategic move aims at containing China, its unease with Beijing’s perceived growing clout has been at least one of its main driving forces. Interestingly but not surprisingly, despite their belonging to the opposite sides of the American partisan politics, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and former Republican Presidential nominee Mitt Romney both share this latent fear about America’s future as well as China’s ambition. Neither wants to see the widely anticipated Asian (Pacific) Century become a Chinese, rather than American, century.

Herein lies America’s new geopolitics of fear, following the decade-long ‘War on Terror’. But as the focus of this new geopolitical game turns to China and the Asia Pacific at large, fear is not the only emotion at play. Fantasy, as it may be called, is another, and perhaps even more enduring, emotional underpinning of the US’s Asia Pacific strategy.

From the American business community’s ‘Bridge the Pacific’ campaign in the late nineteenth century through Ronald Reagan’s ‘America is a Pacific nation’ declaration to Bill Clinton’s ‘Pacific Century’ statement, the Pacific has long been envisaged as an American Lake and a new frontier in the US’s ‘manifest destiny’ to lead the world from darkness to light. At the heart of Oriental darkness has been China, marked by its backward civilisation, despotic political system, and deplorable human rights records. Therefore, the dream of transforming the Oriental Other in American image has run deeply through US China-engagement policy ever since the missionaries’ ‘Christ for China’ campaign, business executives’ ‘Oil for the lamps of China’ slogan, and more recently, the ‘constructive engagement’ policies of the Bill Clinton and George W. Bush administrations. Considering that modern China studies and, by extension, contemporary China watching, owe much to the missionary writings on China, it is clear that fantasy or a desire to see ‘a huge country with an ancient civilization transforming herself into a modern, democratic, Christian nation and following the lead of the United States’ has been part and parcel of contemporary China research agenda, although the terminology has been changed from religious conversion of China to economic and institutional integration as well as normative socialisation.

Despite the intellectual, commercial and strategic efforts of engaging China, America’s China dream, now as then, proves to be elusive. As a result, a large part of the China fantasy has turned into disillusionment and even fear. In this context, the US’s ‘Rebalancing’ to Asia and its hedging against China represent a new and more sophisticated manifestation of the geopolitics of fear and fantasy. While no doubt many China observers are busy observing the fascinating new geopolitical manoeuvring in the Asia Pacific, they could do well to also critically observe the role of their China knowledge – strongly coloured by fear and fantasy – in the making of this strategic shift that is likely to profoundly shape global politics in the coming decades.

#### The Aff is an example of “China Threat” theory. It’s *not accurate* and is based on *flawed Western IR*. This leads to violent containment policies, turning the case.

Pan 4 — Chengxin, PhD in Political Science and IR at Australian National University, “The ‘China Threat’ in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Otheras Power Politics”, Alternatives, June-July, ebscohost

I have argued above that the "China threat" argument in mainstream U.S. IR literature is derived, primarily, from a discursive **construction of otherness**. This construction is predicated on a particular narcissistic understanding of the U.S. self and on a positivist-based realism, concerned with absolute certainty and security, a concern central to the dominant U.S. self-imaginary. Within these frameworks, it seems imperative that China be treated as a threatening, absolute other since it is unable to fit neatly into the U.S.-led evolutionary scheme or guarantee absolute security for the United States, so that U.S. power preponderance in the post-Cold War world can still be legitimated. Not only does this reductionist representation come at the expense of understanding China as a dynamic, multifaceted country but it leads inevitably to a policy of containment that, in turn, tends to enhance the influence of realpolitik thinking, nationalist extremism, and hard-line stance in today's China. Even a small dose of the containment strategy is likely to have a highly dramatic impact on U.S.-China relations, as the 1995-1996missile crisis and the 2001 spy-plane incident have vividly attested. In this respect, Chalmers Johnson is right when he suggests that "a policy of containment toward China implies the possibility of war, just as it did during the Cold War vis-a-vis the former Soviet Union. The balance of terror prevented war between the United States and the Soviet Union, but this may not work in the case of China."^^ For instance, as the United States presses ahead with a missile defence shield to "guarantee" its invulnerability from rather unlikely sources of missile attacks, it would be almost certain to intensify China's sense of vulnerability and compel it to expand its current small nuclear arsenal so as to maintain the efficiency of its limited deterrence. In consequence, **it is not impossible that the two countries**, and possibly the whole region, **might** be dragged into an escalating arms race that would eventually **make war more likely.** Neither the United States nor China is likely to be keen on fighting the other. But as has been demonstrated, the "China threat" argument, for all its alleged desire for peace and security, tends to make war preparedness the most "realistic" option for both sides. At this juncture, worthy of note is an interesting comment made by Charlie Neuhauser, a leading CIA China specialist. on the Vietnam War, a war fought by the United States to contain the then-Communist "other." Neuhauser says, "Nobody wants it. We don't want it, Ho Chi Minh doesn't want it; it's simply a question of annoying the other side."94 And, as we know, in an unwanted war some fifty-eight thousand young people from the United States and an estimated two million Vietnamese men, women, and children lost their lives. Therefore, to call for a halt to the vicious circle of theory as practice associated with the "China threat" literature, tinkering with the current positivist-dominated U.S. IR scholarship on China is no longer adequate. Rather, what is needed is to question this un-self-reflective scholarship itself, particularly its connections with the dominant way in which the United States and the West in general represent themselves and others via their positivist epistemology, so that alternative, more nuanced, and less dangerous ways of interpreting and debating China might become possible.

**Link – US-Japan Relations**

#### US alliances are an attempt to subjugate East Asia to American control.

Lim 11 — Kean Fan Lim, Assistant Professor in Economic Geography and Faculty of Social Sciences at University of Nottingham, 2011 (‘What You See Is (Not) What You Get? The Taiwan Question, Geo-Economic Realities, and the “China Threat” Imaginary’, Wiley Online Library, September 29, available online at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-8330.2011.00943.x/full, Accessed 06/22/16, JZ)

Then again, if China has no plausible economic motivation to engage in military conflict with the US, the potential for conflict could be attributed to the unilateral and sustained willingness of the US to accede to Taiwan's arms purchase requests, in the knowledge that China views such arms sales as a clear show of support for what it considers its own province. Intriguingly, the US framing of its relations with Taiwan could actually be due to an implicit distrust of putative allies in the East Asian region. Cha (2010:158) theorizes post-World War II US geopolitical alliances with South Korea, Taiwan and Japan as a form of bilateral “powerplay” designed to suppress not only the Soviet threat, but also: to constrain anticommunist allies in the region that might engage in aggressive behavior against adversaries that could entrap the United States in an unwanted larger war. Underscoring the U.S. desire to avoid such an outcome was a belief in the domino theory—that the fall of one small country in Asia could trigger a chain of countries falling to communism. This strategy arguably applies in the present day, despite the demise of the Soviet Union and China's peaceful integration into the global political economy. For instance, Christensen (1999:50) sees US military presence in East Asia as resolving a “security dilemma” triggered by a tendency for one country, affected profoundly by “historically based mistrust”, to overreact to another country's acquisition of ostensibly defensive military equipment. What Christensen (1999) does not emphasize, however, is that the US is also a major exporter of such equipment, which makes the “powerplay” logic a doublethink ratiocination. This echoes Cowen and Smith's (2009:42) aforementioned caveat that “geopolitical calculation is always available when deemed necessary”. Even though the Cold War is officially over, Johnson's analysis (2005, in Asia Times Online) strongly suggests that the “powerplay” approach remains in full swing: Since the end of the Cold War in 1991, the United States has repeatedly pressured Japan to revise Article 9 of its constitution (renouncing the use of force except as a matter of self-defense) and become what US officials call a “normal nation”… America's intention is to turn Japan into what Washington neo-conservatives like to call the “Britain of the Far East”—and then use it as a proxy in checkmating North Korea and balancing China. Cha's (2010)“powerplay” thesis thus illustrates how collaborating with the US through bilateral alliances already implies subjugation to broader US interests, although the US need not necessarily view subjugation as non-threatening. Asymmetrical bilateral alliances (between a large power and a smaller “ally”), as Cha (2010:164) puts it, are actually “power instruments of control” through which “the larger patron enjoys a great deal of leverage”. Such alliances are preferred when larger powers do not want to lose power vis-à-vis smaller “allies”, which highlight the implicit distrust prior to alliance formation. After all, as Bartelson (1995:164) writes, “[s]ecurity is not primarily an object of foreign policy; before security can be brought to function as such, it requires a prior differentiation of what is alien, other or simply outside the state and therefore threatens it”. Building on the insights of Johnson (Asia Times Online 2005) and Cha (2010), I will explore the implications of this “powerplay” strategy in the next section by focusing on how the geopolitical calculations of the US—exemplified through the unilaterally crafted TRA and sustained arms sales to Taiwan—could indirectly destabilize the “China region” and possibly even Sino-US geo-economic formations.

**Link – US-Taiwan Relations**

#### US alliances are an attempt to subjugate East Asia to American control.

Lim 11 — Kean Fan Lim, Assistant Professor in Economic Geography and Faculty of Social Sciences at University of Nottingham, 2011 (‘What You See Is (Not) What You Get? The Taiwan Question, Geo-Economic Realities, and the “China Threat” Imaginary’, Wiley Online Library, September 29, available online at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-8330.2011.00943.x/full, Accessed 06/22/16, JZ)

Then again, if China has no plausible economic motivation to engage in military conflict with the US, the potential for conflict could be attributed to the unilateral and sustained willingness of the US to accede to Taiwan's arms purchase requests, in the knowledge that China views such arms sales as a clear show of support for what it considers its own province. Intriguingly, the US framing of its relations with Taiwan could actually be due to an implicit distrust of putative allies in the East Asian region. Cha (2010:158) theorizes post-World War II US geopolitical alliances with South Korea, Taiwan and Japan as a form of bilateral “powerplay” designed to suppress not only the Soviet threat, but also: to constrain anticommunist allies in the region that might engage in aggressive behavior against adversaries that could entrap the United States in an unwanted larger war. Underscoring the U.S. desire to avoid such an outcome was a belief in the domino theory—that the fall of one small country in Asia could trigger a chain of countries falling to communism. This strategy arguably applies in the present day, despite the demise of the Soviet Union and China's peaceful integration into the global political economy. For instance, Christensen (1999:50) sees US military presence in East Asia as resolving a “security dilemma” triggered by a tendency for one country, affected profoundly by “historically based mistrust”, to overreact to another country's acquisition of ostensibly defensive military equipment. What Christensen (1999) does not emphasize, however, is that the US is also a major exporter of such equipment, which makes the “powerplay” logic a doublethink ratiocination. This echoes Cowen and Smith's (2009:42) aforementioned caveat that “geopolitical calculation is always available when deemed necessary”. Even though the Cold War is officially over, Johnson's analysis (2005, in Asia Times Online) strongly suggests that the “powerplay” approach remains in full swing: Since the end of the Cold War in 1991, the United States has repeatedly pressured Japan to revise Article 9 of its constitution (renouncing the use of force except as a matter of self-defense) and become what US officials call a “normal nation”… America's intention is to turn Japan into what Washington neo-conservatives like to call the “Britain of the Far East”—and then use it as a proxy in checkmating North Korea and balancing China. Cha's (2010)“powerplay” thesis thus illustrates how collaborating with the US through bilateral alliances already implies subjugation to broader US interests, although the US need not necessarily view subjugation as non-threatening. Asymmetrical bilateral alliances (between a large power and a smaller “ally”), as Cha (2010:164) puts it, are actually “power instruments of control” through which “the larger patron enjoys a great deal of leverage”. Such alliances are preferred when larger powers do not want to lose power vis-à-vis smaller “allies”, which highlight the implicit distrust prior to alliance formation. After all, as Bartelson (1995:164) writes, “[s]ecurity is not primarily an object of foreign policy; before security can be brought to function as such, it requires a prior differentiation of what is alien, other or simply outside the state and therefore threatens it”. Building on the insights of Johnson (Asia Times Online 2005) and Cha (2010), I will explore the implications of this “powerplay” strategy in the next section by focusing on how the geopolitical calculations of the US—exemplified through the unilaterally crafted TRA and sustained arms sales to Taiwan—could indirectly destabilize the “China region” and possibly even Sino-US geo-economic formations.

**Link – US-South Korea Relations**

#### US alliances are an attempt to subjugate East Asia to American control.

Lim 11 — Kean Fan Lim, Assistant Professor in Economic Geography and Faculty of Social Sciences at University of Nottingham, 2011 (‘What You See Is (Not) What You Get? The Taiwan Question, Geo-Economic Realities, and the “China Threat” Imaginary’, Wiley Online Library, September 29, available online at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-8330.2011.00943.x/full, Accessed 06/22/16, JZ)

Then again, if China has no plausible economic motivation to engage in military conflict with the US, the potential for conflict could be attributed to the unilateral and sustained willingness of the US to accede to Taiwan's arms purchase requests, in the knowledge that China views such arms sales as a clear show of support for what it considers its own province. Intriguingly, the US framing of its relations with Taiwan could actually be due to an implicit distrust of putative allies in the East Asian region. Cha (2010:158) theorizes post-World War II US geopolitical alliances with South Korea, Taiwan and Japan as a form of bilateral “powerplay” designed to suppress not only the Soviet threat, but also: to constrain anticommunist allies in the region that might engage in aggressive behavior against adversaries that could entrap the United States in an unwanted larger war. Underscoring the U.S. desire to avoid such an outcome was a belief in the domino theory—that the fall of one small country in Asia could trigger a chain of countries falling to communism. This strategy arguably applies in the present day, despite the demise of the Soviet Union and China's peaceful integration into the global political economy. For instance, Christensen (1999:50) sees US military presence in East Asia as resolving a “security dilemma” triggered by a tendency for one country, affected profoundly by “historically based mistrust”, to overreact to another country's acquisition of ostensibly defensive military equipment. What Christensen (1999) does not emphasize, however, is that the US is also a major exporter of such equipment, which makes the “powerplay” logic a doublethink ratiocination. This echoes Cowen and Smith's (2009:42) aforementioned caveat that “geopolitical calculation is always available when deemed necessary”. Even though the Cold War is officially over, Johnson's analysis (2005, in Asia Times Online) strongly suggests that the “powerplay” approach remains in full swing: Since the end of the Cold War in 1991, the United States has repeatedly pressured Japan to revise Article 9 of its constitution (renouncing the use of force except as a matter of self-defense) and become what US officials call a “normal nation”… America's intention is to turn Japan into what Washington neo-conservatives like to call the “Britain of the Far East”—and then use it as a proxy in checkmating North Korea and balancing China. Cha's (2010)“powerplay” thesis thus illustrates how collaborating with the US through bilateral alliances already implies subjugation to broader US interests, although the US need not necessarily view subjugation as non-threatening. Asymmetrical bilateral alliances (between a large power and a smaller “ally”), as Cha (2010:164) puts it, are actually “power instruments of control” through which “the larger patron enjoys a great deal of leverage”. Such alliances are preferred when larger powers do not want to lose power vis-à-vis smaller “allies”, which highlight the implicit distrust prior to alliance formation. After all, as Bartelson (1995:164) writes, “[s]ecurity is not primarily an object of foreign policy; before security can be brought to function as such, it requires a prior differentiation of what is alien, other or simply outside the state and therefore threatens it”. Building on the insights of Johnson (Asia Times Online 2005) and Cha (2010), I will explore the implications of this “powerplay” strategy in the next section by focusing on how the geopolitical calculations of the US—exemplified through the unilaterally crafted TRA and sustained arms sales to Taiwan—could indirectly destabilize the “China region” and possibly even Sino-US geo-economic formations.

**Link – “Indo-Pacific”**

#### The US constructs a monolithic Indo-Pacific region that needs to be “saved” to justify fears of China.

Pan 14 — Chengxin Pan, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of Arts, Deakin University, 2014, (“The ‘Indo-Pacific’ and geopolitical anxieties about China's rise in the Asian regional order,” Australian Journal of International Affairs, March 31, Available online at <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10357718.2014.884054>, Accessed 6-22-2016, SAA)

The ‘Indo-Pacific’ has its roots first and foremost in US geopolitical imaginations about the world in general and the rise of China in particular. As the ‘imagined community par excellence’ (Campbell 1998, 91, 132), geopolitics has been central to the US self-imagination. US security and survival, for instance, is often predicated on various spatial practices of geopolitics, with ever expanding frontiers seen as crucial for its self-renewal as the exceptional and indispensable nation. Dean Acheson (1950) once asserted that Americans ‘are children of freedom’ and ‘cannot be safe except in an environment of freedom’. In order to create and maintain this living space for freedom, its value has to be communicated to ‘the four corners of the earth’. This belief reflects what Hardt and Negri (2000, 165) call US imperial sovereignty, with ‘its tendency toward an open, expansive project operating on an unbounded terrain’. While classical geopolitics gave rise to the Monroe Doctrine to exclude the European powers from the Americas, the USA's new imperial imagination, combining both geopolitics and a certain ‘New World’ idealism, provided the impetus for Americans to turn to ‘new frontiers’ in the Pacific and Asia. Running through the USA's foreign policy tradition is a strategic article of faith that the USA ought to ‘dominate the western hemisphere while not permitting another great power to dominate Europe or Northeast Asia’ (Mearsheimer 2001a, 46). While this strategy helps ease US geopolitical anxieties, its geopolitical mindset of seeing its mirror image in the behaviour of other powers sustains a perpetual state of fear, with China now increasingly as its main ‘source’ (Pan 2004, 2012a). With its vast land mass and fast-growing economy, China is seen as a natural candidate to dominate Asia and uproot US primacy in the region. Drawing from the logic that explains US expansion and ascendancy in the past, many American observers perceive China's rise in Asia as following an essentially similar geopolitical trajectory. As John Mearsheimer (2001b, 401) argues, like the rise of the USA in the nineteenth century, a rising China ‘would surely pursue regional hegemony’ with its own Monroe Doctrine. It is predicted that this Chinese Monroe Doctrine would ‘push U.S. forces out of the Asia-Pacific region’ (Walt 2012) and lead to ‘the loss of the Indian and Western Pacific oceans as veritable American military lakes’ (Kaplan 2009a, 45). As the imaginative catchphrase of ‘Red Star over the Pacific’ implies, the days of US control of the vast ocean seem to be numbered (Yoshihara and Holmes 2010). Washington's heightened concerns over its freedom of navigation in the South China Sea and China's ‘anti-access/area denial’ (A2/AD) capabilities, for instance, epitomise this anxiety. Indeed, ‘access denial has become the prism through which policymakers in Washington survey the rise of Chinese sea power’ (Yoshihara and Holmes 2010, 6).

#### The “Indo-Pacific” is an Orientalist representation to establish the US as regionally dominant against the constructed China threat

Pan 14 — Chengxin Pan, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of Arts, Deakin University, 2014, (“The ‘Indo-Pacific’ and geopolitical anxieties about China's rise in the Asian regional order,” Australian Journal of International Affairs, March 31, Available online at <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10357718.2014.884054>, Accessed 6-22-2016, SAA)

US anxieties about China's rise are not just about the latter's economic and military power per se (Zhang 2013). Increasingly, the ‘China threat’ is now seen in the context of the Middle Kingdom's growing regional ambition. In other words, the traditional bilateral competition between Washington and Beijing has taken the form of regionalism rivalry (Zhu 2013)—a contest that China appears to be winning. For example, after the 1997–8 Asian financial crisis, China emerged as a ‘responsible economic actor’ in the region (Breslin 2008). In contrast to George W. Bush's ‘shock and awe’ unilateralism, Beijing's ‘charm offensive’ in South-East Asia and elsewhere seemed to win it many friends, so much so that it was widely believed that a Sino-centric East Asian order was on the horizon (Beeson 2009). Thus, at the height of the USA's war on terrorism, the neoconservative Francis Fukuyama (2005) urged the USA not to forget that ‘the biggest geopolitical development of this generation’ was the rise of China. Meanwhile, US Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick (2005) made it clear that China's rise had generated ‘a cauldron of anxiety’ in the USA and elsewhere, although he remained hopeful that China could still be socialised to become a ‘responsible stakeholder’. Similar hopes were shared by Barack Obama at the beginning of his presidency when he briefly pursued a policy of strategic reassurance to China (Wei 2013; Zhao 2012). Yet his departure from ‘balance-of-power’ geopolitics proved to be short-lived, as Obama quickly embraced a more Bush-style, neoconservative vision of friends and foes, and democracies and autocracies (Kagan 2010). From this standpoint, the increasing regional clout of an assertive authoritarian China took on a doubly sinister quality and rebalancing against it became a strategic imperative. The USA's fear of losing the ‘contest over defining an Asian regional identity’ (Buzan 2012, 2–3) can thus help explain Obama's tour of Asian democracies in 2010 and the US-led Trans-Pacific Partnership framework, as well as the rising popularity of the ‘Indo-Pacific’ concept. The ‘Indo-Pacific’ construct offers the rationale for the Pentagon's AirSea Battle plan, as well as recent US strategic deployment and realignment in this vast region, sometimes known as its ‘pivot to Asia’ (Medcalf, Heinrichs, and Jones 2011, 19–20; O'Hanlon 2012; White 2012, 76–77). It serves a dual purpose of both constraining the rise of a ‘peer competitor’ in Asia and preventing regional integration from being ‘inward looking and exclusive’ (Condoleezza Rice, quoted in Ciorciari 2011, 146). The second purpose reflects another US geopolitical imperative, which has been brilliantly summed up by Zbigniew Brzezinski. Imperial geostrategy, as he puts it, needs ‘to prevent collusion and maintain security dependence among the vassals, to keep tributaries pliant and protected, and to keep the barbarians from coming together’ (Brzezinski 1997, quoted in Beeson 2009, 507). In this sense, the USA's motive behind the ‘Indo-Pacific’ becomes clearer. There is no better way of keeping the ‘barbarians’ apart than by designing a ‘super-region’ like the ‘Indo-Pacific’ in order to allow the USA to legitimately claim that ‘we are here to stay’, all the while thwarting the emergence of indigenous regional groupings (Buzan 2012). This is how the Indian Ocean was brought to the fore. Another ‘American lake’, the Indian Ocean region has become more fluid with the rise of India and the spectre of India–China rivalry or even cooperation. For example, during Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao's visit to India in 2005, his Indian counterpart Manmohan Singh posited that: ‘Together, India and China could reshape the world order’ (quoted in Prestwitz 2005). But such an order is hardly music to the ears of US strategists. Invoking the vicious imagery of a monsoon, Kaplan, whose writings have done much to educate US officials about the greater Indian Ocean (Green and Shearer 2012, 175), promptly warned that the dawn of the Indo-Pacific era could not have come at ‘a more turbulent time’. Crowded with ‘highly volatile and populous pivot states’, the region is characterised by ‘weak institutions, tottering infrastructures, and young and restive populations tempted by extremism. Yet they are the future’ (Kaplan 2010, xii; see also Munson 2013). To Kaplan (2010, xiv) and others, ‘America's own destiny and that of the West as a whole’ are on the line in these troubled waters. Yet, by the same token, these menacing imageries also open up strategic opportunities for the USA to ‘pivot’ to this part of the world and enlist India as a ‘desirable’ partner (Blank 2007, 1). To US defence contractors, India's estimated US$80 billion military modernisation program by 2015 no doubt adds another dimension to New Delhi's desirability (Berteau and Green 2012, 38). With more than 60 joint military exercises with the Pentagon in the past decade, India has conducted more exercises with the USA than with any other country (Berteau and Green 2012). Despite the USA's role in initiating those operations (Gilboy and Heginbotham 2013, 125–126), Clinton (2011, 58) insisted that it was the region which was ‘eager for our leadership and our business’. In any case, as McDevitt (2013, 8) points out, it was India's emergence as a strategic partner and the strengthening of US–India security ties that ‘led U.S. government policy officials to begin thinking about the interconnectedness of the Pacific and Indian oceans’, not the other way round. Also, by insisting on ‘old-fashioned alliance management’ (i.e. the ‘hub-and-spoke’ system) instead of new regional multilateral initiatives (Green and Shearer 2012, 187), the elite conception of the ‘Indo-Pacific’ ‘fits with a longstanding and very clever antiregional diplomatic tactic of the US’ (Buzan 2012).

#### The geopolitical representation of the Indo-Pacific only serves to create regional conflict

Pan 14 — Chengxin Pan, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of Arts, Deakin University, 2014, (“The ‘Indo-Pacific’ and geopolitical anxieties about China's rise in the Asian regional order,” Australian Journal of International Affairs, March 31, Available online at <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10357718.2014.884054>, Accessed 6-22-2016, SAA)

Yet, despite such exceptions and denials, geopolitics has been central to mainstream ‘Indo-Pacific’ discourses. If anti-piracy, disaster relief and fighting terrorism were the main purposes of the new regional design, then the reported plan to deploy giant unmanned patrol planes to the Cocos Islands, and aircraft carriers and nuclear-powered attack submarines near Perth would not make much sense (Taylor 2012). Even when there was anti-piracy or disaster relief cooperation, geopolitics still seemed to be at play, as exemplified by China's exclusion from the 2004 tsunami core group (from which the short-lived quadrilateral talks emerged) and the US-led Task Force 151, the main multilateral anti-piracy group (Green and Shearer 2012, 185). Such geopolitical practices of security seem to lend credence to a senior US official's admission that ‘China is a central element in our effort to encourage India's emergence as a world power’ and that ‘we don't need to talk about the containment of China. It will take care of itself as India rises’ (Twining 2007, 83; see also Gilboy and Heginbotham 2013, 139). And given that the criteria or principles for regional cooperation often entail ‘democratic values’ and ‘a willingness to help shape and abide by rules and norms for a secure and stable region’ (Medcalf 2013b, p. 66), it is not difficult to see which country is the main intended target for socialisation and, failing that, exclusion. The fact that such a geopolitical undertone is not always palpable may be due to ‘the sensitive presentation of initiatives with an emphasis on broader benefits to the region’ (Berteau and Green 2012, 33). But in her appeal to Congress to maintain State Department funding, Secretary Clinton felt obliged to talk straight: ‘We are in a competition for influence with China; let's put aside the moral, humanitarian, do-good side of what we believe in, and let's just talk straight realpolitik’ (Dombey 2011). The geopolitical and neoconservative constructions of the ‘Indo-Pacific’ should raise concerns about its long-term political implications. As this concept gains traction, we need to look more closely at its conflicting regional agendas and ask whose interests it serves (Bisley and Phillips 2012). For all its apparent inclusion of such ‘low-politics’ ‘do-good’ issues as climate change and anti-piracy, this spatial imagination has been galvanised by the perceived rise of China and concurrent great-power rivalries for regional hegemony. This geopolitical obsession not only obscures the extensive regional cooperation and transnational issues of human security such as poverty, hunger, public health, small-arms and drug trafficking, environmental degradation and natural disasters in the region (Bateman, Chan, and Graham 2011, 8–9), but it also plays on and exacerbates the existing anxieties, mistrust and security dilemmas. When the USA turned down the United Nations' request to include China in the joint tsunami disaster relief operations in December 2004, China allegedly hastened the ‘rollout of its out-of-area “military missions other than war” activities’ (Gupta 2012). And in response to China's military modernisation, alongside the pivot to Asia, a long article in the prestigious Journal of Strategic Studies (Mirski 2013), with a shorter version appearing in the influential National Interest magazine, now openly advocates a US naval blockade against China, specifically targeting its oil imports. The likely tit-for-tat cycles of such fanciful but potentially self-fulfilling game plays do not bode well for the future regional order. It is in this context that it is imperative to critically examine the overwhelming geopolitical reading of the regional dynamism. Insofar as all regions are ‘social constructions created through politics’ (Katzenstein 2002, 105), rather than predetermined by certain mysterious, irresistible geographical forces, the ‘Indo-Pacific’ can and should be made for the better through less geopolitically driven imaginations.

**Link – China-Japan Relations**

#### Their call for cooperation only exists because they view Asian nations a potential threat or asset in containing rogue states – conflict is inevitable when other nations are viewed in light of their potential for war.

Stone 06 — PhD Psychology at Washington State and researcher at Desert Research Institute, 2006 [Asako Brook, “Impacts of Social Identity, Misperceptions, and Uncertainty in China – Japan Conflict” (Doctoral Thesis at Washington State University), <https://research.wsulibs.wsu.edu:8443/jspui/bitstream/2376/490/1/a_stone_050906.pdf>]

The relevance of perception in international relations is based on its contribution to conflict escalation. Perceptions are interpretations of reality, and thus perceptual errors or misperceptions create distorted reality (Herrmann, 1985). Without correcting those misperceptions, intergroup interactions only lead to misunderstanding and ultimately lead to intergroup conflict. Image theory describes how a decision maker’s perceptions of opponents can affect the ways in which foreign policies are implemented. Images are often used to process incoming information fast and to make fairly good judgments without overwhelming our cognitive capacity. Images, like stereotypes, are interpretations of reality. Because such images influence our actions, it is important to understand them and how they affect behavior. Image theory takes a political-psychological approach to the issue and draws a connection between policy makers’ images of other countries and the behavior that results from such images (Herrman, Schopler, & Sedikides, 1997). These images tend to have multiple dimensions: Capability (superior, equal, or inferior), Culture (superior, equal, inferior, or weak-willed), Intentions (good, benign, or harmful), Decision- Making (by many, a few groups, small elite, or confused), and Perception (threats or opportunities). The combination of these dimensions results in one of seven images: Ally, Barbarian, Colonial, Degenerate, Enemy, Imperial, and Rogue (Cottam, Dietz-Uhler, Mastors, & Preston, 2004). Ally Image Ally image reflects equality in others’ capability and culture. Their intentions are interpreted as good, and the complexity of decision-making processes is perceived (Cottam, 1986). However, because they are equally capable, they are perceived as a threat. Thus, maintaining alliance is important. Because of equality in capability and culture, diplomacy is an effective strategy to maintain peace amongst allies. Barbarian Image Barbarian image reflects superiority in capability while culture is perceived as inferior to a perceiver. A threat is perceived as a result because of lack of ability to reason and to think rationally. Unlike countries with the enemy image, a barbarian country is particularly threatening because diplomacy is not an effective way to resolve issues. In order to deal with threats posed by a barbaric country, perceivers form coalitions in order to gain power and security (Cottam *et* *al.,* 2004). Colonial Image A colonial country is believed to be inferior in their culture and capability, and their intensions are benign (Cottam, 1994). Because of this, they are perceived as opportunities (Cottam, 1994, Cottam & Cottam, 2001). This is a flip side of the imperial image, which is described later in this section. A colonial country is often patronized by an imperialist country, and citizens tend to feel powerlessness due to forceful behavior from an imperialist country (Cottam *et al.,* 2004). Degenerate Image While capability is perceived either equal or superior to a perceiver, a degenerate country is associated with opportunity rather than threat because of its culturally weak-willed nature. Decision makers of a degenerate country are seen as confused, and thus it seems impossible for a degenerate country to become successful politically (Cottam *et al.,* 2004). Enemy Image The enemy image also reflects equality in others’ capability and culture like the ally image. Because of their capability, a threat is perceived (Cottam, 1994). However, their intentions are interpreted as harmful, unlike the ally image. Because they are not considered as ingroup, decisions are made by small numbers of elite. In other words, complexity of their decision making process is not perceived. Imperialist Image The imperialist image reflects superiority in both capability and culture. Intention of an imperialist country is perceived as harmful, and thus a threat is perceived. Actions of a imperialist country are interpreted as very patronizing, which often leaves little room for negotiation from a colonial country. Rogue Image The rogue image is the latest addition to the images, which was created after the Cold War to describe former allies of Soviet Union (Cottam *et al.,* 2004). Despite its perceived inferiority in capability and culture, a country with Rogue image poses a threat to a perceiver because of its harmful intention. Strategies such as economic sanctions are often used to deal with a rogue country, as perceivers refuse to negotiate with inferior existence. The relevance of the image theory in the present study is based on its effects on conflict escalation. Perceptions are interpretations of reality, and thus perceptual errors or misperceptions create distorted reality. Without correcting those misperceptions, intergroup interactions can only lead to misunderstanding and ultimately to intergroup conflict. Thus, assessment of existing misperceptions between China and Japan is essential for further understanding the root causes of the China-Japan conflict. Even though the present study does not primarily concern China and Japan’s nationalistic characteristics, one characteristic of nation states is worthy of mentioning: sensitivity to threats. Nation-states tend to view others’ intention as hostile, even though no such intention exists. It is because people create a very simplified and stereotyped image of the threatening (Cottam & Cottam, 2001). This presumptuous image leads to conflict spiral, which in turn leads to misperception (Holsti, North, & Brody's, 1968). Conflict between nationalistic states is highly emotional because of intensity in perceived threats. When threats are perceived, the threatened forms very simplified image of the threatener. The concept of nationalism is most relevant to image theory during analysis. Intention of others is measured partially by perceived flexibility of the target government.

**Link – China Relations – A2: “But We Cooperate”**

#### “We must cooperate now” ignores that China has been cooperating for decades. The US moves the goalposts to make China look recalcitrant.

Pan 4 (Chengxin, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of Arts, Deakin University, Discourses Of ‘China’ In International Relations: A Study in Western Theory as (IR) Practice, p. 324-325)

Given the danger and high stakes involved, some may wonder why China did not simply cooperate so that there would be no need for U.S. “containment.” To some extent, China has been cooperative. For example, Beijing was at pains to calm a disgrun­tled Chinese public by explaining that the U.S. “sorry” letter issued at the end of the spy-plane incident was a genuine “apology,” with U.S. officials openly rejecting that interpretation. On the Taiwan question, China has dropped many of its previous demands (such as “one China” being defined as the People’s Republic). As to the South China Sea, China has allowed the ASEAN Regional Forum to seek a negotiated solution to the Spratly Islands dispute and also agreed to join the Philippines as co-chairs of the working group on confidence-building measures 89 In January 2002, China chose to play down an incident that a presidential jet outfitted in the United States had been crammed with sophisticated satellite-operated bugs, a decision that, as the New York Times puts it, “illustrates the depth of China’s current com­mitment to cultivating better relations with the United States.”90 Also, over the years, China has ratified a number of key nonprolif­eration treaties and pledged not to assist countries in developing missiles with ranges that exceed the limits established under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). More recently, China has collaborated with the United States in the war on terrorism, including issuing new regulations to restrict the export of missile technology to countries usually accused by the United States of aid­ing terrorists. Indeed, as some have argued, by any reasonable mea­sure China is now more responsible in international affairs than at any time since 1949. And yet, the real problem is that, so long as the United States continues to stake its self-identity on the realization of absolute security, no amount of Chinese cooperation would be enough. For instance, Iain Johnston views the constructive development of China’s arms-control policy as a kind of “realpolitik adaptation,” rather than “genuine learning.”92 From this perspective, however China has changed, it would remain a fundamentally threatening other, which the United States cannot live with but has to take full control of.

#### Policy founded on improving US-Sino relations frames China as an issue of crisis that needs to be managed — diplomacy becomes war.

Pan 4 — (Chengxin, Dept, of Poli Sci and Int. Rel’ts, Australian National University, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Vol. 29, No. 3, p. 315)

The discursive construction of the U.S. self and the "Chinese threat" argument are(is) not (an) innocent, descriptive accounts of some "independent" reality. Rather, they are always a clarion call for the practice of power politics. At the apex of this power-politics agenda is the politico-strategic question of "what is to be done" to make the United States secure from the (perceived) threats it faces. At a general level, as Benjamin Schwarz proposes, this requires an unhindered path to U.S. global hegemony that “means not only that the United States must dominate wealthy and technologically sophisticated states in Europe and East Asia-- America's "allies"--but also that it must deal with such nuisances as Saddam Hussein, Slobodan Milosevic and Kim Jong Il, so that potential great powers need not acquire the means to deal with those problems themselves. And those powers that eschew American supervision--such as China--must be both engaged and contained. The upshot of "American leadership" is that the United States must spend nearly as much on national security as the rest of the world combined. (67)” This "neocontainment" policy has been echoed in the "China threat" literature. In a short yet decisive article titled "Why We Must Contain China," Washington Post columnist Charles Krauthammer insists that "containing China" and "undermining its ruthless dictatorship" constitute two essential components of "any rational policy toward a rising, threatening China." Not only is a policy other than containment considered irrational, but even a delay to implement it would be undesirable, as he urges that "containment of such a bully must begin early in its career." To this end, Krauthammer offers such "practical" options as strengthening regional alliances (with Vietnam, India, and Russia, as well as Japan) to box in China; standing by Chinese dissidents; denying Beijing the right to host the Olympics; and keeping China from joining the World Trade Organization on the terms it desires. (68) Containing China is of course not the only option arising from the "China threat" literature. More often than not, there is a subtle, business-style "crisis management" policy. For example, Bernstein and Munro shy away from the word containment, preferring to call their China policy management. (69) Yet, what remains unchanged in the management formula is a continued promotion of controlling China. For instance, a perusal of Bernstein and Munro's texts reveals that what they mean by management is no different than Krauthammer's explicit containment stance. (70) By framing U.S.-China relations as an issue of "crisis management," they leave little doubt of who is the "manager" and who is to be "managed." In a more straightforward manner, Betts and Christensen state that coercion and war must be part and parcel of the China management policy: “In addressing the China challenge, the United States needs to think hard about three related questions: first, how to avoid crises and war through prudent, coercive diplomacy; second, how to manage crises and fight a war if the avoidance effort fails; third, how to end crises and terminate war at costs acceptable to the United States and its allies. (71)” This is not to imply that the kind of perspectives outlined above will automatically be translated into actual China policy, but one does not have to be exceedingly perceptive to note that the "China threat" perspective does exert enormous influence on U.S. policy making on China. To illustrate this point, I want now to examine some specific implications of U.S. representations of the "China threat" for U.S.-China relations in relation to the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait missile crisis and the "spy plane" incident of 2001.

**Link – China Rise**

#### Representations of China’s “relative power” take the definition of power for granted.

Pan 14 — Chengxin Pan, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at Deakin University, former visiting professor at the University of Melbourne, the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, and Peking University, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science and International Relations from the Australian National University and an LL.B. and LL.M. from Peking University, 2014 (“Rethinking Chinese Power: A Conceptual Corrective to the ‘Power Shift’ Narrative,” *Asian Perspective*, Volume 38, Number 3, July-September, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via ProQuest ABI/INFORM Complete New Platform, p. 388-390)

The Power-Shift Debate and the Literature on Power: A Case of Mutual Neglect

The now-familiar narrative on a power shift comprises a wide range of literature and centers on at least four concepts: whether there has been a power shift; how far-reaching this shift has been, and whether it can be slowed down or even reversed; in what areas (e.g., economic power, military power, or soft power) the [end page 388] shift is most evident; and what this shift means for great-power relations as well as how to best respond to it. In this vast literature, opinions have ranged, for example, from assertions that we are already in the “Chinese century” to claims that China still has a long way to go (Nye 2002; Chan 2008; Gurtov 2013), and from the “power transition” thesis that a more powerful China is more likely to challenge the international status quo (Tammen and Kugler 2006) to a more sanguine belief that socializing China into the international community is still possible (Steinfeld 2010).

Hotly debated as these power-shift questions are, what is missing is a more reflective analysis of the concept of power itself. As Shaun Breslin argues, in the study of China’s IR, “The concept of ‘power’ is often left undefined, with an assumption that size and importance is the same as power” (2007, 6). In a similar vein, Jeffrey Reeves and Ramon Pacheco Pardo note that “the study of modern Chinese power remains largely underdeveloped” (2013, 450). This conceptual underdevelopment is certainly not unique to the study of China. According to Martin Smith (2012, 1), IR analysts in general are often “more comfortable thinking and writing about who has power and what they do with it, rather than about the core issue of what it is.” There may be a good reason for this general unease. Though power is a central political concept in the study of IR, it has been widely recognized as notoriously “elusive,” “slippery,” “essentially contested,” and “most troublesome” (Keohane and Nye 2001, 1; Barnett and Duvall 2005, 2; Gilpin 1981, 13).

This conceptual minefield notwithstanding, some audacious efforts at theorizing power have been made. As demonstrated in many different typologies of power, social and political theorists as well as scholars from international political economy and constructivist perspectives have made some noteworthy contributions to our thinking about power. The introduction of the concept “soft power” by Joseph Nye (1990), for example, has generated a vibrant new research program in IR, including the subfield of Chinese IR (Li 2009). The division of power into coercive, normative, and remunerative power by sociologist Amitai Etzioni has been aptly applied to the study of Chinese power (Lampton 2008). In addition to the conventional understanding of power as [end page 389] resources or capabilities, scholars have added motivation, desire, and will to the mix, thereby helping differentiate actual power from potential power (Baldwin 1980; Strange 1996). Furthermore, informed by Foucault’s notion of disciplinary power as well as the “faces of power” debate (Dahl 1957; Bachrach and Baratz 1962; Lukes 2005), Barnett and Duvall (2005) and Guzzini (2013) have begun theorizing power from a constructivist perspective. To be sure, this theoretical debate on power is far from settled or completed, and my intention is not to engage directly with it. But the various efforts at theorizing and conceptualizing power have added more nuanced understandings to the question of what power is.

Surprisingly, however, these different understandings have been largely absent from the power-shift narrative. Indeed, the two bodies of literature are marked by conspicuous mutual neglect. Except at the most general level, few theorists of power seem interested in the current power-shift debate with the possible exception of Nye (2010). Meanwhile, few power-shift analysts pay close attention to what theorists have to say about the complexities of power in international relations. Even as the word “power” figures prominently in the titles of many publications on power shift, as a concept it rarely receives any in-depth discussion. True, in the debate there is “a shared understanding about what makes a state powerful” (Chan 2008, 2), but there has been no explicit self-reflection on this understanding.

#### Taking the definition of power for granted makes their arguments tautological. Challenging dominant discourses about power is needed to avoid a self-fulfilling prophecy.

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Commonly agreed-upon statements in the argumentative international relations (IR) community are often hard to come by, but one exception is the view that the center of gravity in world politics is shifting away from where it used to be. The early twenty-first century, the argument goes, is witnessing a dramatic power shift from the West to the East, and from the United States to China in particular (Hoge 2004; Prestowitz 2005; Shambaugh 2005; Mahbubani 2008; White 2010). Yet amid such burgeoning discourses on a power shift, the dominant way of conceptualizing power has remained largely unchanged. While scholars in the debate often disagree on how to measure the changing distribution of power, they rarely question their state-centric, resource-based concept of power itself. Without critically examining the concept [end page 387] of power, the power-shift debate, no matter how sophisticated, will remain inadequate.

In this article I call for rethinking power by paying more attention to the complex and changing meanings of power. Given that China has received the lion’s share of attention in contemporary power-shift analysis, the focus of this rethinking is on Chinese power. Since the rapidly developing Chinese economy has most directly fueled the power-shift narrative, my study draws on some specific vignettes about Chinese economic power—for example, “Made in China,” “the China price,” and China’s “financial nuclear weapons.” My aim is not to arrive at some kind of general theory about Chinese power; rather, it is to draw attention to the insights offered by some existing critical power analyses in order to introduce necessary conceptual self-reflexivity into the power-shift debate.

I have divided this article into four parts. I begin with a discussion of the mutual neglect between the power-shift debate and the literature on the concept of power. Next, I provide an overview of a conception of power alternative to the state-centric, quantitative, and zero-sum understanding of power that has dominated the power-shift narrative. In the third section, I illustrate the contingency and socially constructed nature of “Chinese” economic power and what it means for the so-called US-China power shift. I conclude by calling for further interrogating our conventional ways of thinking about power. I argue that unless a new type of power discourse emerges, the United States and China, among other countries, will be hard pressed to build a new type of major power relationship.

#### We critique the conception of power underlying their scholarship about China’s rise.

#### 1. It’s state-centric.

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Rethinking “Power”

In this article, my main purpose is to offer a conceptual corrective to this neglect of explicit critical engagement with the concept of power in the power-shift literature. While there is no single alternative way of conceptualizing power, power may be rethought at least along the following dimensions. First, although the state does hold power, it is not a neatly bounded property coterminous with state boundaries. Rather, it has always been “exercised” by or through a diversity of actors, agents, and social structures alongside the state. Among them, for example, are consumers, investors, transnational corporations, credit rating agencies, markets, global supply chains, nongovernmental organizations, the media, the Internet, and even the ruled and the powerless. Such agents and structures often transcend national borders and are not necessarily beholden to state power. Nor can their power be readily mapped onto the state in which they happen to reside. All these considerations undermine “the possibility of seeing power as solely a spatial monopoly exercised by states” (Sassen 2006, 222). Thus, upon a closer look, the complex geographies of power in global politics defy a state-centric conception.

#### 2. It’s not zero-sum.

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Second, power is always relational and contextual (Barnett and Duvall 2005; Hagström 2005; Piven 2008; Guzzini 2013). As Guzzini (2013, 24) notes, “Any power instrument becomes a potential power resource only if its control is seen to be valued by [end page 392] other actors in the interaction. Power comes out of this relation, not from the power holder alone.” Relational and contextual power may be best understood not in terms of its quantifiable capabilities but within its specific social contexts. The “same amount” of capability may not translate into the same degree of power or achieve the same effect within different relationships or domains. With the acceleration of globalization and expansion of global production networks, even the state rarely stands still. As the state becomes more internationalized or globalized, its power may change in “quality” as well as quantity (Cox 1987; Agnew 2003, 78–79). As a consequence, “national” power is not only less receptive to objective measurement but is also less national in nature. Certainly this does not imply the end of the nation-state, nor is the world quite as flat as Thomas Friedman (2005) has famously asserted. Nevertheless, the national boundaries of power, if such things exist, are becoming more blurred and flattened. In short, it has become problematic to invoke the sharp-edged notions of national economy and state power—or, for that matter, the perceived congruence between the two.

If power has no independently verifiable quantity, then power relations are rarely zero-sum, unless they are imagined as such and acted upon accordingly. In reality, power takes on an interdependent dimension, which, among other things, means that “what some have lost, others have not gained” (Strange 1996, 14). Moreover, power cuts both ways, a phenomenon Anthony Giddens calls the “dialectic of control in social systems” (1986, 16; emphasis in original). This point holds true even in seemingly asymmetric relationships, such as those between landlords and tenants, state elites and voting publics, priests and their parishioners, and masters and slaves (Piven 2008). Given that power is not always neatly distributed in proportion to the distribution of capabilities, a shift in the latter may not necessarily mean a corresponding shift in the former.

Furthermore, a state’s relational power is not merely a reflection of its position in the distribution of capabilities across states (Waltz 1979); it also bears the imprint of global political economic structures. In this sense, a small country’s power against potential aggression may be greater than its defense capabilities might indicate, thanks to its intersubjectively recognized sovereignty [end page 393] in the international system. Meanwhile, with structurally derived relational power also comes structural vulnerability. As we know well in domestic politics, independent members who hold the balance of power in parliament gain power primarily because of their contingent structural position; by the same token, their power is susceptible to changes of that structure. Power in the international system is no exception.

#### 3. It’s socially constructed.

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Third, power is socially constructed. If “our idea of what belongs to the realm of reality is given for us in the language that we use” (Winch 1958, 15), power as a central phenomenon in reality must also owe its meaning and existence to how we conceptualize it. Thus, a fuller understanding of power needs to take seriously its normative and discursive constructions. In the eyes of many power transition theorists, a country’s power status is ontologically independent of ideational factors such as intentions and norms (even though these may be seen as relevant variables in states’ power behavior). Yet, as John Allen notes, power “as an outcome cannot and should not be ‘read off’ from a resource base” (2003, 5). Likewise, Guzzini (2013, 115) argues that “what counts as a power resource in the first place cannot be assessed ex ante independently from general norms, the actors’ particular value systems, and the specific historical context of the interaction.” In other words, power depends on its social recognition within a community (Ashley 1986). Consequently, in power analysis a focus on the (material) distribution of power is not enough (Hindess 1996); it must also, according to Barnett and Duvall, “include a consideration of the normative structures and discourses” (2005, 3).

If diverse discourses are at play in the construction of power, then “a considerable indeterminacy in the patterning of power” may result (Piven 2008, 4). Power indeterminacy has always been compounded by the evolving normative context in which power is constructed, legitimized, and exercised. Realists insist that country A with more material capabilities than country B has more control over the latter, but in reality a clear-cut correlation between capabilities and control is rare (Hoffmann 1967). Scholars, including some notable neorealists, acknowledge that military primacy does not always pay, at least not as much as is commonly [end page 394] assumed (Waltz 1979; Drezner 2013). At the root of this nonalignment between power as resources and power as effects are not just some power conversion problems, but more importantly the intrinsic factor of norms and discourses. By helping legitimize or delegitimize power, discourses construct as well as constrain power.

Given that power is contextual, relational, interdependent, non-zero-sum, and socially constructed, it is more than a property monopolized by the state, and its shift necessarily entails more than just a spatial shift between states. From this perspective, we need to rethink China’s rising power. Focusing on Chinese economic power, I examine in the next section how changes in Chinese power cannot be simply described in terms of China’s “rise” (and the West’s fall).

#### Threatening framings of China rise are self-fulfilling — they spur Chinese nationalism and ensure confrontation.

Gries 7 —(Peter Hayes, the Harold J. & Ruth Newman Chair in US-China Issues and Director of the Institute for U.S.-China Issues at the University of Oklahoma, “Harmony, Hegemony, & U.S.-China Relations,” World Literature Today, August 2007, Vol. 81.5.)

Chinese Occidentalism—Chinese uses of the “West” in general and the United States in particular as others against which to define what it means to be “Chinese”— is nothing new.2 Ever since the emergence of popular Chinese nationalism in the mid-1990s, with best-sellers like China Can Say No (1996) and Behind the Demonization of China (1997), the United States has been central to Chinese nationalist constructions of “China’s rise,” both as a marker of similarity against which to establish China’s great-power status and as a marker of difference against which to establish China’s “peaceful” nature. A discourse of similarity was central to late-1990s Chinese responses to American “clash of civilizations” and “China threat” discourses. In each case, many Chinese nationalists objected to American implications that China might be threatening—but simultaneously delighted in being perceived as threatening. This paradox begs explanation. American perceptions of a China threat, in my view, served to confirm Chinese nationalist assertions about China’s great-power status. Indeed, many Chinese nationalists obsessively compare China to the United States, generating a discourse of U.S.-China similarity. Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations” argument created a sensation among Chinese nationalists in the 1990s less out of a stated opposition to his view of a “Confucian threat” to the West than out of a secret delight that high-status Westerners like Huntington felt threatened by China. Writing in Beijing’s influential Reading magazine, for instance, the Chinese Academy of Social Science’s Li Shenzhi argued that China “should take Huntington’s perspectives seriously because they represent a kind of deep [racial] fear.”3 Huntington’s argument was celebrated because it provided external validation of Chinese nationalists’ own claims about “China’s rise.” Similarly, journalists Richard Bernstein and Ross Munro’s The Coming Conflict with China (1998), Bill Gertz’s The China Threat (2000), and other American “China threat” diatribes were both reviled and celebrated by Chinese nationalists—reviled for their challenge to in-group positivity (“China is good, not bad”) but celebrated for confirming China’s rise (by feeling threatened). American “China threat” discourse played a central role in a Chinese discourse of similarity with the superpower United States, confirming Chinese nationalist assertions about China’s great-power status.

### Link – China Economy

#### Fear of Chinese economic growth inspires China Threat Discourse.

Campion 16 — Andrew Stephen Campion, is the Head of Research at the Atlantic Council, UK. His work focuses on the construction of security threats with an emphasis on energy and China, 2016 (“The Geopolitics of Red Oil: Constructing the China Threat Through Energy Security” p. 2 (available online via Google Books), accessed 6/21/16 AEC) ES= energy security, CT = china threat SOS= security of supply

A recent Pew Research Center (a non-partisan think tank based in Washing- ton, DC) report gauged public opinion from countries around the globe about perceptions of Chinese versus US power. Its findings suggest that there is a significant percentage of people around the world who are convinced that “China [will] eventually replace the U .S. as the world’s leading superpower”, and that these feelings are especially acute in leading Westem countries.3 Although this report did not lend a qualitative assessment to these results about whether China’s growth over the US was welcome or not. the exploration of language surrounding China’s rise has suggested that many in the West are wary of Chinese growth. What I explore in this book is how perceptions of Chinese growth have crystalized into a palpable China Threat Discourse, and how this has become the defining image of China in U S geopolitical approaches. In par- ticular. I explore the issue of energy security (ES), as US has become central to nations" perceptions of their national security. As the threat from China and energy security are issues which receive frequent attention in academic and popular sources, anyone daring to add to this corpus of research must. have something original and useful (and ideally interesting) to say about them. I hope you will feel that I have accomplished this in this book.

### Link – China Energy

#### Energy Security literature otherizes China and increases China Threat Discourse.

Campion 16 — Andrew Stephen Campion, is the Head of Research at the Atlantic Council, UK. His work focuses on the construction of security threats with an emphasis on energy and China, 2016 (“The Geopolitics of Red Oil: Constructing the China Threat Through Energy Security” p. 3-4 (available online via Google Books), accessed 6/21/16 AEC) ES= energy security, CT = china threat SOS= security of supply

The importance Western actors place on studies of China and its rise is reflected by the large amount of material devoted to it and this book’s bibliography is a tes- tament to this fact. I aim to make my own contribution to the literature by almost subverting the causal approach to the subject. Rather than exploring the China threat itself, that is exploring the possibility that China’s rise might unsettle Western power structures, I aim to analyze how the CT as a discourse has emerged. In this way I explore how Western power structures have actually worked to con- struct China as a threat rather than to explore how the CT challenges Western/US power structures I aim to get to the bottom of the assumptions which are central to China threat arguments to demonstrate how the CT is a notion that has been act- ively' created. In this way, I do not necessarily deny or support CT arguments. but I aim to highlight that the China Threat Discourse is just that - a discourse - and that counter arguments exist to challenge it as well. In this sense. my approach is also unusual because it is unashamedly poststructuralist whereas popular approaches to case-study analysis in IR tend to remain positivist. China threat proponents perceive a China that is capable of, and intent on, challenging Western powers. Stefan IIalper, Director of the American StudiesProgramme at Cambridge effectively demonstrates how CT and ES perceptions have become entwined with one other. Halper states that the CT emerges as China “advances diplomatic, political, and economic values antithetical to those that have informed the status quo architecture” and from “its need for energy and natural resources which leads it to threaten its neighbors as well as regions further afield”, 4 Such threat sentiments are evidenced by [Emma Broomficld who claims that “The totalitarian dictatorship of the Chinese Communist Party with its expansionist goals and ruthless policies cannot co-exist in peace with the United States and its ideals of freedom and self-determination".5 This tone is common in Western literature with writers such as Denny Ro\_\,~'," Nancy Bernkopt' Tucker,” David Isenberg.8 and countless journalists and politicians engaging with CT assumptions, assumptions which are often articulated in realist terms. Employing these realist claims. John Mearsheimer states that “the US is likely to behave towards China much the way it behaved towards the Soviet Union during the Cold W ar“.9 Broomfield helps to further explain this phenomenon when she states: “Lest the reader forget who we are dealing with, there is an overwhelming tendency in this literature not to refer to the country as just ‘China’, or even the ‘People‘s Republic of China‘, but repeatedly as Communist China"- ”’ Statements like this help to highlight aspects of China in which it is portrayed as not only different to the West, but also as a challenger.

#### The drive for energy security increases the construction of the China threat.

Campion 16 — Andrew Stephen Campion, is the Head of Research at the Atlantic Council, UK. His work focuses on the construction of security threats with an emphasis on energy and China, 2016 (“The Geopolitics of Red Oil: Constructing the China Threat Through Energy Security” p. 9-11 (available online via Google Books), accessed 6/21/16 AEC) ES= energy security, CT = china threat SOS= security of supply,

Such discrepancies help to illustrate that although there exist many conceptions of the term, those who discuss ES often assume the reader is aware of the definition they support. Despite these different understandings ES is usually deployed in its conventional guise as assumptions of the primacy of the SOS of non-renewable resources permeate debates. 'This has resulted in the entrenchment of conventional notions of energy security within American discourse in which oil security and SOS have become intrinsic to perceptions of US national security.31 Oil retains a privileged position in the Western energy mix because much of our energy infra- structure has been built around it and because oil is perhaps the most strategic commodity of the day. Although oil supply security is as vital to US national security in 2015 as it was in 1973 when OPEC disrupted Western aceess,‘2 con- cerns and perceptions surrounding SOS no longer tend to surround the producer- states of OPEC, but instead they stem from the growing demand from competing importer states - most notably China. As China’s unprecedented growth continues, critics argue that traditional sources of energy supplies are becoming strained as they struggle to meet the growing demand, and this fear has become a defining theme of the China threat. As the US and China are both net oil importers whose HS understandings and resultant strategies are overwhelmingly conventional, these SOS concerns ensure that China and the US compete for the same scarce resources, and these specific ES perceptions twin with perceptions to exacerbate Sino- American tensions. Therefore the conventional notions of ES which are dominant in American discourse work to further conceptions of China as a threat to US inter- ests because the non-renewable energy resources emphasized by the ESD are viewed as scarce and limited. When reading the situation through these optics, the increasing energy demands which are inexorably linked to China’s economic growth ensure that China is perceived as a competitor to the United States in a zero-sum game of energy acquisition,33 Perhaps the most conspicuous idea which emerges from the interaction of the China Threat and Energy Security Discourses is that China‘s growth will compel it to act. belligerently towards its neighbours and other regional powers in order for it to secure its ever-increasing energy requirements. Of greatest significance is the argument that China‘s need for oil will draw it into competition with other oil importers and particular emphasis has been placed on the possibility of con- flict between China and the United States. Thus, these CT perceptions are both exacerbated by. as well as contribute to Western ES concerns. To China threat proponents the threat has cast a pall over China‘s relations with its neighbours and the West, but most significantly with the United States. If we accept that the China threat and energy security are discourses which are often deployed while rarely being defined then we are able to confront the most problematic issue which is associated with them. It is deeply troubling that reference by scholars and policymakers to notions of the CT as well as ES is often made without any suggestion or articulation as to what they mean when they invoke these terms, but this often occurs in the literature. Indeed, the very notion that the CT or 138 have inherent and universally understood meanings is troublesome. In keeping, otherwise serious and thoughtful work devoted to these issues is undermined by overreliance on commonplace and often misleading expectations and beliefs. Issues surrounding the CT and ES have saturated con- temporary discussions of international affairs but there is a pressing need for critical work to redress the fact that some prevalent perceptions and assumptions associated with these terms often enjoy a privileged, unchallenged, and possibly undeserved place within the literature. I therefore aim to challenge these mis- leading frameworks for analysis by eschewing positivist ideas of causality in order to question and explore the constructions and representations of the China threat and energy security so as to explore how the CT has become a defining motif of the twenty-first century. This examination will illustrate how the rela- tionship between these terms has become actualized in practice, and the book will use CNOOC‘s failed 2005 bid for Unoeal to do so.

**Link – US/Global Economy**

#### Aff discourse of global economic stability and trade justifies military interventions to prop up the global economy — leads to endless warfare.

Neocleous 8 **—** [Mark Neocleous, Prof. of Government @ Brunel, Prof of Gov, Critique of Security, p95-]

In other words, the new international order moved very quickly to reassert the connection between economic and national security: the commitment to the former was simultaneously a commitment to the latter, and vice versa. As the doctrine of national security was being born, the major player on the international stage would aim to use perhaps its most important power of all – its economic strength – in order to re-order the world. And this re-ordering was conducted through the idea of ‘economic security’.99 Despite the fact that ‘econ omic security’ would never be formally deﬁned beyond ‘economic order’ or ‘economic well-being’,100 the signiﬁcant conceptual con sistency between economic security and liberal order-building also had a strategic ideological role. By playing on notions of ‘economic well-being’, economic security seemed to emphasise economic and thus ‘human’ needs over military ones. The reshaping of global capital, international order and the exercise of state power could thus look decidedly liberal and ‘humanitarian’. This appearance helped co-opt the liberal Left into the process and, of course, played on individual desire for personal security by using notions such as ‘personal freedom’ and‘social equality’.101 Marx and Engels once highlighted the historical role of the bour geoisie in shaping the world according to its own interests. The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It must nestle everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere . . . It compels all nations, on pain of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production; it compels them . . . to become bourgeois in themselves. In one word, it creates a world after its own image.102 In the second half of the twentieth century this ability to ‘batter down all Chinese walls’ would still rest heavily on the logic of capital, but would also come about in part under the guise of security. The whole world became a garden to be cultivated – to be recast according to the logic of security. In the space of ﬁfteen years the concept ‘economic security’ had moved from connoting insurance policies for working people to the desire to shape the world in a capitalist fashion – and back again. In fact, it has constantly shifted between these registers ever since, being used for the constant reshaping of world order and resulting in a comprehensive level of intervention and policing all over the globe. Global order has come to be fabricated and administered according to a security doctrine underpinned by the logic of capitalaccumulation and a bourgeois conception of order. By incorporating within it a particular vision of economic order, the concept of national security implies the interrelatedness of so many different social, econ omic, political and military factors that more or less any development anywhere can be said to impact on liberal order in general and America’s core interests in particular. Not only could bourgeois Europe be recast around the regime of capital, but so too could the whole international order as capital not only nestled, settled and established connections, but also‘secured’ everywhere. Security politics thereby became the basis of a distinctly liberal philosophy of global ‘intervention’, fusing global issues of economic management with domestic policy formations in an ambitious and frequently violent strategy. Here lies the Janus-faced character of American foreign policy.103 One face is the ‘good liberal cop’: friendly, prosperous and democratic, sending money and help around the globe when problems emerge, so that the world’s nations are shown how they can alleviate their misery and perhaps even enjoy some prosperity. The other face is the ‘bad liberal cop’: should one of these nations decide, either through parliamentary procedure, demands for self-determination or violent revolution to address its own social problems in ways that conﬂict with the interests of capital and the bourgeois concept of liberty, then the authoritarian dimension of liberalism shows its face; the ‘liberal moment’ becomes the moment of violence. This Janus-faced character has meant that through the mandate of security the US, as the national security state par excellence, has seen ﬁt to either overtly or covertly re-order the affairs of myriads of nations – those ‘rogue’ or ‘outlaw’ states on the ‘wrong side of history’.104 ‘Extrapolating the ﬁgures as best we can’, one CIA agent com mented in 1991,‘there have been about 3,000 **major covert operations** and over 10,000 minor operations – all illegal, and all designed to disrupt, destabilize, or modify the activities of other countries’, adding that ‘every covert operation has been rationalized in terms of U.S. national security’.105 These would include ‘interventions’ in Greece, Italy, France, Turkey, Macedonia, the Ukraine, Cambodia, Indonesia, China, Korea, Burma, Vietnam, Thailand, Ecuador, Chile, Argentina, Brazil, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Uruguay, Bolivia, Grenada, Paraguay, Nicaragua, El Salvador, the Philippines, Honduras, Haiti, Venezuela, Panama, Angola, Ghana, Congo, South Africa, Albania, Lebanon, Grenada, Libya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, and many more, and many of these more than once. Next up are the ‘60 or more’ countries identiﬁed as the bases of ‘terror cells’ by Bush in a speech on 1 June 2002.106 The methods used have varied: most popular has been the favoured technique of liberal security – ‘making the economy scream’ via controls, interventions and the imposition of neo-liberal regulations. But a wide range of other techniques have been used: terror bombing; subversion; rigging elections; the use of the CIA’s ‘Health Alteration Committee’ whose mandate was to ‘incapacitate’ foreign ofﬁcials; drug-trafﬁcking;107 and the sponsorship of terror groups, counterinsurgency agencies, death squads. Unsurprisingly, some plain old fascist groups and parties have been co-opted into the project, from the attempt at reviving the remnants of the Nazi collaborationist Vlasov Army for use against the USSR to the use of fascist forces to undermine democratically elected governments, such as in Chile; indeed, one of the reasons fascism ﬂowed into Latin America was because of the ideology of national security.108 Concomitantly, ‘national security’ has meant a policy of non-intervention where satisfactory ‘security partnerships’ could be established with certain authoritarian and military regimes: Spain under Franco, the Greek junta, Chile, Iraq, Iran, Korea, Indonesia, Cambodia, Taiwan, South Vietnam, the Philippines, Turkey, the ﬁve Central Asian republics that emerged with the break-up of the USSR, and China. Either way, the whole world was to be included in the new‘secure’ global liberal order. The result has been the slaughter of untold numbers. John Stock well, who was part of a CIA project in Angola which led to the deaths of over 20,000 people, puts it like this: Coming to grips with these U.S./CIA activities in broad numbers and ﬁguring out how many people have been killed in the jungles of Laos or the hills of Nicaragua is very difﬁcult. But, adding them up as best we can, we come up with a ﬁgure of six million people killed – and this is a minimum ﬁgure. Included are: one million killed in the Korean War, two million killed in the Vietnam War, 800,000 killed in Indonesia, one million in Cambodia, 20,000 killed in Angola – the operation I was part of – and 22,000 killed in Nicaragua.109 Note that the six million is a minimum ﬁgure, that he omits to mention rather a lot of other interventions, and that he was writing in 1991. **This is security as the slaughter bench of history**. All of this has been more than conﬁrmed by events in the twentyﬁrst century: in a speech on 1 June 2002, which became the basis of the ofﬁcial National Security Strategy of the United Statesin September of that year, President Bush reiterated that the US has a unilateral right to overthrow any government in the world, and launched a new round of slaughtering to prove it. While much has been made about the supposedly ‘new’ doctrine of preemption in the early twenty-ﬁrst century, the policy of preemption has a long history as part of national security doctrine. The United States has long maintained the option of pre-emptive actions to counter a sufﬁcient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction – and the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves . . . To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adver saries, the United States will, if necessary, act pre emptively.110 In other words, the security policy of the world’s only superpower in its current ‘war on terror’ is still underpinned by a notion of liberal order-building based on a certain vision of ‘economic order’. The National Security Strategy concerns itself with a ‘single sustainable model for national success’ based on ‘political and economic liberty’, with whole sections devoted to the security beneﬁts of ‘economic liberty’, and the beneﬁts to liberty of the security strategy proposed.111

#### Economic policy is now securitized — the aff is just another example of the problematic national security agenda.

Higgott 4 —Richard Higgott, an Emeritus Professor of International Political Economy (and former Pro-Vice Chancellor for Research) at the University of Warwick. He was (1989–90) president of the Australasian Political Studies Association, 2004 (“After Neo-liberal Globalization” Critical Asian Studies, p.462 accessed 6/24/16, AEC)

At one level it is inevitable in the post-9/11 era that the reassertion of the geo-security agenda over the geoeconomic agenda (which prevailed in the 1990s heyday of neoliberal globalization) should result in wider policy change. Moreover, the weakened U.S. economy of the early twenty-first century — which does not contradict the argument that we live in a unipolar hegemonic moment — has seen the administration think more about the degree to which the security agenda could also be a prop to the U.S. domestic economy. U.S. economic policy is increasingly framed as a security question and globalization is now seen not simply through rose-tinted neoliberal economic (deregulatory and liberalizing) lenses, but also through the less-rosy-colored lenses of the national security agenda. Specifically, economic globalization is seen not only as an economic benefit, but also as a security “problem.” In the context of the New Security Agenda, economic policy becomes an explicit arm of security policy. This trend can be seen across the spectrum of U.S. economic policy — not only toward the neoliberal economic globalization project in general but also in specific policies toward the international economic institutions (the IMF, the World Bank) and especially toward the WTO in the Doha Multilateral Trade Negotiations (MTN) Round; in bilateral economic relations with the European Union (EU), where the nexus between economic and security relations is now an integral part of its wider security agenda in the wake of the split over military involvement in Iraq and in the economic relationship with Asia. Contrary to some of the more pietistic beliefs that prevailed in the 1990s hyper-globalist literature, globalization does not eliminate more traditional understandings of inter-state competition between the major powers.30 Nor does it eliminate competition between various sectors of the ruling economic elites of the major powers. As Marxists, and many non-Marxists, would argue, the interests of “capital” can be expected to split between sections that are global and sections that are more nationalist in character. In the United States, the prime example of that section that is more nationalist than global is the so-called military industrial complex.

#### Threat of economic collapse is used as a smokescreen to justify militant action

Jefferis 12 (Daniel C, "Battlefield Borders, Threat Rhetoric, and The Militarization of State and Local Law Enforcement." National Security Law Brief 3, no. 1 (2012): 37-73. Date Accessed: 7/27/14 <http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1046&context=nslb>)

Threat rhetoric is particularly powerful in the war on terror because our collective conceptualization of "security" has shifted dramatically since the early-to-mid twentieth century from a personal "democratic to a collective "national security."I19 As Aziz Rana describes, before World War Il security Was understood as the protection Of individual property and well-being120 Draw- ing on the philosophies Of John Locke, it followed that individuals possessed the knowledge and reasoning necessary to best 100k after their own security. 121 Based on that collective knowledge, the institutions and policies employed in the interests Of security were largely relegated to the "people" as democratic matters — hence, "democratic security." 122 Democratic security emphasized transparency and civilian control and deemphasized secrecy and expertization.123 In Other words, the people — collectively — were capable Of discerning What was best for their own security. Beginning in the early twentieth century, however, against the **backdrop of economic collapse**, industrialization, and the New Deal, the complexities of the new century became clear: **ordinary citizens no longer understood the controlling forces nor possessed the capacity to provide for their own wellbeing**. 124 The United States faced numerous new external threats — threats to the home- land. 125 The external threats were complex: they were foreign, and they required specialized experts to gather and analyze intelligence from abroad. 126 The threats required shifting the U.S. foreign policy focus from diplomacy to military affairs. 127 The new conceptualization of security — national security — could no longer be governed democratically. 13 While ordinary citizens may have been capable of deciding matters of their own personal security, they no longer held the capacity to decide matters of national security. Demo- critic deliberation on national security matters, it was thought, "would only lead to conflict and to decision-making driven by special interests rather than those with actual knowledge about social conditions.”ISO Thus, the notion of transparency and public decision-making fell away and was replaced by a growing industry of government experts bound by secrecy. 131 "National security" be- came something "pre-political"l32 and removed from democracy — an all-encompassing, "unifying commitment that transcended ordinary popular disagreement and thus was appropriately removed from the regular political process."L33 this commitment to secrecy and the "non-democratic" nature of **national security policy is precisely why threat rhetoric IS effective.** With no check on the veracity or reliability of the intelligence and information guiding decision-making, the Executive is free to control the substantive information and its presentation — to shape the rhetoric. The flexibility and lack of accountability permit the Executive to shape the information, not to reflect an actual threat, but to fit policy goals. In no other recent era was the efficacy of threat rhetoric to garner support for a literal war clearer than in the months before the 2003 invasion Of Iraq. 1M Through speeches, interviews, congressional briefings, and public documents, the Bush administration's threat rhetoric involved hundreds of claims regarding Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi regime's possession of biological and chemical weapons and, quite simply, the general threat that Iraq posed to the United States. Coupled With ominous Images Of mushroom clouds and a Vial Of anthrax brandished by then-Secretary Of State Colin Powell at a United Nations Security Council speech,13S the Executive sought to link Iraq to the War on terror,13C' thereby instilling fear in the public137 and convincing Congress that the use Of force in Iraq "was a necessityl,l not a choice' '1" — that is, that the battlefield in the war on terror must extend to Iraq. Briefly, the threat rhetoric progressed as follows: In September 2002, President Bush claimed before the United Nations General Assembly that Iraq possessed weapons Of mass destruction and that the Saddam Hussein regime posed a "grave and gathering danger" 139 and a "threat to Thereafter, the terrorism theme Of the threat rhetoric — necessary to link Iraq to the war on terror,141 which already enjoyed public support — dominated presidential discourse. 142 At that early point, a majority Of the public believed that the President should get the approval Of Congress, the UN, Western allies and Arab States before confronting the threat With force. 143 By President State Of the Union Address in late January 2003, however, just five months later, public opinion echoed the Executive's position — that the use Of force Via military action in Iraq was necessary.' And by early March 2003, a majority Of the public was persuaded that toppling the Hussein regime was necessary and worth the loss Of troops. I'S

**Link – Generic War Reps**

**Their representations of war are emblematic of security politics that are driven by a fundamental fear of the Other that create the *enabling conditions* for violence – it’s try or die**

**Jabri ‘6** (Vivienne, Director of the Centre for International Relations and Senior Lecturer at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London, War, Security and the Liberal State, Security Dialogue, 37;47)

LATE MODERN TRANSFORMATIONS are often conceived in terms of the sociopolitical and economic manifestations of change emergent from a globalized arena. What is less apparent is how late modernity as a distinct era has impacted upon our conceptions of the social sphere, our lived experience, and our reflections upon the discourses and institutions that form the taken-for-granted backdrop of the known and the knowable. The paradigmatic certainties of modernity – the state, citizenship, democratic space, humanity’s infinite capacity for progress, the defeat of dogma and the culmination of modernity’s apotheosis in the free-wheeling market place – have in the late modern era come face to face with uncertainty, unpre- dictability and the gradual erosion of the modern belief that we could indeed simply move on, assisted by science and technology, towards a condition where instrumental rationality would become the linchpin of government and human interaction irrespective of difference. Progress came to be associated with peace, and both were constitutively linked to the universal, the global, the human, and therefore the cosmopolitan. What shatters such illusions is the recollection of the 20th century as the ‘age of extremes’ (Hobsbawm, 1995), and the 21st as the age of the **ever-present condition of war**. While we might prefer a forgetting of things past, a **therapeutic anamnesis** that manages to reconfigure history, it is perhaps the continuities with the past that act as antidote to such righteous comforts. How, then, do we begin to conceptualize war in conditions where distinctions disappear, where war is conceived, or indeed articulated in political discourse, in terms of peace and security, so that **the political is** somehow **banished** in the name of governmentalizing practices whose purview knows no bounds, whose remit is precisely the banishment of limits, of boundaries and distinctions. Boundaries, however, do not disappear. Rather, they become manifest in every instance of violence, every instance of control, every instance of practices targeted against a constructed other, the enemy within and without, the all-pervasive presence, the defences against which come to form the legitimizing tool of war. Any scholarly take on the present juncture of history, any analysis of the dynamics of the present, must somehow render the narrative in measured tones, taking all factors into account, lest the narrator is accused of exaggeration at best and particular political affiliations at worst. When the late modern condition of the West, of the European arena, is one of camps, one of the detention of groups of people irrespective of their individual needs as migrants, one of the incarceration without due process of suspects, one of overwhelming police powers to stop, search and detain, one of indefinite detention in locations beyond law, one of invasion and occupation, then language itself is challenged in its efforts to contain the description of what is. The critical scholarly take on the present is then precisely to **reveal the conditions of possibility in relation to how we got here, to** unravel the enabling dynamics that led to the disappearance of distinctions between war and criminality, war and peace, war and security. When such distinctions disappear, impunity is the result, **accountability shifts beyond sight,** and violence comes to form the linchpin of control. We can reveal the operations of violence, but far more critical is the revelation of power and how power operates in the present. As the article argues, such an exploration raises fundamental questions relating to the **relationship of power and violence, and their** **mutual interconnection** in the complex interstices of disrupted time and space locations. Power and violence are hence separable analytical categories, separable practices; they are at the same time connected in ways that work on populations and on bodies – with violence often targeted against the latter so that the former are reigned in, governed. Where Michel Foucault sought, in his later writings, to distinguish between power and violence, to reveal the subtle workings of power, now, in the present, this article will venture, perhaps the distinction is no longer viable when we witness the indistinctions I highlight above The article provides an analysis of the place of war in late modern politics. In particular, it concentrates on the implications of war for our conceptions of the liberty–security problematique in the context of the modern liberal state. The first section of the article argues the case for the figure of war as analyser of the present. The second section of the article reveals the con- ditions of possibility for a distinctly late modern mode of war and its imbri- cations in politics. The final section of the article concentrates on the political implications of the primacy of war in late modernity, and in particular on possibilities of dissent and articulations of political agency. The aim through- out is to provide the **theoretical and conceptual tools** that might begin to meet the challenges of the present and to **open an agenda of research** **that concentrates on the politics of the present**, the **capacities** or otherwise **of** contestation **and accountability**, and the institutional locations wherein such political agency might emerge. The Figure of War and the Spectre of Security The so-called war against terrorism is constructed as a global war, transcend- ing space and seemingly defiant of international conventions. It is dis- tinguished from previous global wars, including the first and the second world wars, in that the latter two have, in historiography, always been analysed as interstate confrontations, albeit ones that at certain times and in particular locations peripherally involved non-state militias. Such distinc- tions from the old, of course, will be subject to future historical narratives on the present confrontation and its various parameters. What is of interest in the present discussion is the distinctly global aspect of this war, for it is the globality1 of the war against terrorism that renders it particularly relevant and pertinent to investigations that are primarily interested in the relation- ship between war and politics, war and the political processes defining the modern state. The initial premise of the present article is that war, rather than being confined to its own time and space, **permeates the normality of the political process**, has, in other words, a defining influence on elements con- sidered to be constitutive of liberal democratic politics, including executive answerability, legislative scrutiny, a public sphere of discourse and inter- action, equal citizenship under the law and, to follow liberal thinkers such as Habermas, political legitimacy based on free and equal communicative practices underpinning social solidarity (Habermas, 1997). War disrupts these elements and is a time of crisis and emergency. **A war that has a permanence to it clearly normalizes the exceptional**, inscribing emergency into the daily routines of social and political life. While the elements of war – conflict, social fragmentation, exclusion – may run silently through the assemblages of control in liberal society (Deleuze, 1986), nevertheless the persistent iteration of war into politics brings these practices to the fore, and with them a call for a rethinking of war’s relationship to politics. The distinctly global spatiality of this war suggests particular challenges that have direct impact on the liberal state, its obligations towards its citizenry, and the extent to which it is implicated in undermining its own political institutions. It would, however, be a mistake to assume that the practices involved in this global war are in any way anathema to the liberal state. The analysis provided here would argue that while it is crucial to acknowledge the transformative impact of the war against terrorism, it is **equally as important** to appreciate the **continuities in social and political life that are the** enabling conditions **of this global** **war, forming its conditions of possibility**. These enabling conditions are not just present or apparent at global level, but incorporate **local practices** that are deep-rooted and institu- tionalized. The mutually reinforcing relationship between global and local conditions renders this particular war distinctly all-pervasive, and poten- tially, in terms of implications, far more threatening to the spaces available for political **contestation and** **dissent**. Contemporary global politics is dominated by what might be called a ‘matrix of war’2 constituted by a series of transnational practices that vari- ously target states, communities and individuals. These practices involve states as agents, bureaucracies of states and supranational organizations, quasi-official and private organizations recruited in the service of a global machine that is highly militarized and hence led by the United States, but that nevertheless incorporates within its workings various alliances that are always in flux. The crucial element in understanding the matrix of war is the notion of ‘**practice’**, for this captures the idea that any practice is not just situated in a system of enablements and constraints, but is itself **constitutive of structural continuities**, both discursive and institutional. As Paul Veyne (1997: 157) writes in relation to Foucault’s use of the term, ‘practice is not an agency (like the Freudian id) or a prime mover (like the relation of produc- tion), and moreover for Foucault, there is no agency nor any prime mover’. It is in this recursive sense that practices (of violence, exclusion, intimidation, control and so on) become structurated in the routines of institutions as well as lived experience (Jabri, 1996). To label the contemporary global war as a ‘war against terrorism’ confers upon these practices a certain legitimacy, suggesting that they are geared towards the elimination of a direct threat. While the threat of violence perpetrated by clandestine networks against civilians is all too real and requires state responses, many of these responses appear to assume a wide remit of operations – so wide that anyone interested in the liberties associated with the democratic state, or indeed the rights of individuals and communities, is called upon to unravel the implications of such practices. When security becomes the overwhelming imperative of the democratic state, its legitimization is achieved both through a discourse of **‘**balance’ between security and liberty and in terms of the ‘protection’ of liberty.3 The implications of the juxtaposition of security and liberty may be investigated either in terms of a discourse of ‘securitization’ (the power of speech acts to construct a threat juxtaposed with the power of professionals precisely to so construct)4 or, as argued in this article, in terms of a discourse of war. The grammars involved are closely related, and yet that of the latter is, para- doxically, the critical grammar, the grammar that highlights the workings of power and their imbrications with violence. What is missing from the securitization literature is an **analytic of war**, and it is this analytic that I want to foreground in this article. The practices that I highlight above seem at first hand to constitute differ- ent response mechanisms in the face of what is deemed to be an emergency situation in the aftermath of the events of 11 September 2001. The invasion and occupation of Iraq, the incarceration without due process of prisoners in camps from Afghanistan to Guantánamo and other places as yet un- identified, the use of torture against detainees, **extra-judicial assassination**, the **detention** and deportation – again **without due process** – of foreign nationals deemed a threat, increasing restrictions on refugees, their confine- ment in camps and detention centres, the construction of the movement of peoples in security terms, and restrictions on civil liberties through domestic legislation in the UK, the USA and other European states are all represented in political discourse as necessary security measures geared towards the protection of society. All are at the same time institutional measures targeted against a particular other as enemy and source of danger. It could be argued that the above practices remain **unrelated** and must hence be subject to different modes of analysis. To begin with, these practices involve different agents and are framed around different issues. Afghanistan and Iraq may be described as situations of war, and the incarceration of refugees as encompassing practices of security. However, what links these elements is not so much that they constitute a constructed taxonomy of dif- ferentiated practices. Rather, what links them is the **element of antagonism directed against distinct and particular others**. Such a perspective suggests that the politics of security**, including the** production of fear and a whole array of exclusionary measures, **comes to** service practices that constitute war and **locates the discourse of war at the** heart of politics, not just domes- tically, but, more crucially in the present context, globally. The implications for the late modern state and the distinctly liberal state are **monumental**, for a perpetual war on a global scale has **implications for political structures** and political agency, for our conceptions of citizenship and the role of the state in meeting the claims of its citizens,5 and for the workings of a public sphere that is increasingly global and hence increasingly multicultural. The matrix of war is **centrally constituted** around the element of antago- nism, having an association with **existential threat**: the idea that the continued presence of the other constitutes a danger not just to the well-being of society but to its continued existence in the form familiar to its members, hence the relative ease with which European politicians speak of migrants of particular origins as forming a threat to the ‘idea of Europe’ and its Christian origins.6 Herein lies a **discourse of cultural and racial exclusion** based on a certain **fear of the other**. While the war against specific clandestine organiza- tions7 involves operations on both sides that may be conceptualized as a classical war of attrition, what I am referring to as the matrix of war is far more complex, for here we have a set of diffuse practices, violence, disci- plinarity and control that at one and same time target the other typified in cultural and racial terms and instantiate a wider remit of operations that impact upon society as a whole. The practices of warfare taking place in the immediate aftermath of 11 September 2001 **combine with societal** processes, reflected in media **representations** and in the wider public sphere, where increasingly the source of threat, indeed the source of terror, is perceived as the cultural other, and specifically the other associated variously with Islam, the Middle East and South Asia. There is, then, a particularity to what Agamben (1995, 2004) calls the ‘state of exception’, a state not so much generalized and generalizable, but one that is experienced differently by different sectors of the global population. It is precisely this differential experience of the exception that draws attention to practices as diverse as the formulation of interrogation techniques by military intelligence in the Pentagon, to the recent provisions of counter-terrorism measures in the UK,8 to the legitimizing discourses surrounding the invasion of Iraq. All are practices that draw upon a discourse of legitimization based on prevention and pre-emption. Enemies constructed in the discourses of war are hence always potential, always abstract even when identified, and, in being so, always drawn widely and, in consequence, communally. There is, hence, a ‘profile’ to the state of exception and its experience. Practices that profile particular communities, including the citizens of European states, create particular challenges to the self-understanding of the liberal democratic state and its capacity, in the 21st century, to deal with difference. While a number of measures undertaken in the name of security, such as proposals for the introduction of identity cards in the UK or increasing surveillance of financial transactions in the USA, might encompass the population as a whole, the politics of exception is marked by racial and cul- tural signification. Those targeted by exceptional measures are members of particular racial and cultural communities. The assumed threat that under- pins the measures highlighted above is one that is now openly associated variously with Islam as an ideology, Islam as a mode of religious identi- fication, Islam as a distinct mode of lifestyle and practice, and Islam as a particular brand associated with particular organizations that espouse some form of a return to an Islamic Caliphate. When practices are informed by a discourse of antagonism, no distinctions are made between these various forms of individual and communal identification. When communal profiling takes place, the distinction between, for example, the choice of a particular lifestyle and the choice of a particular organization disappears, and diversity within the profiled community is sacrificed in the name of some ‘pre- cautionary’ practice that targets all in the name of security.9 The practices and language of antagonism, when racially and culturally inscribed, place the onus of guilt onto the entire community so identified, so that its indi- vidual members can no longer simply be citizens of a secular, multicultural state, but are constituted in discourse as particular citizens, subjected to particular and hence exceptional practices. When the Minister of State for the UK Home Office states that members of the Muslim community should expect to be stopped by the police, she is simply expressing the condition of the present, which is that the Muslim community is particularly vulnerable to state scrutiny and invasive measures that do not apply to the rest of the citizenry.10 We know, too, that a distinctly racial profiling is taking place, so that those who are physically profiled are subjected to exceptional measures. Even as the so-called war against terrorism recognizes no boundaries as limits to its practices – indeed, many of its practices occur at transnational, often indefinable, spaces – what is crucial to understand, however, is that this does not mean that boundaries are no longer constructed or that they do not impinge on the sphere of the political. The paradox of the current context is that while the war against terrorism in all its manifestations assumes a boundless arena, borders and boundaries are at the heart of its operations. The point to stress is that these boundaries and the exclusionist practices that sustain them are not coterminous with those of the state; rather, they could be said to be located and perpetually constructed upon the corporeality of those constructed as enemies, as **threats to security**. It is indeed the corporeal removal of such subjects that **lies at the heart** of what are constructed as counter-terrorist measures, typified in practices of **direct war**, in the use of torture, in extra-judicial incarceration and in judicially sanctioned **detention**. We might, then, ask if such measures constitute violence or relations of power, where, following Foucault, we assume that the former acts upon bodies with a view to injury, while the latter acts upon the actions of subjects and assumes, as Deleuze (1986: 70–93) suggests, a relation of forces and hence a subject who can act. What I want to argue here is that violence is imbricated in relations of power, is a mode of control, a technology of governmentality. When the population of Iraq is targeted through aerial bombardment, the consequence goes beyond injury and seeks the pacifica- tion of the Middle East as a political region. When legislative and bureaucratic measures are put in place in the name of security, those targeted are categories of population. At the same time, the war against terrorism and the security discourses utilized in its legitimiza- tion are conducted and constructed in terms that imply the defence or protection of populations. One option is to **limit** policing, **military** and intel- ligence efforts through the targeting of particular organizations. However, it is the limitless construction of the war against terrorism, its targeting of particular racial and cultural communities, that is the source of the challenge presented to the liberal democratic state. In conditions constructed in terms of emergency, **war permeates discourses on politics**, so that these come to be subject to the restraints and imperatives of war and practices constituted in terms of the demands of security against an existential threat. The implications for liberal democratic politics and our conceptions of the modern state and its institutions are far-reaching,11 for the liberal democratic polity that considers itself in a state of perpetual war is also a state that is in a permanent state of mobilization, where every aspect of public life is geared towards combat against potential enemies, internal and external. One of the most significant lessons we learn from Michel Foucault’s writ- ings is that war, or ‘the distant roar of battle’ (Foucault, 1977: 308), is never quite so distant from liberal governmentality. Conceived in Foucaultian terms, war and counter-terrorist measures come to be seen **not as discontinuity** from liberal government, but as **emergent from the enabling conditions that liberal government** and the modern state has historically set in place. On reading Foucault’s renditions on the emergence of the disciplinary society, what we see is the continuation of war in society and not, as in Hobbes and elsewhere in the history of thought, the idea that wars happen at the outskirts of society and its **civil order**. The disciplinary society is not simply an accumulation of **institutional** and bureaucratic **procedures** that permeate the everyday and the routine; rather, it has running through its interstices the **constitutive elements of war as continuity**, including confrontation, struggle and the corporeal removal of those deemed enemies of society. In Society Must Be Defended (Foucault, 2003) and the first volume of the History of Sexuality (Foucault, 1998), we see reference to the discursive and institutional continuities that structurate war in society. Reference to the ‘distant roar of battle’ suggests confrontation and struggle; it suggests the **ever-present construction of threat** accrued to the particular other; it suggests the **immediacy of threat** and **the construction of fear of the enemy**; and ultimately it calls for the corporeal removal of the enemy as source of threat. The analytic of war also encompasses the techniques of the military and their presence in the social sphere – in particular, the control and regulation of bodies, timed pre- cision and instrumentality that turn a war machine into an active and live killing machine. In the matrix of war, there is hence the level of discourse and the level of institutional practices; both are mutually implicating and mutually enabling. There is also the level of bodies and the level of population. In Foucault’s (1998: 152) terms: ‘the biological and the historical are not con- secutive to one another . . . but are bound together in an increasingly com- plex fashion in accordance with the development of the modern technologies of power that take life as their objective’. What the above suggests is the idea of **war as a continuity** in social and political life. **The matrix of war suggests both discursive and institutional practices**, technologies that target bodies and populations, enacted in a complex **array of locations**. The critical moment of this form of analysis is to point out that **war is not simply an isolated occurrence** taking place as some form of interruption to an existing peaceful order. Rather, this peaceful order is imbricated with the elements of war, present as continuities in social and political life, elements that are deeply rooted and **enabling of the actuality of war in its traditional battlefield sense**. **This implies a continuity** of sorts between the **disciplinary**, the carceral and the violent manifestations of government.

#### Violence can’t be controlled in a linear, predictable manner – you have to err ethically towards non-violence because the epistemological uncertainty surrounding the success of violence – the plan’s attempt to control it will inevitably fail

Jackson 11**-** Richard, Director of the National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, the University of Otago. Former. Professor of International Politics at Aberystwyth University, Fantasy and the Epistemological Crisis of Counter-terrorism, Amputations and Crocodiles: Counter-Analogies of Political Violence, http://richardjacksonterrorismblog.wordpress.com/2011/08/07/amputations-and-crocodiles-analogies-of-political-violence/

It is common for politicians and commentators to use analogies and metaphors to describe and explain acts of political violence. Medical analogies are particularly common, such as the notion that terrorism is a ‘cancer’ or that aerial bombing can be ‘surgical’. The problem is that these analogies can influence the way we think; for example, they can make us believe that a massive bombing campaign against a country – a series of ‘surgical strikes’ or military ‘operations’ – can destroy the ‘cancer’ of terrorism or cure a lack of democracy; they can make us think that violence can sometimes be an instrument of healing. Particularly when the analogy or metaphor is inaccurate or misleading, it can **obscure the reality of political violence** and cause us to accept its legitimacy **without** really **questioning its real-world effects** or true nature. It can, in other words, lead to **destructive policy choices**. Although no analogy is perfect and will contain its own distortions of the thing being described, I want to suggest two analogies which will help us to think more clearly and realistically about contemporary political violence. First, following the popularity of medical analogies, I want to suggest that we should always think about political violence as amputation rather than as general surgical operations or medical intervention. Adopting this analogy can help us to face some important truths about violence, such as that while amputation (violence) may sometimes be necessary in an extreme emergency to save a person’s life, it is always disfiguring and it will leave the patient (victim) a less than whole person who will suffer forever afterwards, even if prosthetics and other therapies make their life easier. In other words, violence can never be good or noble or positive in itself; it will always be destructive and cause suffering to its victims, even if it is viewed as necessary. Violence is permanently damaging and disfiguring by its very nature, as anyone who has ever been victimized will testify. Another principle to take from this analogy is that amputation (violence) should always be the very last option and viewed as an extreme measure that we must first take every possible step to avoid. Accepting this analogy would limit the frequency with which our leaders go to war or intervene militarily in other countries, and encourage them to try a great deal harder to find non-violent alternatives to the policy of political violence. If the leaders of the world’s nations accepted that violent military intervention would be analogous to doctors chopping off a patient’s legs or arms, they might be more cautious and not necessarily advocate it as an almost automatic policy response to the lack of democracy, acts of terrorism, or humanitarian crisis. If we’re lucky, it might also convince the leaders of social movements to reconsider the decision to escalate their campaign to include violent strategies and tactics when they feel frustrated by the lack of progress on social justice. A second analogy is to think of political violence as a crocodile, rather than as a dog or a horse (as in unleashing the ‘dogs of war’ or ‘war horse’). The fact is that, unlike dogs or horses, crocodiles can never be tamed or controlled. This is because crocodiles have very small, primitive brains which can only respond to instinctual survival needs. In other words, no matter how often someone feeds and cares for a crocodile, the crocodile will fail to recognize that person as anything more than a potential meal and a moment of carelessness will see the crocodile try to eat them, even after twenty years of loving care. It also means that even if the crocodile owner were to take it for a walk through town and it was not to try and eat every small child it came across, this would not be proof of the tameness of the crocodile; it would just be luck on that particular occasion. The importance of this analogy lies in its application to humanitarian intervention and the application of military force as a policy option. The fact is that military force (like the crocodile) will always be an untamed beast that will try and devour its owner if it senses the opportunity. **It cannot be tamed or controlled** like a dog on a leash. This is because war and violence has its own **inbuilt tendencies** towards **extreme action** and **unpredictable consequences**, as Clausewitz explained a long time ago. Sometimes the application of violence will provoke violent resistance and further **escalation**; other times it will result in capitulation. Most often, it leads to the distortion of our thinking and **impedes learning**, and in every case, it has incalculable opportunity costs. There is **no way to predict** which way the crocodile will go, except that it will be painful and damaging for someone. Therefore, any politician who says that military success is assured is only expressing the hope that the crocodile won’t eat any small children on this particular occasion. The emerging quagmire in Libya, with its thousands of civilian victims (the very ones the crocodile was deployed to protect), the growing prospects of civil war between rebel factions, and the lack of any measureable success, is testament to the crocodile nature of applying military force – as is the ten years of war so far in Afghanistan, the seven years of war so far in Iraq, and the inglorious record of military intervention in places like Lebanon, Gaza, Somalia, DRC, the former Yugoslavia, Chechnya, Kashmir, Colombia, and a hundred other **conveniently forgotten places**. In sum, the lessons to take from these analogies are: if you take your crocodile for a walk, don’t ever forget that it can never be tamed and it will usually try to eat the little children who cross its path; also, it is not advisable to use a crocodile in an operation of surgical amputation, even when it’s for democracy or human rights or some other noble ideal. Try to find another approach instead. After all, there are plenty of tried and tested non-violent alternatives to resolving conflict, just as there are usually medical alternatives to amputation.

#### Conflict de-escalation is backwards – assumptions of violence become a self-fulfilling prophecy and guarantee environmental collapse

Clark 4- Mary E. French Cumbie Professor of Conflict Resolution at George Mason University, “Rhetoric, Patriarchy & War: Explaining the Dangers of "Leadership" in Mass Culture,” Women and Language. Urbana: Fall,. Vol. 27, Iss. 2, ProQuest

Today's Western patriarchal world view now dominates globalwide dialogue among the "leaders" of Earth's nearly two hundred nation-states. Its Machiavellian/Realpolitik assumptions about the necessity of' military power to preserve order within and between groups of humans trumps--and stifles--other potential viewpoints. Founded on the belief that "evil" is innate, it dictates that human conflict must be "controlled": global "law" backed by coercive force. This view, when cross-culturally imposed, becomes a **self-fulfilling prophecy**, thus "legitimating" an escalating use of force. Western leaders (male and female) use a rhetoric couched in a "hegemonic masculinity" to justify their ready use of military force to coerce "those who are against us" into compliance. This translates globally as "national leaders must never lose face!" Changing this dominant paradigm requires dismantling the hierarchic hegemony of masculine militarism and its related economic institutions, through global cross-cultural dialogues, thus replacing a hegemonic world view and institutions with new, more adaptive visions, woven out of the most useful remnants of multiple past cultural stories. The paper concludes with a few examples where people around the worm are doing just this--using their own small voices to insert their local "sacred social story" into the global dialogue. This global process--free from a hegemonic militaristic rhetoric--has the potential to initiate a planetary dialogue where "boundaries" are no longer borders to be defended, but sites of social ferment and creative adaptation. When the call came for papers on War, Language, and Gender, referring us to Carol Cohn's seminal paper "Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals," (1) I at first felt that little more could be added on the subject. But events in Washington in the ensuing weeks stimulated me to a broader "take" on this topic. Defense intellectuals, after all, are embedded in a whole culture, and the interaction is two-way. Not only does their strategic framework with its euphemistic language about war and killing have the outcome of forcing society to think in their terms; their framework and language developed in response to our deeply embedded, Western cultural image of a Machiavellian / neo-Darwinian universe. In other words, militarism and the necessity for organized physical force (2) emerge out of culturewide assumptions about human nature. Throughout historical times these assumptions have repeatedly proved to be self-fulfilling prophecies. **The pervasive perception of enemy-competitors has generated violent conflicts** that flared up and died back, only to flare up again through our failure to achieve deep resolution and, especially, to alter our basic beliefs about human nature and our consequent social institutions. Today our species, politically, comprises some 180190 "nations" of varying cultural homogeneity and moral legitimacy, not to mention size and physical power. Regardless of their indigenous, internal cultural preferences, their cross-national interactions are institutionalized to fit a framework long established by former Western colonial powers among themselves. In other words, the global "reality" constructed by Western patriarchies-a Realpolitik, ultimately grounded in military power-has come to define day-to-day cross-national politics. During the era of the Cold War, this resulted in small, powerless nations seeking alliances with one or other superpower, which offered not only development aid but military protection, and, for locally unpopular, but "cooperating" leaders, small arms to maintain order at home. The "end" of the Cold War brought little change in this pervasive global militarism (though it did strengthen the role of economic hegemony by the remaining superpower (3)). The enormous technological "improvements"-i.e. efficiency in killing power-in weaponry of all types over the past few decades has now resulted in a dangerously over-armed planet that simultaneously faces a desperate shortage of resources available for providing the world's people with water, energy, health care, education, and the infrastructure for distributing them. **While our environmental** and social **overheads continue to mount, our species seems immobilized, trapped in an institutionalized militarism**-an evolutionary cul-de-sac! We need new insights-as Cohn said, a new language, a new set of metaphors, a new mental framework-for thinking, dialoguing and visioning new patterns of intersocietal interaction.

#### Their security reps are inaccurate and cause action-reaction cycles. Such cycles are the root of violence and make extinction inevitable.

Der Derian 98 (James, Professor of Political Science – University of Massachusetts, On Security, Ed. Lipschutz, p. 24-25)

No other concept in international relations packs the metaphysical punch, nor commands the disciplinary power of "security." In its name, peoples have alienated their fears, rights and powers to gods, emperors, and most recently, sovereign states, all to protect themselves from the vicissitudes of nature--as well as from other gods, emperors, and sovereign states. In its name, weapons of mass destruction have been developed which have transfigured national interest into a security dilemma based on a suicide pact. And, less often noted in international relations, in its name billions have been made and millions killed while scientific knowledge has been furthered and intellectual dissent muted. We have inherited an ontotheology of security, that is, an a priori  argument that proves the existence and necessity of only one form of security because there currently happens to be a widespread, metaphysical belief in it. Indeed, within the concept of security lurks the entire history of western metaphysics, which was best described by Derrida "as a series of substitutions of center for center" in a perpetual search for the "transcendental signified." Continues... [7](http://libcat1.cc.emory.edu:32888/20050307122932441313c0=www.ciaonet.org:80/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html#note7) In this case, Walt cites IR scholar Robert Keohane on the hazards of "reflectivism," to warn off anyone who by inclination or error might wander into the foreign camp: "As Robert Keohane has noted, until these writers `have delineated . . . a research program and shown . . . that it can illuminate important issues in world politics, they will remain on the margins of the field.' " [8](http://libcat1.cc.emory.edu:32888/20050307122932441313c0=www.ciaonet.org:80/book/lipschutz/lipschutz12.html#note8) By the end of the essay, one is left with the suspicion that the rapid changes in world politics have triggered a "security crisis" in security studies that requires extensive theoretical damage control. What if we leave the desire for mastery to the insecure and instead imagine a new dialogue of security, not in the pursuit of a utopian end but in recognition of the world as it is, other than us ? What might such a dialogue sound like? Any attempt at an answer requires a genealogy: to understand the discursive power of the concept, to remember its forgotten meanings, to assess its economy of use in the present, to reinterpret--and possibly construct through the reinterpretation--a late modern security comfortable with a plurality of centers, multiple meanings, and fluid identities. The steps I take here in this direction are tentative and preliminary. I first undertake a brief history of the concept itself. Second, I present the "originary" form of security that has so dominated our conception of international relations, the Hobbesian episteme of realism. Third, I consider the impact of two major challenges to the Hobbesian episteme, that of Marx and Nietzsche. And finally, I suggest that Baudrillard provides the best, if most nullifying, analysis of security in late modernity. In short, I retell the story of realism as an historic encounter of fear and danger with power and order that produced four realist forms of security: epistemic, social, interpretive, and hyperreal. To preempt a predictable criticism, I wish to make it clear that I am not in search of an "alternative security." An easy defense is to invoke Heidegger, who declared that "questioning is the piety of thought." Foucault, however, gives the more powerful reason for a genealogy of security: I am not looking for an alternative; you can't find the solution of a problem in the solution of another problem raised at another moment by other people. You see, what I want to do is not the history of solutions, and that's the reason why I don't accept the word alternative. My point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. The hope is that in the interpretation of the most pressing dangers of late modernity we might be able to construct a form of security based on the appreciation and articulation rather than the normalization or extirpation of difference. Nietzsche transvalues both Hobbes's and Marx's interpretations of security through a genealogy of modes of being. His method is not to uncover some deep meaning or value for security, but to destabilize the intolerable fictional identities of the past which have been created out of fear, and to affirm the creative differences which might yield new values for the future. Originating in the paradoxical relationship of a contingent life and a certain death, the history of security reads for Nietzsche as an abnegation, a resentment and, finally, a transcendence of this paradox. In brief, the history is one of individuals seeking an impossible security from the most radical "other" of life, the terror of death which, once generalized and nationalized, triggers a futile cycle of collective identities seeking security from alien others--who are seeking similarly impossible guarantees. It is a story of differences taking on the otherness of death, and identities calcifying into a fearful sameness.

#### Security experts can’t keep us safe- the ideological apparatus of realism escalates all problems into global disaster- their world view is structurally incapable of responding to global problems- this outweighs and turns the case

Der Derian 05 - James is Director of the Global Security Program and Research Professor of International Studies at the Watson Institute for International Studies at Brown University An Accident Waiting to Happen by James Der Derian Predicting the Present, Vol. 27 (3) - Fall 2005 Issue http://hir.harvard.edu/index.php?page=article&id=1430

It often takes a catastrophe to reveal the illusory beliefs we continue to harbor in national and homeland security. To keep us safe, we place our faith in national borders and guards, bureaucracies and experts, technologies and armies. These and other instruments of national security are empowered and legitimated by the assumption that it falls upon the sovereign country to protect us from the turbulent state of nature and anarchy that permanently lies in wait offshore and over the horizon for the unprepared and inadequately defended. But this parochial fear, posing as a realistic worldview, has recently taken some very hard knocks. Prior to September 11, 2001, national borders were thought to be necessary and sufficient to keep our enemies at bay; upon entry to Baghdad, a virtuous triumphalism and a revolution in military affairs were touted as the best means to bring peace and democracy to the Middle East; and before Hurricane Katrina, emergency preparedness and an intricate system of levees were supposed to keep New Orleans safe and dry. The intractability of disaster, especially its unexpected, unplanned, unprecedented nature, erodes not only the very distinction of the local, national, and global, but, assisted and amplified by an unblinking global media, reveals the contingent and highly interconnected character of life in general. Yet when it comes to dealing with natural and unnatural disasters, we continue to expect (and, in the absence of a credible alternative, understandably so) if not certainty and total safety at least a high level of probability and competence from our national and homeland security experts However, between the mixed metaphors and behind the metaphysical concepts given voice by US Homeland Security Director Michael Chertoff early into the Katrina crisis, there lurks an uneasy recognition that this administration—and perhaps no national government—is up to the task of managing incidents that so rapidly cascade into global events. Indeed, they suggest that our national plans and preparations for the “big one”—a force-five hurricane, terrorist attack, pandemic disease—have become part of the problem, not the solution. His use of hyberbolic terms like “ultra-catastrophe” and “fall-out” is telling: such events exceed not only local and national capabilities, but the capacity of conventional language itself. An easy deflection would be to lay the blame on the neoconservative faithful of the first term of US President George W. Bush, who, viewing through an inverted Wilsonian prism the world as they would wish it to be, have now been forced by natural and unnatural disasters to face the world as it really is—and not even the most sophisticated public affairs machine of dissimulations, distortions, and lies can close this gap. However, the discourse of the second Bush term has increasingly returned to the dominant worldview of national security, realism. And if language is, as Nietzsche claimed, a prisonhouse, realism is its supermax penitentiary. Based on linear notions of causality, a correspondence theory of truth, and the materiality of power, how can realism possibly account—let alone prepare or provide remedies—for complex catastrophes, like the toppling of the World Trade Center and attack on the Pentagon by a handful of jihadists armed with box-cutters and a few months of flight-training? A force-five hurricane that might well have begun with the flapping of a butterfly’s wings? A northeast electrical blackout that started with a falling tree limb in Ohio? A possible pandemic triggered by the mutation of an avian virus? How, for instance, are we to measure the immaterial power of the CNN-effect on the first Gulf War, the Al-Jazeera-effect on the Iraq War, or the Nokia-effect on the London terrorist bombings? For events of such complex, non-linear origins and with such tightly-coupled, quantum effects, the national security discourse of realism is simply not up to the task. Worse, what if the “failure of imagination” identified by the 9/11 Commission is built into our national and homeland security systems? What if the reliance on **planning for the catastrophe that never came reduced our capability to flexibly respond and improvise** for the “ultra-catastrophe” that did? What if worse-case scenarios, simulation training, and disaster exercises—as well as border guards, concrete barriers and earthen levees—not only prove inadequate but might well act as force-multipliers—what organizational theorists identify as “negative synergy” and “cascading effects” —that produce the automated bungling (think Federal Emergency Management Agency) that transform isolated events and singular attacks into global disasters? Just as “normal accidents” are built into new technologies—from the Titanic sinking to the Chernobyl meltdown to the Challenger explosion—we must ask whether “ultra-catastrophes” are no longer the exception but now part and parcel of densely networked systems that defy national management; in other words, “planned disasters.” What, then, is to be done? A first step is to move beyond the wheel-spinning debates that perennially keep security discourse always one step behind the global event. It might well be uni-, bi-, or multi-polar, but it is time to recognize that the power configuration of the states-system is rapidly being subsumed by a heteropolar matrix, in which a wide range of different actors and technological drivers are producing profound global effects through interconnectivity. Varying in identity, interests, and strength, these new actors and drivers gain advantage through the broad bandwidth of information technology, for networked communication systems provide the means to traverse political, economic, religious, and cultural boundaries, changing not only how we interpret events, but making it ever more difficult to maintain the very distinction of intended from accidental events. According to the legal philosopher of Nazi Germany, Carl Schmitt, when the state is unable to deliver on its traditional promissory notes of safety, security, and well-being through legal, democratic means, it will necessarily exercise the sovereign “exception:” declaring a state of emergency, defining friend from foe, and, if necessary, eradicating the threat to the state. But what if the state, facing the global event, cannot discern the accidental from the intentional? An external attack from an internal auto-immune response? The natural as opposed to the “planned disaster”? The enemy within from the enemy without? We can, as the United States has done since September 11, continue to treat catastrophic threats as issues of national rather than global security, and go it alone. However, once declared, bureaucratically installed, and repetitively gamed, national states of emergency grow recalcitrant and become **prone to even worse disasters**. As Paul Virilio, master theorist of the war machine and the integral accident once told me: “The full-scale accident is now the prolongation of total war by other means.”

**Link – Hegemony**

#### Hegemony is a paranoid fantasy – the strategy omnipotence sees threats to empire everywhere, which necessitates constant violence – you have an obligation to place the structural violence that hegemony invisibilizes at the core of your decision calculus

McClintock 9- Anne, chaired prof of English and Women’s and Gender Studies at UW–Madison. MPhil from Cambridge; PhD from Columbia (, Paranoid Empire: Specters from Guantánamo and Abu Ghraib, Small Axe Mar2009, Issue 28, p50-74

By now it is fair to say that the United States has come to be **dominated by two grand and dangerous hallucinations: the promise of benign US globalization and the permanent threat of the “war on terror.”** I have come to feel that we cannot understand the **extravagance of the violence** to which the US government has committed itself after 9/11—two countries invaded, **thousands of innocent people imprisoned, killed, and tortured**—unless we grasp a defining feature of our moment, that is, **a deep and disturbing doubleness with respect to power**. Taking shape, as it now does, around **fantasies of global omnipotence** (Operation Infinite Justice, the War to End All Evil) coinciding with **nightmares of impending attack, the U**nited **S**tates **has entered the domain of paranoia: dream world and catastrophe.** For it is only in paranoia that one finds simultaneously and in such condensed form both **deliriums of absolute power and forebodings of perpetual threat.** Hence the spectral and nightmarish quality of the “war on terror,” a **limitless war against a limitless threat, a war vaunted by the US administration to encompass all of space and persisting without end.** But the war on terror is not a real war, for “terror” is not an identifiable enemy nor a strategic, real-world target. The war on terror is what William Gibson calls elsewhere “**a consensual hallucination,”** 4 and the US government can fling its military might against ghostly apparitions and hallucinate a victory over all evil **only at the cost of catastrophic self-delusion and the infliction of great calamities elsewhere.** I have come to feel that we urgently need to make visible **(the better politically to challenge)** those established but **concealed circuits of imperial violence** that now animate the war on terror. We need, as urgently, to illuminate the **continuities that connect those circuits** of imperial violence abroad with the vast, internal shadowlands of prisons and supermaxes—the modern “slave-ships on the middle passage to nowhere”—that have come to characterize the United States as a **super-carceral state.** 5 Can we, the uneasy heirs of empire, now speak only of national things? If a long-established but primarily covert US imperialism has, since 9/11, manifested itself more aggressively as an overt empire, does the terrain and object of **intellectual** **inquiry**, as well as the claims of political responsibility, not also extend beyond that useful fiction of the “exceptional nation” to embrace **the shadowlands of empire?** If so, how can we theorize the phantasmagoric, imperial violence that has come so dreadfully to constitute our kinship with the ordinary, but which also at the same moment renders extraordinary the ordinary bodies of ordinary people, an imperial violence which in collusion with a complicit corporate media would render itself invisible, **casting states of emergency into fitful shadow and fleshly bodies into specters?** For **imperialism is not something that happens elsewhere,** an **offshore** fact to be deplored but as easily ignored. Rather, the force of empire comes to reconfigure, **from within**, the nature and violence of the nation-state itself, giving rise to perplexing questions: Who under an empire are “we,” the people? And who are the ghosted, ordinary people beyond the nation-state who, in turn, constitute “us”? We now inhabit **a crisis of violence and the visible**. **How do we insist on seeing the violence that the imperial state attempts to render invisible,** while also seeing the ordinary people afflicted by that violence? For to allow the spectral, disfigured people (especially those under torture) obliged to inhabit the **haunted no-places and penumbra** of empire to be made visible as ordinary people is to **forfeit the** long-held **US claim of moral and cultural exceptionalism, the traditional self-identity of the U**nited **S**tates **as the uniquely superior, universal standard-bearer of moral authority, a tenacious, national mythology of originary innocence now in tatters.** The deeper question, however, is not only how to see but also how to theorize and oppose the violence without becoming beguiled by the seductions of spectacle alone. 6 Perhaps in the labyrinths of torture **we must also find a way to speak with ghosts, for specters disturb the authority of vision and the hauntings of popular memory disrupt the great forgettings of official history.** Paranoia Even the paranoid have enemies. —Donald Rumsfeld Why paranoia? Can we fully understand the **proliferating circuits of imperial violence**—the very eclipsing of which gives to our moment its uncanny, phantasmagoric cast—without understanding the **pervasive presence of the paranoia** that has come, quite **violently**, to manifest itself across the **political and cultural spectrum** as a defining feature of our time? By paranoia, I mean not simply Hofstadter’s famous identification of the US state’s tendency toward conspiracy theories. 7 Rather, I conceive of paranoia as an inherent contradiction with respect to power: a double-sided phantasm that oscillates precariously between deliriums of grandeur and nightmares of perpetual threat, a deep and dangerous doubleness with respect to power that is held in unstable tension, but which, if suddenly destabilized (as after 9/11), can produce pyrotechnic displays of violence. The pertinence of understanding paranoia, I argue, lies in its peculiarly intimate and peculiarly dangerous relation to violence. 8 Let me be clear: I do not see paranoia as a primary, structural cause of US imperialism nor as its structuring identity. Nor do I see the US war on terror as animated by some collective, psychic agency, submerged mind, or Hegelian “cunning of reason,” nor by what Susan Faludi calls a national “terror dream.” 9 Nor am I interested in evoking paranoia as a kind of psychological diagnosis of the imperial nation-state. Nations do not have “psyches” or an “unconscious”; only people do. Rather, a social entity such as an organization, state, or empire can be spoken of as “paranoid” if the dominant powers governing that entity cohere as a collective community around contradictory cultural narratives, self-mythologies, practices, and identities that oscillate between delusions of inherent superiority and omnipotence, and phantasms of threat and engulfment. The term paranoia is analytically useful here, then, not as a description of a collective national psyche, nor as a description of a universal pathology, but rather as an analytically strategic concept, a way of seeing and being attentive to contradictions within power, a way of making visible (the better politically to oppose) the contradictory flashpoints of violence that the state tries to conceal. Paranoia is in this sense what I call a hinge phenomenon, articulated between the ordinary person and society, between psychodynamics and socio-political history. Paranoia is in that sense dialectical rather than binary, for its violence erupts from the force of its multiple, cascading contradictions: the intimate memories of wounds, defeats, and humiliations condensing with cultural fantasies of aggrandizement and revenge, in such a way as to be productive at times of unspeakable violence. For how else can we understand such debauches of cruelty? A critical question still remains: does not something terrible have to happen to ordinary people (military police, soldiers, interrogators) to instill in them, as ordinary people, in the most intimate, fleshly ways, a paranoid cast that enables them to act compliantly with, and in obedience to, the paranoid visions of a paranoid state? Perhaps we need to take a long, hard look at the simultaneously humiliating and aggrandizing rituals of militarized institutions, whereby individuals are first broken down, then reintegrated (incorporated) into the larger corps as a unified, obedient fighting body**, the methods by which schools**, the military, training camps— **not to mention the paranoid image-worlds of the corporate media—instill paranoia in ordinary people and fatally conjure up collective but unstable fantasies of omnipotence**. 10 In what follows, I want to trace the flashpoints of imperial paranoia into the labyrinths of torture in order to illuminate three crises that animate our moment: the crisis of violence and the visible, the crisis of imperial legitimacy, and what I call “the enemy deficit.” I explore these flashpoints of imperial paranoia as they emerge in the torture at Guantánamo and Abu Ghraib. I argue that Guantánamo is the territorializing of paranoia and that torture itself is paranoia incarnate, in order to make visible, in keeping with Hazel Carby’s brilliant work, those contradictory sites where imperial racism, sexuality, and gender catastrophically collide. 11 The Enemy Deficit: Making the “Barbarians” Visible Because night is here but the barbarians have not come. Some people arrived from the frontiers, And they said that there are no longer any barbarians. And now what shall become of us without any barbarians? Those people were a kind of solution. —C. P. Cavafy, “Waiting for the Barbarians” The barbarians have declared war. —President George W. Bush C. P. Cavafy wrote “Waiting for the Barbarians” in 1927, but the poem haunts the aftermath of 9/11 with the force of an uncanny and prescient déjà vu. To what dilemma are the “barbarians” a kind of solution? Every modern empire faces an abiding **crisis of legitimacy** in that it flings its power over territories and peoples who have not consented to that power. Cavafy’s insight is that **an imperial state claims legitimacy** **only by evoking the threat of the barbarians**. **It is only the threat of the barbarians that constitutes the silhouette of the empire’s borders in the first place.** On the other hand, the hallucination of the barbarians disturbs the empire with **perpetual nightmares of impending attack.** **The enemy is the abject of empire:** **the rejected from which we cannot part**. And **without the barbarians the legitimacy of empire vanishes like a disappearing phantom.** **Those people were a kind of solution.** With the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the grand antagonism of the United States and the USSR evaporated like a quickly fading nightmare. The cold war rhetoric of totalitarianism, Finlandization, present danger, fifth columnist, and infiltration vanished. **Where were the enemies now to justify the continuing escalation of the military colossus?** “And now **what shall become of us without any barbarians?”** By rights, **the thawing of the cold war should have prompted an immediate downsizing of the military**; any plausible external threat had simply ceased to exist. Prior to 9/11, General Peter Schoomaker, head of the US Army, bemoaned the enemy deficit: “It’s no use having an army that did nothing but train,” he said. “There’s got to be a certain appetite for what the hell we exist for.” Dick Cheney likewise complained: “**The threats have become so remote. So remote that they are difficult to ascertain**.” Colin Powell agreed: “Though we can still plausibly identify specific threats—North Korea, Iran, Iraq, something like that—the real threat is the unknown, the uncertain.” Before becoming president, George W. Bush likewise fretted over the post–cold war dearth of a visible enemy: “We do not know who the enemy is, but we know they are out there.” It is now well established that the invasion of Iraq had been a long-standing goal of the US administration, but there was no clear rationale with which to sell such an invasion. In 1997 a group of neocons at the Project for the New American Century produced a remarkable report in which they stated that to make such an invasion palatable would require “a catastrophic and catalyzing event—like a new Pearl Harbor.” 12 The 9/11 attacks came as a dazzling solution, both to the enemy deficit and the problem of legitimacy, offering the Bush administration what they would claim as a **political casus belli and the military unimaginable license to expand its reach**. General Peter Schoomaker would publicly admit that the attacks were an immense boon: “There is a huge silver lining in this cloud. . . . War is a tremendous focus. . . . Now we have this focusing opportunity, and we have the fact that (terrorists) have actually attacked our homeland, which gives it some oomph.” In his book Against All Enemies, Richard Clarke recalls thinking during the attack, “Now we can perhaps attack Osama Bin Laden.” After the invasion of Afghanistan, Secretary of State Colin Powell noted, “America will have a continuing interest and presence in Central Asia of a kind we could not have dreamed of before.” Charles Krauthammer, for one, called for a declaration of total war. “We no longer have to search for a name for the post-Cold War era,” he declared. “It will henceforth be known as the age of terrorism.” 13

**Link – SCS Conflict**

#### Their discourse assumes a homogenized identity of Asian culture – regionalism gets trumped by nationalism and becomes the basis for conflict and imperialism

He 04- Chair of International Studies at Deakin University Australia, 2004 (Baogang, PhD Political Science, Australian National University and visiting scholar at Cambridge, winner of Australian Political Science Association Harry Mayer award, National Endowment for Democracy Fellow, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 58:1, March, “East Asian Ideas of Regionalism: A Normative Critique,” www.chinesedemocratization.com/English%20Website/frame/materials/journal/english/East%20Asian%20Ideas%20of%20Regionalism.pdf)

The fallacies of Pan-Asianism Pan-Asianism was a doctrine of Asian regionalism, which was rejected by Indians, Chinese and Koreans. The failure of Pan-Asianism was the same as that of Pan-Germanism and Pan-Africanism. The failure of Pan-Asianism provides lessons to be learnt. The most important lesson is about the proper balancing relationship between regionalism and nationalism. As the practical demands of each particular nationalism and the territorial and ideological rivalries among national states become more intense, less and less is said about pan-continental combinations. There was no real incompatibility between Tagore’s ideal of a Pan-Asian spiritual revival and the goals of the nationalists. Politically minded intellectuals like Gandhi and Nehru wished to use Tagore’s theory for nationalist purposes, but the materialists Roy and Prakasam explicitly rejected it and its underlying foundation (Hay 1970: 311 & 330). When China and Japan were antagonising each other, nationalism and Pan-Asianism were not compatible with each other. Pan-Asianism lacked the idea of how to deal with relations among member states within Asia. The revitalisation of Asian cultural traditions and their democratisation in a fusion with the originally Western idea of nationalism could lead to sharp conflict among Asian nations, rather than to the kind of Pan-Asian understanding that Tagore and others had hoped to see established (Hay 1970: 328). When East Asian regional identity was used to fight against the West externally and to override national identities internally, it became an imperialist doctrine and a political tool for Japanese expansion. Pan-Asianism mistakenly assumed the homogeneity of Asia in its imagined community of Pan-Asianism. Pan-Asianism was supposed to be based on an imagined yellow race. The opposition of the West and East as well as materialism and spirituality, or the opposition of yellow and white races, was mistakenly assumed. As Hay points out, ‘as scattered intellectuals grew increasingly vocal in proclaiming the universal validity of their reinterpreted cultural heritages, and as modern transportation and communication enabled them to enter into personal contact with one another and with their Western Orientalist and Orientophile allies, their mutually contradictory images of Eastern civilisation began to collide’ (Hay 1970: 315). It should be noted, unfortunately, that the above ideas continue to play out in the current politics of regionalism in East Asia.

### Link – Lampton

**Lampton’s analysis relies upon descriptions of China that rely upon a false objectivity. This approach to “knowing” China renders critical reflection impossible and legitimizes violence.**

**Pan 4,** (Chengxin ,Lecturer in International Relations and School Honours Coordinator, Peking University and Australian National University, PhD in Political Science and International Relations, visiting scholar at the University of Melbourne, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, member of the International Studies Association, Chinese Studies Association of Australia, editoral board of Series in International Relations Classics, The “China Threat” in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics”)

**While U.S. China scholars argue fiercely over "what China precisely is," their debates have been underpinned by some common ground,** especially **in terms of a positivist epistemology.** Firstly, **they believe that China is ultimately a knowable object, whose reality can be, and ought to be, empirically revealed by scientific means.** **For example,** after expressing his dissatisfaction with often conflicting Western perceptions of China, **David M. Lampton,** former president of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations**, suggests that "it is time to step back and look at where China is today, where it might be going, and what consequences that direction will hold for the rest of the world."2 Like many other China scholars, Lampton views his object of study as essentially "something we can stand back from and observe with clinical detachment.**"3 Secondly, associated with the first assumption, it is commonly believed that China scholars merely serve as "disinterested observers" [end page 305] and that their studies of China are neutral, passive descriptions of reality. And thirdly, in pondering whether China poses a threat or offers an opportunity to the United States, they rarely raise the question of "what the United States is." That is, the meaning of the United States is believed to be certain and beyond doubt. I do not dismiss altogether the conventional ways of debating China. It is not the purpose of this article to venture my own "observation" of "where China is today," nor to join the "containment" versus "engagement" debate per se. Rather, I want to contribute to a novel dimension of the China debate by questioning the seemingly unproblematic assumptions shared by most China scholars in the mainstream IR community in the United States. To perform this task, I will focus attention on a particularly significant component of the China debate; namely, the "China threat" literature. More specifically, **I want to argue that U.S. conceptions of China as a threatening other are always intrinsically linked to how U.S. policymakers/mainstream China specialists see themselves (as representatives of the indispensable, security-conscious nation, for example). As such, they are not value-free, objective descriptions of an independent, preexisting Chinese reality out there, but are better understood as a kind of normative, meaning-giving practice that often legitimates power politics in U.S.-China relations and helps transform the "China threat" into social reality.** In other words, **it is self-fulfilling in practice, and is always part of the "China threat" problem it purports merely to describe.** In doing so, I seek to bring to the fore two interconnected themes of self/other constructions and of theory as practice inherent in the "China threat" literature—themes that have been overridden and rendered largely invisible by those common positivist assumptions.

### Link – Panzer

#### Their Panzer card relies on Mearsheimer’s analysis of China as a threat.

Rehighlighted 1AC Panzer 7 — Michael J. Panzer, a New York Institute of Finance faculty member and a graduate of Columbia University. Financial Armageddon: Protect Your Future from Economic Collapse, p. 137-138

China will likely assume an increasingly belligerent posture toward Taiwan, while Iran may embark on overt colonization of its neighbors in the Mideast. Israel, for its part, may look to draw a dwindling list of allies from around the world into a growing number of conflicts. Some observers, like John Mearsheimer, a political scientists at the University of Chicago, have even speculated that an “intense confrontation” between the United States and China is “inevitable” at some point. More than a few disputes will turn out to be almost wholly ideological. Growing cultural and religious differences will be transformed from wars of words to battles soaked in blood. Long-simmering resentments could also degenerate quickly, spurring the basest of human instincts and triggering genocidal acts. Terrorists employing biological or nuclear weapons will vie with conventional forces using jets, cruise missiles, and bunker-busting bombs to cause widespread destruction. Many will interpret stepped-up conflicts between Muslims and Western societies as the beginnings of a new world war.

#### Mearsheimer disagrees with the thesis of the aff and is pure “China threat” rhetoric.

Kwon 12 — Edward Kwon, assistant professor of Political Science at Northern Kentucky University, 2012 (“Invisible Anxiety: Would the Rise of China Really Be a Security Threat to the United States?”, Pacific Focus, Dec. 6th, <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1976-5118.2012.01088.x/full#pafo1088-note-0001>, accessed June 24th, CE)

Realist scholars in international relations and security practitioners have had more serious concerns about the rise of China. Mearsheimer insisted that the US engagement policy of assisting China's economic development as well as favoring its becoming a member of world economy is misguided. The USA should instead slow down the rise of China.19 He strongly objected to the idea of a peaceful rise of China, even while insisting that China's remarkable economic growth will likely lead to serious security competition and subsequently to war.20 His assurance of offensive realism, in which the great powers pursue “opportunities to gain power at each others' expense,”21 led him to believe such a pessimistic vision. He asserted that the United States must not tolerate a possibility of China as a peer competitor. Brzezinski and Mearsheimer22 debated different perspectives of US–China relations. According to Brzezinski, Chinese leaders would not pursue a confrontational foreign policy toward the United States that disturbs the country's continuous economic growth and endanger the survival of its communist regime.23 Mearsheimer disagrees, arguing that China would concentrate on its economic growth only for the time being. However, upon surpassing the United States economically, China might transform its economic capability into military power, thus posing a security threat to the United States.24

**A2: China Is A Threat**

#### No epistemological grounding for Chinese militarism — the biggest internal link to US-China war US violence against the other.

Pan 4 — (Chengxin, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of Arts, Deakin University, Discourses Of ‘China’ In International Relations: A Study in Western Theory as (IR) Practice, p. 255-256)

For example, as I pointed out in Chapter 5, the ‘China threat’ as conceived by Richard Bernstein, Ross Munro, Richard Betts, and Thomas Christensen, has been derived less from an ‘objective’ examination of China’s military capabilities, strategic posture, or actual foreign behaviour, and more from a (neo)realist conception of China as an aggressive, threatening entity in an unremittingly anarchic system. This conception, in turn, is derived from an entrenched understanding of the Western/American self as the rational orderer of the system, an understanding which has long been passed as the universal reality of world politics per se. The neorealist John Mearsheimer sums up this perspective well in proposing that: If… China becomes not only a leading producer of cutting-edge technologies but also the world’s wealthiest great power, it would almost certainly use its wealth to build a mighty military machine. For sound strategic reasons, moreover, it would surely pursue regional hegemony, just as the United States did in the western hemisphere during the nineteenth century. So if Chinese relative power grows substantially, one should expect it to attempt to dominate Japan and South Korea, as well as other regional actors, by building military forces that are so powerful that those other states would not dare challenge it. One should also expect it to develop its own version of the Monroe Doctrine, directed at the United States; just as the United States has made it clear to distant great powers that they are not allowed to meddle in the western hemisphere, China will make it clear that American interference in Asia is unacceptable [emphases added].12 This is a typical example of Western discourse allowing no room for an understanding of China outside the parameters of Western self-perception, an argument that, as I illustrated in Chapter 6, is equally applicable to the (neo)liberal perspective. In this latter context, for example, Western efforts to report and depict the Tiananmen uprising of 1989 as a ‘pro-democracy’ movement relied on ‘pro-Western’ interpretations of the movement’s motives, interpretations not easily attached to the event. It is as if the Tiananmen movement would make little sense were it not a specific example of the worldwide democratic wave to become more like ‘us.’ Thus, setting out to know the specifically different society called ‘China,’ both realist and liberal discourses have invariably ended up ‘discovering’ the same world everywhere, a world essentially of their own making. The very notion that ‘we’ know for sure how China will behave in international relations and what China’s ‘real goal’ is (even before the Chinese themselves know it) brings home this kind of ‘objective’ knowledge of others as narcissistic, modernist self-imagination. This self/Other construction, as I pointed out in Chapter 2, is particularly evident in regard to the U.S., whose dominant self-imagination has been essential to both the formation of its knowledge of others and to its often violent foreign policy trajectory in global politics based upon that knowledge.

#### Even if the facts are valid, the aff’s inscription of meaning onto those facts creates US conflict against alterity.

Pan 4 — (Chengxin, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of Arts, Deakin University, Discourses Of ‘China’ In International Relations: A Study in Western Theory as (IR) Practice, p. 180-181)

Before proceeding further, I want to make it clear that, in evaluating Western (neo)liberal accounts of China, I do not for a moment deny that China in many significant ways is changing, and has to some degree become similar to the West. I have no doubt, for example, that China’s economic development and market reforms have significantly altered its socio-economic landscape and opened up numerous opportunities for international business, nor do I doubt that China has participated in many important multilateral institutions and international regimes and, on a number of issues, has played a cooperative, responsible role (e.g., regarding the Asian financial crisis in 1997-1998 and North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs). Indeed, it can be said that many of the ‘facts’ supplied by liberal observers in support of their claims are valid. The existence of many of these ‘facts,’ therefore, is not controversial. What is problematic, however, is that liberal scholars allow only one particular meaning to be given to those ‘facts.’ As indicated above, these scholars do not just claim the obvious, that China is changing. Rather, in their view, its change has a unilinear direction, pointing unequivocally in the direction of liberal democracy, the free market, and international integration, all of which have been explicitly or implicitly equated to the West and Western values. In this way, I argue that the seemingly objective descriptions of China become powerful discourses of self and Other, a discourse which always expects China, rather than the West or both, to change. Thus, with the implicit conception of the West as the necessary path and inevitable destiny of this one-way transformation or convergence process, this discourse is also an autobiographical, selfcongratulatory, and legitimating discourse about the Western/American self.

#### Continuing to claim that China is a threat proves our argument and is offense against the perm — their method can’t understand that aggression from the west produced Chinese reactions.

Pan 4 — (Chengxin, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of Arts, Deakin University, Discourses Of ‘China’ In International Relations: A Study in Western Theory as (IR) Practice, p. 207-208)

My critical analysis of Western IR literature on China in the previous two chapters might well be objected to for the reason that it ignores the ‘hard facts’ on the ground. For example, liberal scholars may point out that the ‘opportunity for convergence’ is clearly real, for the Chinese themselves are talking about opening up, global integration, and joining track with international norms. Similarly, realist observers may contend that because the Chinese are caught up with nationalist fervour and realpolitik ideas and busy with military build-up and sabre-rattling in the Taiwan Strait, the ‘China threat’ is more than just a discursive construct. To some extent, these observers are right. Both the ‘China threat’ and ‘China as opportunity’ theses have certain ‘empirical’ qualities, and they were so acknowledged in the previous two chapters. Having said that, however, I want to suggest that the existence of the ‘threat’ or ‘opportunity’ reality in China says more about the self-fulfilling consequences of Western discourse as social construction than about its objective truth status. In other words, these trends are not pregiven, but have much to do with the very ways in which China has been so constructed by Western discursive practice. More specifically, in the first half of this chapter, I want to illustrate how China’s transformation into a more responsible member in the international community is largely a product of the Western liberal conception of it, which is in many ways self-fulfilling in practice. I argue, moreover, that this self-fulfilling prophecy also has its own limitations and paradoxical implications for China’s foreign relations. Thus, in spite of, or perhaps because of, its shaping power on Chinese perceptions and foreign behaviour, this discourse is unlikely to remake a homogeneous China in the image of the West. In the second half, I will look at how the Western realist discourse on China proves to be also a self-fulfilling prophecy with even more dangerous practical implications. But first let me begin with the constitutive influence of the (neo)liberal discourse on China.

### A2: “Our China Desription is True”

#### Western descriptions of China that rely upon false objectivity. This approach to “knowing” China renders critical reflection impossible and legitimizes violence.

Pan 4 — (Chengxin ,Lecturer in International Relations and School Honours Coordinator, Peking University and Australian National University, PhD in Political Science and International Relations, visiting scholar at the University of Melbourne, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, member of the International Studies Association, Chinese Studies Association of Australia, editoral board of Series in International Relations Classics, The “China Threat” in American Self-Imagination: The Discursive Construction of Other as Power Politics” //Rufus)

While U.S. China scholars argue fiercely over "what China precisely is," their debates have been underpinned by some common ground, especially in terms of a positivist epistemology. Firstly, they believe that China is ultimately a knowable object, whose reality can be, and ought to be, empirically revealed by scientific means. For example, after expressing his dissatisfaction with often conflicting Western perceptions of China, David M. Lampton, former president of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, suggests that "it is time to step back and look at where China is today, where it might be going, and what consequences that direction will hold for the rest of the world."2 Like many other China scholars, Lampton views his object of study as essentially "something we can stand back from and observe with clinical detachment."3 Secondly, associated with the first assumption, it is commonly believed that China scholars merely serve as "disinterested observers" [end page 305] and that their studies of China are neutral, passive descriptions of reality. And thirdly, in pondering whether China poses a threat or offers an opportunity to the United States, they rarely raise the question of "what the United States is." That is, the meaning of the United States is believed to be certain and beyond doubt. I do not dismiss altogether the conventional ways of debating China. It is not the purpose of this article to venture my own "observation" of "where China is today," nor to join the "containment" versus "engagement" debate per se. Rather, I want to contribute to a novel dimension of the China debate by questioning the seemingly unproblematic assumptions shared by most China scholars in the mainstream IR community in the United States. To perform this task, I will focus attention on a particularly significant component of the China debate; namely, the "China threat" literature. More specifically, I want to argue that U.S. conceptions of China as a threatening other are always intrinsically linked to how U.S. policymakers/mainstream China specialists see themselves (as representatives of the indispensable, security-conscious nation, for example). As such, they are not value-free, objective descriptions of an independent, preexisting Chinese reality out there, but are better understood as a kind of normative, meaning-giving practice that often legitimates power politics in U.S.-China relations and helps transform the "China threat" into social reality. In other words, it is self-fulfilling in practice, and is always part of the "China threat" problem it purports merely to describe. In doing so, I seek to bring to the fore two interconnected themes of self/other constructions and of theory as practice inherent in the "China threat" literature—themes that have been overridden and rendered largely invisible by those common positivist assumptions.

#### Descriptions of China are not objective — they rely on Western rationalizations. The result is a flawed emergency of a “China threat” based only on orientalization.

Pan 4 **—** Chengxin**,** prof school of international and political studies, Deakin U. PhD in pol sci and IR, “The "China threat" in American self-imagination: the discursive construction of other as power politics,” 1 June 2004, http://www.articlearchives.com/asia/northern-asia-china/796470-1.html

Having examined how the "China threat" literature is enabled by and serves the purpose of a particular U.S. self-construction, I want to turn now to the issue of how this literature represents a discursive construction of other,instead of an "objective" account of Chinese reality**.** This, I argue, has less to do with its portrayal of China as a threat per se than with its essentialization and totalization of China as an externally knowable object, independent of historically contingent contexts or dynamic international interactions. In this sense, the discursive construction of China as a threatening other cannot be detached from (neo)realism, a positivist, ahistorical framework of analysis within which global life is reduced to endless interstate rivalry for power and survival. As many critical IR scholars have noted, (neo)realism is not a transcendent description of global reality but is predicated on the modernist Western identity, which, in the quest for scientific certainty, has come to define itself essentially as the sovereign territorial nation-state. This realist self-identity of Western states leads to the constitution of anarchy as the sphere of insecurity, disorder, and war. In an anarchical system, as (neo)realists argue, "the gain of one side is often considered to be the loss of the other," (45) and"All other states are potential threats." (46) In order to survive in such a system, states inevitably pursue power or capability. In doing so, these realist claims represent what R. B. J. Walker calls "a specific historical articulation of relations of universality/particularity and self/Other." (47) The (neo)realist paradigm has dominated the U.S. IR discipline in generaland the U.S. China studies field in particular**.** As Kurt Campbell notes, after the end of the Cold War, a whole new crop of China experts "are much more likely to have a background in strategic studies or international relations than China itself." (48) As a result, for those experts to know China is nothing more or less than to undertake a geopolitical analysis of it, often by asking only a few questions such as how China will "behave" in a strategic sense and how it may affect the regional or global balance of power, with a particular emphasis on China's military power or capabilities. As Thomas J. Christensen notes, "Although many have focused on intentions as well as capabilities, the most prevalent component of the [China threat] debate is the assessment of China's overall future military power compared with that of the United States and other East Asian regional powers." (49) Consequently, almost **by default, China emerges as** an absolute other and **a threat** thanks to this (neo)realist prism. The (neo)realist emphasis on survival and security in international relations dovetails perfectly with the U.S. self-imagination, because for the United States to define itself as the indispensable nation in a world of anarchy is often to demand absolute security. As James Chace and Caleb Carr note, "for over two centuries the aspiration toward an eventual condition of absolute security has been viewed as central to an effective American foreign policy." (50) And this self-identification in turn leads to the definition of not only "tangible" foreign powers but global contingency and uncertainty per se as threats. For example, former U.S. President George H. W. Bush repeatedly said that "the enemy [of America] is unpredictability. The enemy is instability." (51) Similarly, arguing for the continuation of U.S. Cold War alliances, a high-ranking Pentagon official asked, "if we pull out, who knows what nervousness will result?" (52) Thus understood, by its very uncertain character, China would now automatically constitute a threat to the United States. For example, Bernstein and Munro believe that "China's political unpredictability, the always-present possibility that it will fall into a state of domestic disunion and factional fighting," constitutes a source of danger. (53) In like manner, Richard Betts and Thomas Christensen write: If the PLA [People's Liberation Army] remains second-rate, should the world breathe a sigh of relief? Not entirely.... Drawing China into the web of global interdependence may do more to encourage peace than war, but it cannot guarantee that the pursuit of heartfelt political interests will be blocked by a fear of economic consequences.... U.S. efforts to create a stable balance across the Taiwan Strait might deter the use of force under certain circumstances, but certainly not all. (54) The upshot, therefore, is that since China displays no absolute certainty for peace, it must be, by definition, an uncertainty, and hence, a threat. In the same way, a multitude of other unpredictable factors (such as ethnic rivalry, local insurgencies, overpopulation, drug trafficking, environmental degradation, rogue states, the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and international terrorism) have also been labeled as "threats" to U.S. security. Yet, it seems that in the post-Cold War environment, China represents a kind of uncertainty par excellence. "Whatever the prospects for a more peaceful, more democratic, and more just world order, nothing seems more uncertain today than the future of post-Deng China," (55) argues Samuel Kim. And such an archetypical uncertainty is crucial to the enterprise of U.S. self-construction, because it seems that only an uncertainty with potentially global consequences such as China could justify U.S. indispensability or its continued world dominance. In this sense, Bruce Cumings aptly suggested in 1996 that China (as a threat) was basically "a metaphor for an enormously expensive Pentagon that has lost its bearings and that requires a formidable 'renegade state' to define its mission (Islam is rather vague, and Iran lacks necessary weights)." (56) It is mainly on the basis of this self-fashioning that many U.S. scholars have for long claimed their "expertise" on China. For example, from his observation (presumably on Western TV networks) of the Chinese protest against the U.S. bombing of their embassy in Belgrade in May 1999, Robert Kagan is confident enough to speak on behalf of the whole Chinese people, claiming that he knows "the fact" of "what [China] really thinks about the United States." That is, "they consider the United States an enemy--or, more precisely, the enemy.... How else can one interpret the Chinese government's response to the bombing?" he asks, rhetorically. (57) For Kagan, because the Chinese "have no other information" than their government's propaganda, the protesters cannot rationally "know" the whole event as "we" do. Thus, their anger must have been orchestrated, unreal, and hence need not be taken seriously. (58) Given that Kagan heads the U.S. Leadership Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and is very much at the heart of redefining the United States as the benevolent global hegemon, his confidence in speaking for the Chinese "other" is perhaps not surprising. In a similar vein, without producing in-depth analysis, Bernsteinand Munro invoke with great ease such all-encompassing notions as "the Chinese tradition" and its "entire three-thousand-year history." (59) In particular, they repeatedly speak of what China's "real" goal is: "Chinais an unsatisfied and ambitious power whose goal is to dominate Asia.... China aims at achieving a kind of hegemony.... China is so big and so naturally powerful that [we know] it will tend to dominate its region even if it does not intend to do so as a matter of national policy." (60) Likewise, with the goal of absolute security for the United States in mind, Richard Betts and Thomas Christensen argue: The truth is that China can pose a grave problem even if it does not become a military power on the American model, does not intend to commit aggression, integrates into a global economy, and liberalizes politically. Similarly, the United States could face a dangerous conflict over Taiwan even if it turns out that Beijing lacks the capacity to conquer the [**island**](http://www.articlearchives.com/asia/northern-asia-china/796470-1.html).... This is true because of geography; because of America's reliance on alliances to project power; and because of China's capacity to harm U.S. forces, U.S. regional allies, and the American homeland, even while losing a war in the technical, military sense. (61**)** By now, it seems clear that neither China's capabilities nor intentions really matter**. Rather,** almost by its mere geographical existence,China has been qualified as an absolute strategic "other," **a discursive construct from which it cannot escape**. Because of this, "China" in U.S. IR discourse has been objectified and deprived of its own subjectivity and exists mainly in and for the U.S. self. Little wonder that formany U.S. China specialists, China becomes merely a "national security concern" for the United States, with the "severe disproportion between the keen attention to China as a security concern and the intractable neglect of China's [own] security concerns in the current debate." (62) At this point, at issue here is no longer whether the "China threat" argument is true or false, but is rather its reflection of a shared positivist mentality among mainstream China expertsthat they know China better than do the Chinese themselves. (63) "We" alone can know for sure that they consider "us" their enemy and thus pose a menace to "us."Such an account of China, in many ways, **strongly seems to resemble Orientalists' problematic distinction between the West and the Orient**. Like orientalism, the U.S. construction of the Chinese "other" does not require that China acknowledge the validity of that dichotomous construction. Indeed, as Edward Said point out, "It is enough for 'us' to set up these distinctions in our own minds; [and] **'they' become 'they' accordingly**." (64) It may be the case that there is nothing inherently wrong with perceiving others through one's own subjective lens.Yet, what is problematic with mainstream U.S. China watchers is that they refuse to acknowledge the legitimacy of the inherent fluidity of Chinese identity and subjectivity and try instead to fix its ambiguity as absolute difference from "us," a kind of certainty that denotes nothing but otherness and threats. As a result, it becomes difficult to find a legitimate space for alternative ways of understanding an inherently volatile, amorphous China (65) or to recognize that China's future trajectory in global politics is contingent essentially on how "we" in the United States and the West in general want to see it as well as on how the Chinese choose to shape it. (66) Indeed, discourses of "us" and "them" are always closely linked to how "we" as "what we are" deal with "them" as "what they are" in the practical realm. This is exactly how the discursive strategy of perceiving China as a threatening other should be understood, a point addressed in the following section, which explores some of the practical dimension of this discursive strategy in the containment perspectives and hegemonic ambitions of U.S. foreign policy.

#### Western understandings of China are socially constructed. There is no independent reality out there for the aff to find.

Pan, 12 — Chengxin Pan, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of Arts, Deakin University, 2012, (“Knowledge, Desire and Power in Global Politics: Western Representations of China’s Rise, p. 11-12, accessed 6/21/16, AEC)

For instance, China as the world’s most populous nation seems to be a self-evident fact both beyond doubt and beyond interpretation. Yet, such apparently objective, non-interpreted facts are not the primary concern of China watchers. No scholar is likely to make a career out of collecting and writing on such ‘trivia’ alone, just as no anthropologist would find it either stimulating or worthwhile to ‘go round the world to count the cats in Zanzi- bar’. 52 For us, often what matters is not ‘pure’ reality, but interpreted and contested reality. At issue here is not just whether China is the world’s most populous nation, but also the ‘so what?’ questions: What that means (or often, will mean) for China and the world and what to do about it. As soon as meaning is at issue, commonly-agreed ‘brute-facts’ will be hard to come by.In the eyes of nineteenth-century missionaries, a populous China represented a promised land for religious conversion. During WWII, the US saw China’s massive manpower as a great asset in fighting the Japanese. For business people whose worldview is inevitably defined by market and profit, China’s vast population takes on a quality of enormous commercial opportunities. By contrast, for racists or racially sensitive observers, 1.3 billion Chinese may symbolise ‘Yellow Peril’ and amount to a ‘China threat’. Clearly, none of these claims are stand-alone facts; as ‘facts’, they are always already a product of particular interpretation. Indeed, even the ‘bare-bone’ fact that China is the most populous nation is not entirely independent of language and interpretation, given that concepts such as nation and population are modern inventions and constructs rather than naturally existing categories. Conse-quently, social reality, which is what I mean by ‘reality’ or ‘fact’ throughout this book, is inherently discursive and interpretive, and interpretation cannot be disconnected from thought, knowledge, and language. To quote philoso- pher and linguist Wilhelm von Humboldt, Man lives with his objects chiefly—in fact, since his feeling and acting depends on his perceptions, one may say exclusively—as language presents them to him. Bythe same process whereby he spins language out of his own being, he ensnares himself in it; and each language draws a magic circle round the people to which it belongs, a circle from which there is no escape save by stepping out of it into an-other. 53 Of course, to say that social reality is bound up with language and inter- pretation is not to argue that reality can be freely arranged into any number of discursive permutations or that one interpretation is as valid as another. We cannot access reality except through language, but this is not the same assaying that we cannot know anything beyond language per se, or that all knowing makes equal sense to everyone—were that the case, we in the academia might as well go home and find another line of work. While reality is knowable only through interpretation, its knowing is not subject to the ‘limitlessness of interpretation’. Like ‘texts’, reality imposes restraints upon its interpretation. 54 To return to the earlier example, while China’s population means different things to different observers under shifting circumstances, one cannot reasonably claim that there are now more people living in Australia than in China. While it is true that ‘a person read-ing a text is himself part of the meaning he apprehends’, 55 the reader as a being-in-the-world does not and cannot interpret a given text or reality at will. All interpretation relies on language, but language is above all a social commodity, a carrier of the perceptions, attitudes, and goals of its society. 56 Thus interpretation is by necessity always grounded in and constrained by certain ‘pre understandings’ which in turn are conditioned on their culture,tradition, language, and a particular readership/audience that the relevant 12 Knowledge, desire and power in global politics language entails. 57 The ‘life span’ of an interpretation (or how far it can‘travel’) depends on its communicability and social reception within its situated language and culture. While there are no pre-discursive or non-interpreted social facts and no formal limit on the range of interpretive possibility, in practice interpretation is rarely linguistically or textually random or anarchical, something we make up as we go along; rather, it is always inter textually situated in the sense that texts are dependent on and connected to other texts. In this sense, we need not fear the much-maligned relativist spectre of ‘anything goes’; those who follow that path would soon realise that they cannot go very far. ‘The historian’, wrote E. H. Carr, ‘is of his own age, and is bound to it by the conditions of human existence. The very words which he uses—words like democracy, empire, war, revolution— have current connotations from which he cannot divorce them’. 58 Like reading a text, our interpretation of reality is neither objective knowledge nor purely subjective speculation. Rather, it is a social text which necessarily speaks to other social texts. Such an undeniable and irreducible intertextuali-ty constitutes what Said calls the materiality and worldliness of texts, so that those texts may effectively ‘solicit[ing] the world’s attention’. 59 In this way, while China knowledge (as in the form of the recurring themes of ‘threat’ and ‘opportunity’) is derived from interpretation, it is a particular form of worldly, intertextually situated interpretation that has thus far proved effective in soliciting the West’s attention and capturing its self-imagination. It is often on this basis that China knowledge appears to be objective truth. However, that truth status should best be understood as an effect of its already shared and unquestioned interpretiveness. The intertextual contexts from which it arises have become so widely accepted that we tend to forget its ‘original’ status qua historically specific interpretations.

### A2: “Empirics Prove”

#### Empirics about China are not neutral or objective — they’re carefully chosen to make China seem like a threat and distance it from the West.

Song 15 — Weiqing, associate professor of political science at the University of Macau, received his Ph.D. in political science from the University of Siena, Italy. His research interests include European politics, Chinese foreign policy, and China's post-socialist regime. His research has appeared in a number of international peer-reviewed journals- *The China Review, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Spring 2015), 145-169 Securitization of the "China Threat " Discourse: A Poststructuralist Account* TMY 6/22/16

Here, the China threat issue is securitized in a value-laden manner that is qualitatively different from the scientific mode. Nicholas Kristof, a Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist and longtime commentator on China, does not simply state that China is threatening because it is not democratic; rather, he pursues the more nuanced argument that increasing nationalism in China is a major source of potential conflict with other nations. Yet even a careless reader of the above text may notice that the author adeptly links the alleged threat posed by China with the historical precedents of Nazi Germany and militarist Japan in the past century. Drawing such analogies between history and the present constitutes a securitization act. Using this mode of analogical reasoning, the China threat argument is structurally incorporated into a higher level of security discourse, situated among the "macro-securitising discourses" of political ideo logy,55 which involve certain ethical and subjective sets of doctrines, ideals, and worldviews about the governance of human societies, usually with a blueprint for a specific social order. It is important for poststruc turalist discourse analysts to bear in mind the perspective on social goods communicated in this use of language.56 Kristof attributes the possibility of a China threat to the Chinese government's ill-intentioned promotion of "ferocious nationalism." As one of the West's veteran commentators on China, Kristof noticed the country's vigorous rise much earlier than many others. Twenty years ago, in his early Foreign Affairs essay "The Rise of China," he warned that although China is neither a "villain" nor a "renegade country," it is "an ambitious nation."57 In this and other works, he has sought to define the possible China threat arising from Chinese nationalism. Such arguments involve the politics of identity. The poststructuralist approach to identity formation emphasizes the dualism that structures human experience, particularly the "interior/exterior (inside/outside) binary, according to which the inside is deemed to be the self, good, primary, and original while the outside is the other, dangerous, secondary, and derivative."58 However, when one tries to build one's own identity, the outside is always central to the composition of the inside. Conversely, when one builds an antagonist identity, the inside is essential to the construction of the outside. An interior/exterior binary is exactly what authors like Kristof seek to achieve in their securitization of the China threat issue. Kristof's argument fundamentally, if not overtly, differentiates China from the democracies of the West. Linking China with Nazi Germany and militarist Japan in the first half of the 20th century lends weight to his criticism of the Chinese government and its deliberate instigation of "ferocious nationalism" among the Chinese people. In this way, China is depicted as different from "normal" Western countries, which are represented as right, good, proper, and valuable.

**A2: Judge Choice/“Sever Our Reps”**

#### Judge choice bad —

#### Judge Intervention — the debate should be based on what the affirmative *chose to do*, not what they hypothetically could have done. Judge choice is like letting the aff kick an advantage we impact turned because they could have read a different one in the 1AC.

#### Poor Decisionmaking — only sticking the aff with their advantage and framing choices encourages thoughtful pre-round decisionmaking. Otherwise the aff say anything and deny it later — that’s the Trump model of decisionmaking. Reject it.

#### Aff Conditionality — letting the aff out of arguments we’ve read this late in the debate is unfair to the neg — late breaking debates benefit the aff.

#### Assumed Disadvantages — if they had read different advantages, we would have read DAs or critiques to those. You should assume negative arguments and vote on them.

#### Undermines all Critique — letting the aff reframe the debate eliminates all criticism of the 1AC. That’s the best type of critique because it’s the most specific and the aff has the most control over their choices.

#### Plan can’t be detached from its discursive underpinnings.

Burke 7 — Associate Professor of Politics and International Relations in the University of New South Wales (Anthony, Beyond Security, Ethics and Violence, p. 3-4)

These **frameworks are interrogated** at the level both of their theoretical conceptualisation and their practice: **in their** influence and **implementation in specific policy contexts** and conflicts in East and Central Asia, the Middle East and the 'war on terror', where their meaning and impact take on greater clarity. This approach is based on a conviction that the meaning of **powerful political concepts** cannot be abstract or easily universalised: they **all have histories, often complex** and conflictual; their forms and meanings change over time; and they are developed, refined and deployed in concrete struggles over power, wealth and societal form. While this should not preclude normative debate over how political or ethical concepts should be defined and used, and thus be beneficial or destructive to humanity, it embodies a caution that the meaning of concepts can never be stabilised or unproblematic in practice. Their normative potential must always be considered in relation to their utilisation in systems of political, social and economic power and their consequent worldly effects. Hence this book embodies a caution by Michel Foucault, who warned us about the 'politics of truth . . the battle about the status of truth and the economic and political role it plays', and it is inspired by his call to 'detach the power of truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic and cultural, within which it operates at the present time'.1 It is clear that traditionally coercive and violent approaches to security and strategy are both still culturally dominant, and politically and ethically suspect. However, the reasons for pursuing a critical analysis relate not only to the most destructive or controversial approaches, such as the war in Iraq, but also to their available (and generally preferable) alternatives. There is a necessity to question not merely extremist versions such as the Bush doctrine, Indonesian militarism or Israeli expansionism, but also their mainstream critiques - whether they take the form of liberal policy approaches in international relations (IR), just war theory, US realism, optimistic accounts of globalisation, rhetorics of sensitivity to cultural difference, or centrist Israeli security discourses based on territorial compromise with the Palestinians. The surface appearance of lively (and often significant) debate masks a deeper agreement about major concepts, forms of political identity and the imperative to secure them. Debates about when and how it may be effective and legitimate to use military force in tandem with other policy options, for example, mask a more fundamental discursive consensus about the meaning of security**,** the effectiveness of strategic power, the nature of progress, the value of freedom or the promises ofnational and cultural identity**.** As a result, politicaland intellectual debate about insecurity, violent conflict and global injustice can become hostage to a claustrophic structure of political and ethical possibility that systematically **wards off critique**.

**2NC/1NR – Alt**

**Alt – Top Level**

#### Anti-security is an alternative method of political action. Only a shift away from Western state-centered practices prevents structural violence and oppression — that’s Neocleous and Rigakos.

#### Critical evaluation must come before policy — the alternative has greater effect than political action that replicates the harms.

Bruce 96—Robert, Associate Professor in Social Science – Curtin University and Graeme Cheeseman, Senior Lecturer – University of New South Wales, Discourses of Danger and Dread Frontiers, p. 5-9

This goal is pursued in ways which are still unconventional in the intellectual milieu of international relations in Australia, even though they are gaining influence worldwide as traditional modes of theory and practice are rendered inadequate by global trends that defy comprehension, let alone policy. The inability to give meaning to global changes reflects partly the enclosed, elitist world of professional security analysts and bureaucratic experts, where entry is gained by learning and accepting to speak a particular, exclusionary language. The contributors to this book are familiar with the discourse, but accord no privileged place to its ‘knowledge form as reality’ in debates on defence and security. Indeed, they believe that debate will be furthered only through a long overdue critical re-evaluation of elite perspectives. Pluralistic, democratically-oriented perspectives on Australia’s identity are both required and essential if Australia’s thinking on defence and security is to be invigorated. This is not a conventionalpolicy book; nor should it be, in the sense of offering policy-makers and their academic counterparts sets of neat alternative solutions, in familiar language and format, to problems they pose. This expectation is in itself a considerable **part of the problem** to be analysed. It is, however, a book about policy, one that questions how problems are framed by policy-makers. It challenges the proposition that irreducible bodies of real knowledge on defence and security exist independently of their ‘context in the world’, and it demonstrates how security policy is articulated authoritatively by the elite keepers of that knowledge, experts trained to recognize enduring, universal wisdom. All others, from this perspective, must accept such wisdom or remain outside the expert domain, tainted by their inability to comply with the ‘rightness’ of the official line. But it is precisely the official line, or at least its image of the world, that needs to be problematised. If the critic responds directly to the demand for policy alternatives, without addressing this image, he or she is tacitly endorsing it. Before engaging in the **policy debate** the critics need to reframe the basic terms of reference. This book, then, reflects and underlines the importance of Antonio Gramsci and Edward Said’s ‘critical intellectuals’.15 The demand, tacit or otherwise, that the policy-maker’s frame of reference be accepted as the only basis for discussion and analysis ignores a three thousand year old tradition commonly associated with Socrates and purportedly integral to the Western tradition of democratic dialogue. More immediately, it ignores post-seventeenth century democratic traditions which insist that a good society must have within it some way of critically assessing its knowledge and the decisions based upon that knowledge which impact upon citizens of such a society. This is a tradition with a slightly different connotation in contemporary liberal democracies which, during the Cold War, were proclaimed different and superior to the totalitarian enemy precisely because there were institutional checks and balances upon power. In short, one of the major differences between ‘open societies’ and their (closed) counterparts behind the Iron Curtain was that the former encouraged the critical testing of the knowledge and decisions of the powerful and assessing them against liberal democratic principles. The latter tolerated criticism only on rare and limited occasions. For some, this represented the triumph of rational-scientific methods of inquiry and techniques of falsification. For others, especially since positivism and rationalism have lost much of their allure, it meant that for society to become open and liberal, sectors of the population must be independent of the state and free to question its knowledge and power. Though we do not expect this position to be accepted by every reader, contributors to this book believe that critical dialogue is long overdue in Australia and needs to be listened to. For all its liberal democratic trappings, Australia’s security community continues to invoke closed monological narratives on defence and security. This book also questions the distinctions between policy practice and academic theory that inform conventional accounts of Australian security. One of its major concerns, particularly in chapters 1 and 2, is to illustrate how theory is integral to the practice of security analysis and policy prescription. The book also calls on policy-makers, academics and students of defence and security to think critically about what they are reading, writing and saying; to begin to ask, of their work and study, difficult and searching questions raised in other disciplines; to recognise, no matter how uncomfortable it feels, that what is involved in theory and practice is **not** the ability **to identify a replacement** for failed models, but a realisation that **t**erms and concepts – state sovereignty, balance of power, security**,** and so on – are contested and problematic, and that the world is indeterminate, always becoming what is written about it. Critical analysis which shows how particular kinds of theoretical presumptions can effectively exclude vital areas of political life from analysis has direct practical implications for policy-makers, academics and citizens who face the daunting task of steering Australia through some potentially choppy international waters over the next few years. There is also much of interest in the chapters for those struggling to give meaning to a world where so much that has long been taken for granted now demands imaginative, incisive reappraisal. The contributors, too, have struggled to find meaning, often despairing at the terrible human costs of international violence. This is why readers will find **no single, fully formed panacea** for the world’s ills in general, or Australia’s security in particular. There are none. Every chapter, however, in its own way, offers something more than is found in orthodox literature, often by exposing ritualistic Cold War defence and security mind-sets that are dressed up as new thinking. Chapters 7 and 9, for example, present alternative ways of engaging in security and defence practice. Others (chapters 3, 4, 5, 6 and 8) seek to alert policy-makers, academics and students to alternative theoretical possibilities which might better serve an Australian community pursuing security and prosperity in an uncertain world. All chapters confront the policy community and its counterparts in the academy with a deep awareness of the intellectual and material constraints imposed by dominant traditions of realism, but they avoid dismissive and exclusionary terms which often in the past characterized exchanges between policy-makers and their critics. This is because, as noted earlier, attention needs to be paid to the words and the thought processes of those being criticized. A close reading of this kind draws attention to underlying assumptions, showing they need to be recognized and questioned. A sense of doubt **(**in place of confident certainty**)** is a necessary prelude to a genuine search for alternative policies. **First** comes an awareness of the need for new perspectives, **then** specific policies may follow. As Jim George argues in the following chapter, we need to look not so much at contending policies as they are made for us but at challenging ‘the discursive process which gives [favoured interpretations of “reality”**]** their meaning and which direct [Australia’s] policy/analytical/military responses’. This process is not restricted to the small, official defence and security establishment huddled around the US-Australian War Memorial in Canberra. It also encompasses much of Australia’s academic defence and security community located primarily though not exclusively within the Australian National University and the University College of the University of New South Wales. These discursive processes are examined in detail in subsequent chapters as authors attempt to make sense of a politics of exclusion and closure which exercises disciplinary power over Australia’s security community. They also question the discourse of ‘regional security’, ‘security cooperation’, ‘peacekeeping’ and ‘alliance politics’ that are central to Australia’s official and academic security agenda in the 1990s. This is seen as an important task especially when, as is revealed, the disciplines of International Relations and Strategic Studies are under challenge from critical and theoretical debates ranging across the social sciences and humanities; debates that are nowhere to be found in Australian defence and security studies. The chapters graphically illustrate how Australia’s public policies on defence and security are informed, underpinned and legitimised by a narrowly-based intellectual enterprise which draws strength from contested concepts of realism and liberalism, which in turn seek legitimacy through policy-making processes. Contributors ask whether Australia’s policy-makers and their academic advisors are unaware of broader intellectual debates, or resistant to them, or choose not to understand them, and why?

**Alt Solvency – China**

#### Interrogating the 1AC’s knowledge production deconstructs the objective knowledge of China and creates a better long-term method of engagement.

Pan 4 — (Chengxin, Department of Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of Arts, Deakin University, Discourses Of ‘China’ In International Relations: A Study in Western Theory as (IR) Practice, p. 259-260)

This is not to endorse an ‘anything goes’ attitude on studying China’s foreign relations. Quite the opposite. For the range of social meanings which can be attached to a certain thing is not limitless, and under certain circumstances, it is obvious that some interpretations appear truer than others. Ultimately, it is the different practical consequences associated with different interpretations that matter. Thus, my point here is that while different meaning-giving strategies could all have certain ‘real-world’ implications, some implications are more dangerous than others. Therefore,when we assign some particular meaning to China, we need to remind ourselves of its potential practical effect, and incessantly bear in mind thatsuch effect**,** if dangerous,mayin some degreebe undone if a different, more constructive meaning is given. In short, however tempting it might be, we cannot herereturn to the kind of ‘Hobson’s choice’ between either a new fixed, definite solution or no alternative at all to thecontinued reign of theconventional meaning-giving regime. Rather,the choice lies in constantly recognising**,** on the one hand,the impossibility of having a detached, God’s-eye view of some fundamental truth, and on the other hand, the possibility of formulating nuanced, self-reflective, and responsible ways of seeing an inherently changing world**.** Such choice, as I have demonstrated in this thesis,is **not only clearly possible but also** imperative in the study of a complex China amid the volatility, danger, as well as vast potential of contemporary global politics. A ‘choice’ which might indeed hold the key to world peace in the decades to come.

**A2: Perm – General**

#### All of the links prove that the permutation is mutually exclusive with the aff — attempts to shift the debate are severance, which is a voting issue.

#### The permutation is an attempt to mask the plan’s violent governmentality and war against the Other — these internal contradictions means it inevitably fails.

Sjoberg 13 **—** Laura, Department of Political Science, University of Florida , Gainesville The paradox of security cosmopolitanism?, Critical Studies on Security, 1:1, 29-34

Particularly, Burke suggests that security cosmopolitanism ‘rejects a procedural faith in strongly post-Westphalian forms of government and democracy’ (p. 17) and reiterates that such an approach includes ‘no automatic faith in any one institutional design’ (p. 24). This seems to move away from one of the prominent critiques of, in Anna Agathangelou and Ling’s (2009) words, the ‘neoliberal imperium,’ as reliant on Western, liberal notions of governance to the detriment of those on whom such a form of government is imposed. Burke clearly problematizes this imposition, framing many of the serious problems in global politics as a result of ‘choices that create destructive dynamics and constraints’ (p. 15) at least in part by Western, liberal governments – characterizing modernity as culpable for insecurity. At the same time, the solution seems to be clearly **situated within the discursive framework of the problem.** Burke suggests that there should be a primary concern for ‘effectiveness, equality, fairness, and justice – not for states, per se, but for human beings, and the global biosphere’ (p. 24). Unless the only problem with modernity is the post- Westphalian structure of the state (which this approach does not eschew, but claims not to privilege), then this statement of values might entrench the problem. Many of the ideas of equality, fairness, and justice that come to mind with the (somewhat rehearsed) use of those words in progressive politics are inseparable from an ethos of enlightenment modernity. This may be problematic on a number of levels. First, it may **fail to interrupt** the series of choices that Burke suggests produce a cycle of insecurity. Second, it may fold back onto itself in the recommendations that security cosmopolitanism produces. This especially concerned me in Burke’s discussion of how to end ‘dangerous processes,’ where he places ‘greater faith in the ethical, normative, and legal suppression of dangerous processes and actions than in formalistic or procedural solutions’ (p. 24). It seems to me that there is a good argument that ‘**suppression’ is itself a ‘dangerous process**,’ yet Burke’s framework **does not really include a mechanism for internal critique**. Another problem that seems to confound security cosmopolitanism is evaluating the relationships between power, governance, and governmentality. There are certainly several ways in which Burke uses a notion of the state that distinguishes security cosmopolitanism from the mainstream neoliberal literature. For example, he characterizes the ‘state as an entity whose national survival depends on its global participation, obligations, and depen- dencies,’ (citing Burke 2013a, 5). This view of the state sees it as not only survival-seeking (in the neo-neo synthesis sense) but also dependent on its positive interactions with other states for survival. Burke’s approach to government/governance initially appears to be global rather than state-based, another potentially transformative move. For example, he sees the job of security cosmopolitanism as to ‘theorize and defend norms for the respon- sible conduct and conceptualization of global security governance’ (p. 21). At the same time, later in the article, Burke suggests entrenching the current structure of the state. His practical approach of looking for the ‘solidarity of the governing with the governed’ seems to simultaneously interrogate the current power structures and reify them. Burke says: Such a ‘solidarity of the governed’ that engages in a ‘practical interrogation of power’ ought to be a significant feature of security cosmopolitanism. At the same time, however, security cosmopolitanism must be concerned with improving the global governance of security by elites and experts. (p. 21) This attachment to the improvement of existing structures of governance seems to be at the heart of what I see as the **failure of the radical potential** in the idea of security cosmopolitanism. When discussing how the power dynamics between the elite and the subordinated might change, Burke suggests that ‘voluntary renunciation of the privileges and powers of both state and corporate sovereignty will no doubt be a necessary feature of such an order’ (p. 25). Relying on the voluntary renunciation of power by the powerful seems both unrealistic and not particularly theoretically innovative. This seems to be at the center of a paradox inherent in security cosmopolitanism: Faith in the Western liberal state is insidious, but the Western liberal state does not have to be. Modernity causes insecurity, but need not be discarded fully. Some universalizations are dangerous, others are benign. Dangerous processes must be stopped, even if by dangerous processes. Moral entrepreneurship is the key, but ther e is no clear foundation for what counts as moral. The security cosmopolitanism critique is inspired by consequentialism, but lacks deontological foundations despite deontological implications. Burke calls for (and indeed demands) to ‘take responsibility for it’ (p. 23) in terms of ‘both formal and moral accountability’ (p. 24). In so doing, he endorses (Booth’s vision of) ‘moral progress’ (p. 25), despite understanding the insidious deployment of various notions of moral progress by others. Security cosmopolitanism, then, is a proclamation for radical change that is initially **stalled by its internal contradictions** and further handicapped by its lack of capacity to enact the very sort of radical change Burke sees it as fundamental to righting the wrongs he sees in the world. The result seems to be the (potential) **reification of existing governments/governmentality** through what essentially appears to be a non-anthropocentric ‘human security’ which cannot be clearly distinguished from current notions of human security (p. 15). It appears to remain top-down and without clear moral foundation while claiming significant improvement over existing approaches. **This appearance/seduction of improvement without real promise for change might be more** insidious **than** the **nihilism** of which many post-structuralists are accused, **as it seductively appears to solve a problem it does not solve.**

#### Only complete resistance to security logic can generate genuine political thought.

Neocleous 8 **—** Mark Neocleous, Prof. of Government @ Brunel, 2008 [Critique of Security, 185-6]

The only way out of such a dilemma, to escape the fetish, is perhaps **to eschew the logic of security altogether** - to reject it as so ideologically loaded in favour of the state that any real political thought other than the authoritarian and reactionary should be pressed to give it up. That is clearly something that can not be achieved within the limits of bourgeois thought and thus could never even begin to be imagined by the security intellectual. It is also something that the constant iteration of the refrain 'this is an insecure world' and reiteration of one fear, anxiety and insecurity after another will also make it hard to do. But it is something that the critique of security suggests we may have to consider if we want a political way out of the impasse of security. This impasse exists because security has now become so all-encompassing that it **marginalises all else, most notably** the constructive conflicts, **debates** and discussions **that animate political life.** The constant prioritising of a mythical security as a political end - as the political end constitutes a rejection of politics in any meaningful sense of the term. That is, as a mode of action in which differences can be articulated, in which the conflicts and struggles that arise from such differences can be fought for and negotiated, in which people might come to believe that another world is possible - that they might transform the world and in turn be transformed. Security politics simply removes this; worse, it remoeves it while purportedly addressing it. In so doing it suppresses all issues of power and turns political questions into debates about the most efficient way to achieve 'security', despite the fact that we are never quite told - never could be told - what might count as having achieved it. Security politics is, in this sense, an anti-politics,"' dominating political discourse in much the same manner as the security state tries to dominate human beings, reinforcing security fetishism and the monopolistic character of security on the political imagination. We therefore need to get beyond security politics, not add yet more 'sectors' to it in a way that simply expands the scope of the state and legitimises state intervention in yet more and more areas of our lives. Simon Dalby reports a personal communication with Michael Williams, co-editor of the important text Critical Security Studies, in which the latter asks: if you take away security, what do you put in the hole that's left behind? But I'm inclined to agree with Dalby: **maybe there is no hole**."' The mistake has been to think that there is a hole and that this hole needs to be filled with a new vision or revision of security in which it is re-mapped or civilised or gendered or humanised or expanded or whatever. All of these ultimately remain within the statist political imaginary, and consequently end up reaffirming the state as the terrain of modern politics, the grounds of security. The real task is not to fill the supposed hole with yet another vision of security, but to fight for an **alternative political language** which takes us beyond the narrow horizon of bourgeois security and which therefore does not constantly throw us into the arms of the state. That's the point of critical politics: to develop a new political language more adequate to the kind of society we want. Thus while much of what I have said here has been of a negative order, part of the tradition of critical theory is that the negative may be as significant as the positive in setting thought on new paths. For if security really is the supreme concept of bourgeois society and the fundamental thematic of liberalism, then to keep harping on about insecurity and to keep demanding 'more security' (while meekly hoping that this increased security doesn't damage our liberty) is to **blind ourselves** to the possibility of building real alternatives to the authoritarian tendencies in contemporary politics. To situate ourselves against security politics would allow us to circumvent the debilitating effect achieved through the constant securitising of social and political issues, debilitating in the sense that 'security' helps consolidate the power of the existing forms of social domination and justifies the short-circuiting of even the most democratic forms. It would also allow us to forge another kind of politics centred on a **different conception of the good.** We need a new way of thinking and talking about social being and politics that moves us beyond security. This would perhaps be emancipatory in the true sense of the word. What this might mean, precisely, must be open to debate. But it certainly requires recognising that security is an illusion that has forgotten it is an illusion; it requires recognising that security is not the same as solidarity; it requires accepting that insecurity is part of the human condition, and thus giving up the search for the certainty of security and instead learning to tolerate the uncertainties, ambiguities and 'insecurities' that come with being human; it requires accepting that 'securitizing' an issue does not mean dealing with it politically, but **bracketing it out** and handing it to the state; **it requires us to be brave enough to return the gift."'**

**A2: Perm – Non-Mutually Exclusive Parts of the Alt**

#### This is just the definition of a permutation — there are no parts of the alt that aren’t mutually exclusive since the alt rejects the aff’s knowledge production.

#### Failure to specify what they are permuting is a voter — it’s an attempt to define the debate in the 2AR which causes aff conditionality and magnifies side bias.

#### All parts of the alt are mutually exclusive — the critique and the plan employ conflicting epistemological backings. No way to bridge that gap.

Shambaugh 3 — David Shambaugh, s Professor of Political Science & International Affairs and Director of the China Policy Program in the Elliott School of International Affairs at The George Washington University. He is also a nonresident Senior Fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program and Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies at The Brookings Institution in Washington, DC, 2003, (Imagining Demons: the rise of negative imagery in US–China relations” Journal of Contemporary China, p. 236-237, accessed 6/24/16, AEC)

Americans both romanticized and demonized China and the Chinese—considering them to be cultivated and erudite as well as despotic and heathen, earthy yet superstitious, ideological yet pragmatic, stoic yet sadistic, conservative yet extremist, calm and introspective yet warlike and aggressive, weak yet formidable, and so on. For their part, the Chinese respected and sought to emulate the United States, while also feeling revulsion over many aspects of American society and culture and contempt for American behavior abroad. The United States was, for many Chinese, a ‘beautiful imperialist’ (Mei Di). Sometimes these contradictory and dualistic images existed simultaneously in the collective mindsets of each, while during other periods one set of stereotypes became dominant and held sway for some time before swinging back in the opposite direction. Either way, scholars noted that this ambivalence produced a ‘love–hate syndrome’ in mutual imagery.2 This dual syndrome played directly into a fairly repetitive cycle in the relations between the two countries: Mutual Enchantment → Raised Expectations → Unfulfilled Expectations → Disillusion and Disenchantment → Recrimination and Fallout → Separation and Hostility → Re-embrace and Re-enchantment. And then the cycle repeats. While not always mechanical and predictable, the Sino–American relationship over the past century has tended to follow this pattern while ambivalent mutual images have paralleled underlaid the pattern. The result has been alternating amity and enmity. Two other aspects of Sino–American mutual perceptions have also been evident over time. The first is that neither side seems comfortable with, or is able to grasp, complexity in the other. While it is apparent that mutual images have become more diversified and realistic over time as a result of mutual contact and interaction, the perceptions of the other are still often reduced to overly simplistic stereotypes and caricatures which lack nuance and sophistication. Consequently, because they are derived from overly generalized image structures, they do not tend to easily accommodate incongruous information that contradicts the stereotypical belief— thus producing reinforcing cognitive dissonance and misperception. Certain images—such as the Chinese perception of American hegemony or the American perception of the Chinese government’s despotic nature—become so hardened and ingrained that behavior of the other is filtered through these dominant image constructs and does not allow for nuance or alternative explanations.

**A2: Aff-Inclusive Critiques/Floating PIKs Bad**

#### Plan-centric conceptions of competition lead to incoherent decision-making­­­. The benefits of plan enactment are not responsive to criticisms of reason-giving.

#### This is the best model of competition:

#### 1. Key to productive disagreement­. Debate should train us to find points of agreement, not just points of *dis-*agreement. Forcing the neg to disagree with the entire aff entrenches an unproductive political model that mirrors the worst forms of Beltway partisanship. Nuanced discussions of policy and the representations that are used to frame them are more valuable than Cable News Network-style battles between partisan political operatives. Debate should simulate productive disagreement, not *disagreement-at-all-costs*.

#### 2. Key to critical engagement. Plan-centric models of competition rig the game and devalue criticism. If the stasis point is plan-desirability, criticism is always a secondary consideration.

**A2: McCormack**

#### Be skeptical of their invocation of problem solving at the expense of interrogating their security logic

McCormack 10 **—** Tara, Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Leicester and has a PhD in International Relations from the University of Westminster, Critique, Security and Power pp 42-46

Problem-solving theory then has two functions. It serves as a guide and an excuse for political elites; a guide because it aims to show elites how they might solve problems arising from a specific set of social and political relations, the ‘given framework for action’, and an excuse as these specific social and political relations are naturalised and presented as eternal and unchanging situations rather than a contingent set of arrangements that are open to change. Problem-solving theory naturalises and removes from questioning the institutions and social and power relations that exist, presenting them as immutable and unchanging facts of life (Cox, 1981: 129). Problem-solving theory, therefore, clearly has a conservative ideological function because it delimits what is legitimate enquiry and any potential for change (1981: 129–130). According to Cox, critical theory can challenge both these aspects of problemsolving theory. Critical theory does not accept the given framework for action. For critical theory this framework itself is subject to critique and questioning. Critical theory begins, like problem-solving theory, with ‘some aspect or particular sphere of human activity’ (1981: 129). Yet whilst problem-solving theory stops at the boundaries, critical theory steps outside of the given framework for action. Critical theory questions the existing institutions and social and power relations which problem-solving theory takes as an unchangeable ‘fact of life’ and tries to explain how and why problems arise by putting them in their broader social, historical, and political context (1981: 129). Critical theory, as Jahn argues, has a methodological requirement of analysing concrete phenomena in their historical and social totality (1998: 614). Critical theory [is] critical in the sense that it stands apart from the prevailing order of the world and asks how that order came about . . . It is directed towards an appraisal of the very framework for action, or problematic, which problem-solving theory accepts as its parameters. Critical theory is directed to the social and political complex as a whole rather than to the separate parts . . . the critical approach leads towards the construction of a larger picture the whole of which the initially contemplated part is just one component, and seeks to understand the processes of change in which both parts and whole are involved. (Cox, 1981: 129) Critical theory therefore requires a substantive material analysis of the framework for action, the historical structure (Cox, 1981: 135) which gives rise to the problematic considered. Cox here also explicitly identifies critical theory with historical materialism: ‘Historical materialism is, however a foremost source of critical theory’ (1981: 133). For Cox, historical materialism is a particular current within Marxist thought ‘which reasons historically and seeks to explain, as well as promote, changes in social relations’ (1981: 133). Cox argues that the prevailing international social order (the framework for action or historical structure [1981: 135]) can be understood, abstractly, in terms of the interaction between material capabilities, ideas and institutions (1981: 136). This historical structure influences both human action and theory although not in a direct or entirely deterministic way (1981: 135). As Marx argued, ‘Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly found, given and transmitted by the past’ (1978b: 595). For Cox, critical theory has another advantage over problem-solving theory in that it understands that the social world is in a constant state of change: ‘Critical theory is a theory of history in the sense of being concerned not just with the past but with a constant process of historical change’ (1981: 129). As reality changes we find that the divisions of the social world into separate disciplines may appear arbitrary. Cox gives the example of new kinds of theories that challenge the idea of the state as a coherent actor (1981: 130). Writing in 1981, Cox is referring to pluralism and interdependence theory in the context of the oil crises and the end of the Bretton Woods international financial system. Cox argues that contemporary American realism, which he calls neo-realism, exemplifies the problem-solving approach to theory. Theorists working within this framework have an ahistorical approach which assumes a fixed and unchanging international system. For Cox, theory is a way in which we understand and explain the ‘real social world’ (1981: 126). However, Cox argues that the relationship between the social world and the way in which it is perceived and theorised is more complicated than problem-solving theory allows for. For Cox, there is a crucial and complicated relationship between ‘facts’, ‘reality’ and knowledge. ‘Facts’ are not neutral stepping stones on the way to understanding ‘reality’. Theory is not neutral but socially and politically bounded in a complicated way; it reflects, or is a product of, rather than describes actually existing social and political processes. The form that theory takes and the explanations that it gives, arise from and are part of the way in which people attempt to understand the social world and their position in it. Cox argues therefore that theory derives from a given perspective, a specific social, political and economic position, whether of a nation, or class, for example: [Theory is] always for someone and for some purpose. All theories have a perspective. Perspectives derive from a position in time and space, specifically social and political time and space. The world is seen from a standpoint definable in terms of nation or social class, of dominance or subordination, of rising or declining power, of a sense of immobility or of present crises, of past expectations, and of hopes and expectations for the future. (1981: 128) At the epistemological level, therefore, problem-solving theory ignores the complicit relationship between theory and the social and political perspective which gives rise to theory (Jahn, 1998: 616–617). As well as methodological requirements to engage in a substantive analysis of the given framework for action, critical theory also has an epistemological requirement to be reflexive (Jahn, 1998: 614). For Cox, this means that critical theory can overcome the limitations of problem-solving theory because it is epistemologically aware of the socially constituted nature of theory. Critical theory is ‘reflective upon the process of theorising itself’ and is ‘clearly aware of the perspective which gives rise to theorising, and its relation to other perspectives’ (Cox, 1981: 128). This reflexiveness ensures that, at the epistemological level (unlike problem-solving theory), critical theory can separate its own normative assumptions and values (which are part of critical theories’ own social and political perspective) from what it is trying to explain and analyse objectively (Jahn, 1998: 616). Critical theory is therefore theory that is self-consciously aware of its own socially and historically situated origins. This ability to be reflective is a crucial component, for Cox, of what makes a theory critical. Reflexiveness is why critical theory, unlike problem-solving theory, can transcend the conservative limits of problem-solving theory and allow for a normative choice in favour of an alternative world order. The aim, therefore, of critical theory is to point towards alternative ways of ordering the world: ‘to open up the possibility of choosing a different perspective from which the problematic becomes one of creating an alternative world’ (Cox, 1981: 128). For Cox, critical theory has an explicitly normative dimension: Critical theory allows for a normative choice in favour of a social and political order different from the prevailing order, but it limits the range of choice to alternative orders which are feasible transformations of the existing world. A principle objective of critical theory, therefore, is to clarify this range of possible alternatives . . . In this way critical theory can be a guide to strategic action for bringing about an alternative order, whereas problem-solving theory is a guide to tactical actions, which intended or unintended, sustain the existing order. (1981: 130) For Cox, critical theory can therefore help us to identify potential forces which could push the world order in one direction or another (1981: 149). Cox argues that we may locate the future agent of historical change, which may lead to a different world order, in new social forces produced by changing global production processes (1981: 147, 149–151). Cox illustrates this process using the example of the incorporation of industrial workers into the political process of Western states from the end of the nineteenth century (1981: 138). Whilst Cox draws upon both Frankfurt School critical theory and Gramsci, and subsequent critical theorists, as has been pointed out in the introduction, derive their positions from a number of different theoretical positions, none the less Cox’s distinction between problem-solving and critical theory and the idea that critical theory could attempt to understand and challenge power relations is an accepted idea that runs through critical and emancipatory approaches. Critical and emancipatory theorists, even those who are not explicitly placing themselves as specifically following Cox, associate themselves with this general critique of Realism, and an orientation towards change and being able to challenge the contemporary status quo. In other words, critical and emancipatory theorists understand themselves to have an ontological and epistemological approach that is specifically geared towards unearthing the broader set of power relations that dominate the international sphere and lead to the problems that face us. Critical theory can then interrogate the ‘given framework for action’; in the specific case of security for example, critical and emancipatory approaches to security can, unlike traditional approaches, ask why should security be framed in such a way? That framing is not a natural fact, it is not inevitable, but the consequence of a certain set of power relations which frame even what is to be understood as a problem. Critical security theorists Keith Krause and Michael C Williams exemplify this approach when they argue: [W]e have no wish in this context to engage in the ongoing debates within International Relations over the precise meaning of the term critical, a precise definition is unnecessary. Perhaps the most straightforward way to convey our sense of how criticalshould be understood in this volume is Robert Cox’s distinction between problem-solving and critical theory: the former takes ‘prevailing social and power relationships and the institutions into which they are organized . . . as the given framework for action’, while the latter ‘calls them into question by concerning itself with their origins and how and whether they might be in the process of changing’. For other examples see Wynn Jones, 1999; Booth, 2005. Jahn argues that the works of post-Cox critical theorists are far less critical than Cox. She argues that contemporary critical theorists conflate a reflexive and self-aware epistemology with methodology, taking Cox’s epistemological critique of problem-solving theory to mean that there is no possibility of distinguishing between facts and values (Jahn, 1998: 614) and that a critical theory is a question of using the values of a theorist as methodology. Jahn argues, therefore, that post-Cox critical theorists abandon substantive material analysis in favour of ‘general pronouncements on the emancipation of the species’ (1998: 622). In the following section it will be argued that Cox is more problematic than Jahn identifies and that Cox has conflated epistemology and methodology in his work. Cox, it will be argued, also shows a problematic conflation between epistemology and methodology. This means that Cox simultaneously argues for the necessity of and the impossibility of objective engagement with the social world. There is an inherent contradiction within Cox’s work between critical theory’s commitment to explanation and its purported historical materialist basis and the radically subjective elements introduced by reflexivity and the argument that theory is always for someone and for something. Cox argues that both problem-solving and critical theory begin with a certain problematic or area of the social world (1981: 129). For Cox, problem-solving theory, however, cannot ultimately fulfil its promise to solve problems. The problemsolving approach narrowly focuses on specific aspects of the given framework for action in order to ameliorate problems arising from it. It seeks only to resolve particular problems that arise in isolation from an analysis of the broader historical, social and political context which actually gives rise to the problems. Therefore, by its very nature, problem-solving theory can only ever patch things up rather than really resolve the problem. Critical theory, on the other hand, has a much greater potential for problem-solving. Indeed this is precisely the point of Cox’s claims for critical theory. Unlike problem-solving theory, critical theory can work towards an explanation of how the world is and why, for example, particular problems emerge. Through a substantive analysis of the specific historical framework for action (namely the social, political and economic context which gives rise to the problematic considered [Cox, 1981: 135]), critical theory offers potential for genuine problem-solving. This is because only critical theory can get to the root of the problem and explain why that problem emerges, not simply attempt to resolve problems in isolation (1981: 129). Through theory, it is possible to arrive at an objective picture of the world and, ultimately, to address potential for change. For Cox then, it must be possible for theory to make some kind of objective evaluation of the world as it really is (rather than simply as ideological engagement, although because of the dynamic nature of the social world this can only ever be an explanation of the current historical framework). If this were not so, then there could surely be no hope of a critical theory as Cox sets out. Here we can say, following Jahn, that Cox does presume a distinction between facts and values.

# Affirmative

## 2AC

**2AC – Security K**

#### No link and turn — our aff levels the playing field and engages China on honest terms. The alt perpetuates the status quo where we pretend to trade with China while actually holding all of the cards.

#### Reps K bad — assumes *false determinism*. Prefer the *particularized* and *surrounding context* of HOW our reps were deployed.

Shim 14 — (David Shim is Assistant Professor at the Department of International Relations and International Organization of the University of Groningen – As part of the critique of visual determinism, this card internally quotes David D. Perlmutter, Ph.D.. He is Dean of the College of Media & Communication at Texas Tech University. Before coming to Texas Tech, he was the director of the School of Journalism and Mass Communication at the University of Iowa. As a documentary photographer, he is the author or editor of seven books on political communication and persuasion. Also, he has written several dozen research articles for academic journals as well as more than 200 essays for U.S. and international newspapers and magazines such as Campaigns & Elections, Christian Science Monitor, Editor & Publisher, Los Angeles Times, MSNBC.com., Philadelphia Inquirer, and USA Today. Routledge Book Publication –Visual Politics and North Korea: Seeing is believing – p.24-25)

Imagery can enact powerful effects, since political actors are almost always pressed to take action when confronted with images of atrocity and human suffering resultant from wars, famines and natural disasters. Usually, humanitarian emergencies are conveyed through media representations, which indicate the important role of images in producing emergency situations as (global) events (Benthall 1993; Campbell 2003b; Lisle 2009; Moeller 1999; Postman 1987). Debbie Lisle (2009: 148) maintains that, 'we see that the objects, issues and events we usually study [. . .] do not even exist without the media [.. .] to express them’. As a consequence, visual images have political and ethical consequences as a result of their role in shaping private and public ways of seeing (Bleiker. Kay 2007). This is because how people come to know, think about and respond to developments in the world is deeply entangled with how these developments are made visible to them. Visual representations participate in the processes of how people situate themselves in space and time, because seeing involves accumulating and ordering information in order to be able to construct knowledge of people, places and events. For example, the remembrance of such events as the Vietnam War, the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 or the torture in Abu Ghraib prison cannot be separated from the ways in which these events have been represented in films, TV and photography (Bleiker 2009; Campbell/Shapiro 2007; Moller2007). The visibility of these events can help to set the conditions for specific forms of political action. The current war in Afghanistan serves as an example of this. Another is the nexus of hunger images and relief operations. Vision and visuality thus become part and parcel of political dynamics, also revealing the ethical dimension of imagery, as it affects the ways in which people interact with each other. However, particular representations do not automatically lead to particular responses as, for instance, proponents of the so-called 'CNN effect’ would argue (for an overview of the debates among academic, media and policy-making circles on the 'CNN effect', see Gilboa 2005; see also. Dauber 2001; Eisensee/ Stromberg 2007; Livingston/Eachus 1995; O'Loughlin 2010; Perlmutter 1998, 2005; Robinson 1999, 20011. There is no causalrelationship between a specific image and a political intervention, in which a dependent variable (the image) would explain the outcome of an independent one (the act). David Perlmutter (1998: I), for instance, explicitly challenges, as he calls it, the **'visual determinism' of images,** which dominates political and public opinion. Referring to findings based on public surveys, he argues that the formation of opinions by individuals depends **not on images** but on their idiosyncratic predispositions and values (see also, Domke et al. 2002; Perlmutter 2005).

#### Plan focus good — alternatives are self-serving and regressive which makes 2AC predictability and offense impossible. Evaluating the consequences of the AFF and alternative is the only holistic way to assess prior questions.

#### Weigh consequences *first*—moral absolutism *reproduces evil*.

Isaac 2 — Jeffrey C. Isaac, James H. Rudy Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life at Indiana University-Bloomington, 2002 (“Ends, Means, and Politics,” Dissent, Volume 49, Issue 2, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via EBSCOhost, p. 35-36)

As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness **undercuts political responsibility**. The concern may be morally laudable, reflecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suffers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one’s intention **does not ensure** the achievement of what one intends. Abjuring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean conscience of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of **real violence and injustice**, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of **complicity in injustice**. [end page 35] This is why, from the standpoint of politics—as opposed to religion—pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically repudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any effect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about **unintended consequences** as it is about intentions; **it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant**. Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, **it is often the pursuit of “good” that generates evil**. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is **not enough** that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is **equally important**, **always**, to ask about **the effects of pursuing these goals** and to judge these effects in **pragmatic and historically contextualized** ways. Moral absolutism **inhibits this judgment**. It **alienates** those who are not true believers. It promotes **arrogance**. And it **undermines political effectiveness**.

#### Judge choice — if our reps are bad, reject those and vote aff for other reasons. Good ideas should be accepted regardless of single instances of poor reasoning — otherwise one bad reason eliminates every proposal from policy discussion, dooming policy-making.

#### Security critiques inhibit politics while failing to help understand the world. Reject the neg’s flawed epistemology.

Hynek 13 — et al; Dr. Nik Hynek is Associate Professor of International Relations and Theory of Politics at the Metropolitan University Prague and Charles University. He holds PhD degree in International Politics and Security Studies from the Department of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford - “No emancipatory alternative, no critical security studies”- Critical Studies on Security - Volume 1, Issue 1, 2013. Obtained via Taylor & Francis Fresh Journals Collection. Modifed for potentially objectionable language.

These ‘post-emancipatory’ scholars still frame Western and international intervention in potentially emancipatory terms, but the horizons and aspirations have been substantially lowered from the universalist call to radical academic policy advocacy, of the founders of emancipatory approaches within security studies. While the initial confident calls for emancipatory alternatives at least had an understanding of the need for emancipatory agency, unfortunately found only in Western powers and international institutions, the later approaches lack this clarity and confidence, merely suggesting that more ‘open’, ‘unscripted’, ‘locally sensitive’, ‘desecuritised’ and less ‘universalist’ and ‘liberal’ approaches can avoid the ‘resistances’ held to come from the local level. If these approaches are ‘emancipatory’ they lack **any clear** project or **programme** as to what these claims might mean or **how they might be carried out in reality** and are little different to mainstream think tank proposals calling for more ‘local ownership’, ‘local capacity-building’, ‘empowerment’, ‘sustainability’ and ‘resilience’ (see Chandler 2012, Forthcoming). This article has argued that the appendage ‘critical’ should be removed to allow Security Studies to free itself of the baggage of its founding. It is clear that what little emancipatory content critical security theorising had initially has been more than exhausted and, in fact, thoroughly critiqued. The boom in CSS in the 1990s and early 2000s was essentially parasitical on the shift in Western policy discourses, which emphasised the radical and emancipatory possibilities of power, rather than on the basis of giving theoretical clarity to counter-hegemonic forces. We would argue that the removal of the prefix ‘critical’ would also be useful to distinguish security study based on critique of the world as it exists from normative theorising based on the world as we would like it to be. As long as we keep the ‘critical’ nomenclature, we are affirming that government and international policy-making can be understood and critiqued against the goal of emancipating the non-Western Other. **Judging policy-making and policy outcomes**, **on the basis of this** imputed **goal**, may provide ‘critical’ theorists with endless possibilities to demonstrate their normative standpoints **but it does little to develop academic and political understandings of the world we live in. In fact, no greater** straw man (**strawperson**) **could have been imagined**, than the ability to become ‘critical’ on the basis of **debates** **around** the claim that the West was now capable of undertaking emancipatory **policy missions**. Today, as we witness a narrowing of transformative aspirations on behalf of Western policy elites, in a reaction against the ‘hubris’ of the claims of the 1990s (Mayall and Soares de Oliveira 2012) and a slimmed down approach to sustainable, ‘hybrid’ peacebuilding, CSS has again renewed its relationship with the policy sphere. Some academics and policy-makers now have a united front that rather than placing emancipation at the heart of policy-making it should be ‘local knowledge’ and ‘local demands’.

(Note to students: “CSS” is an acronym standing for “Critical Security Studies”)

#### Perm: do both.

#### Securitization is the best method to break down self-other antagonism and generate political responses to ongoing violence — perm solves best.

Trombetta 8 — (Maria Julia Trombetta, (Delft University of Technology, postdoctoral researcher at the department of Economics of Infrastructures) 3/19/08 http://archive.sgir.eu/uploads/Trombetta-the\_securitization\_of\_the\_environment\_and\_the\_transformation\_of\_security.pdf

On the one hand, an approach that considers the discursive formation of security issues provides a new perspective to analyse the environmental security discourse and its transformative potential. First, it allows for an investigation of the political process behind the selection of threats, exploring why some of them are considered more relevant and urgent than others. The focus shifts from the threats to the collectivities, identities and interests that deserve to be protected and the means to be employed. Second, securitization suggests that the awareness of environmental issues can have a relevant role in defining and transforming political communities, their interests and identities, since the process creates new ideas about who deserve to be protected and by whom. Finally, as Behnke points out, **securitization can open the space for a “genuinely political” constitutive and formative struggle through which political structures are contested and reestablished**.(Behnke 2000: 91) Securitization allows for the breaking and transforming of rules that are no longer acceptable, including the practices associated with an antagonistic logic of security. On the other hand, securitization is problematic because of the set of practices it is supposed to bring about. For the CopS security “carries with it a history and a set of connotations that it cannot escape.”(Wæver 1995: 47) While securitizing an issue is a political choice, the practices it brings about are not. Accordingly, transforming an issue into a security issue is not always an improvement. In the case of the environment, the warning seems clear: “When considering securitizing moves such as ‘environmental security’...one has to weigh the always problematic side effects of applying a mind-set of security against the possible advantages of focus, attention, and mobilization.”(Buzan, Wæver and Wilde 1998: 29) The School shares the normative suggestion that “[a] society whose security is premised upon a logic of war should be re-shaped, re-ordered, simply changed.”(Aradau 2001: introduction) For the CopS this does not mean to transform the practices and logic of security, because, as it will be shown below, for the School, this is impossible. The CopS suggests avoiding the transformation of issues into security issues. It is necessary “to turn threats into challenges; to move developments from the sphere of existential fear to one where they could be handled by ordinary means, as politics, economy, culture, and so on.”(Wæver 1995: 55, quoting Jahn). This transformation, for the CopS, is “desecuritization”, and the School has introduced a distinction between politicization - “meaning the issue is part of public policy, requiring government decision and resources allocation s”(Buzan, Wæver and Wilde 1998: 23) - and securitization - “meaning the issue is presented as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure.”(Buzan, Wæver and Wilde 1998: 23) The slogan is: “less security, more politics!”(Wæver 1995: 56) Nevertheless, there are two major problems behind this suggestion. First, if securitization is normatively problematic, desecuritization can be even more problematic. It can lead to a depoliticization and marginalisation of urgent and serious issues, **while leaving unchallenged the practices associated with security**. In the case of the environment, many appeals to security are aimed at both soliciting action and transforming what counts as security and the way of providing it. Second, within the School’s framework, desecuritization cannot be possible. Securitization in fact can be inescapable, the unwanted result of discussing whether or not the environment is a security issue. As Huysmans has noticed, the performative, constitutive approach suggested by the speech act theory implies that even talking and researching about security can contribute to the securitization of an issue, even if that (and the practices associated with it) is not the desired result. “The normative dilemma thus consists of how to write or speak about security when the security knowledge risks the production of what one tries to avoid, what one criticizes: that is, the securitization of migration, drugs and so forth.”(Huysmans 2002: 43) When the understanding of security is the problematic one described by the CopS, research itself can become a danger. This captures a paradox that characterizes the debate about environmental security. As Jon Barnett has showed in The Meaning of Environmental Security (2001) the securitization of the environment can have perverse effects and several attempts to transform environmental problems into security issues have resulted in a spreading of the national security paradigm and the enemy logic, even if the intentions behind them were different. Barnett has argued that “environmental security is not about the environment, it is about security; as a concept, it is at its most meaningless and malign”(2001: 83) in this way, he seems to accept the ineluctability of the security mindset or logic evoked by securitization. However, his suggestion of promoting a “human centered” understanding of security, in which environmental security is not about (national) security but about people and their needs, within the securitization logic, cannot escape the trap he has described. Why, in fact, should the sort of his claim be different from that of similar ones? 2. The fixity of Security practices These dilemmas, however, are based on the idea that security practices are inescapable and unchangeable and the theory of securitization, as elaborated by the CopS, has contributed to suggest so. The CopS has achieved the result of making a specific, negative understanding of security – which has characterised the dominant Realist discourse within IR - appear as “natural” and unchangeable since all the attempts to transform it appear to reinforce its logic. To challenge this perverse mechanism it is necessary to unpack securitization further. First, it will be shown that securitization is not analytically accurate, the environment representing a relevant case. Second, the assumptions behind this problematic fixity will be explored. The CopS explores the specificity of the environmental sector in Security: A Framework for Analysis (Buzan, Wæver and Wilde 1998) (Security hereafter), the theoretical book where the CopS illustrates the theory of securitization and analyses the dynamics of securitization within five relevant sectors. For each sector the School identifies the actors or objects (referent objects) that are threatened, specifies the relevant threats and the agents that promote or facilitate securitization.11[11] The environmental sector is rather different from the others and the transformative intent that is associated with the appeal to environmental security is more evident.12[12] Amongst the peculiarities of the environmental sector described by the School, three deserve a specific analysis for their implications: First, the presence of two agendas - a scientific and a political one; second, the multiplicity of actors; third, the politicization/securitization relationship. They will be analysed in turn “One of the most striking features of the environmental sector,” it is argued in Security, “is the existence of two different agendas: a scientific agenda and a political agenda.”(Buzan, Wæver and Wilde 1998: 71) The scientific one refers mainly to natural science and non-governmental activities. The “scientific agenda is about the authoritative assessment of threat,”(Buzan, Wæver and Wilde 1998: 72) and Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde admit that “the extent to which scientific argument structures environmental security debates strikes us as exceptional.”(Buzan, Wæver and Wilde 1998: 72) Quoting Rosenau, they suggest that “the demand for scientific proof is a broader emerging characteristic in the international system.”(Buzan, Wæver and Wilde 1998: 72) This 11[11] So for instance in the military sector the referent object is usually the state and the threats are mainly military ones, while in the societal sector the referent objects are collective identities “that can function independent of the state, such as nations and religions.”(Buzan, Wæver and Wilde 1998: 22-3) 12[12] This is the case even if the School adopts a conservative strategy that appears from the choice of the referent object (or what is threatened). In the first works of the School, the referent object within the environmental sector was the biosphere: “Environmental security concerns the maintenance of the local and the planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which all other human enterprises depend.” (Buzan 1991: 19) In Security the School narrows down this perspective and identifies the level of civilization (with all the contradictions that contribute to environmental problems) as the main referent object. This move favours a conservative perspective which considers the securitization of the environment as a way to preserve the status quo and the security strategies on which it is based. Despite this, the description of the environmental sector captures the specificity of the sector and reveals the tensions within the overall framework. questions the “self referentiality” of the speech act security. Are some threats more “real” than others thanks to scientific proof? Can considerations developed to characterize reflective behaviours be applied to natural systems? Even if dealing with these issues is beyond the scope of this article, it is necessary to note that the appeal to an external discourse has serious implications. First, it questions the possibility and opportunity of desecuritization. Is it possible and what does it mean to “desecuritize” an issue which is on the scientific agenda? If scientific research outlines the dangerousness of an environmental problem, how is it possible to provide security? Second, it suggests that security and the practices associated with it can vary from one sector to another and thus from one context to another. The second peculiarity of the environmental sector is the presence of many actors. This contrasts with Wæver’s suggestion that “security is articulated only from a specific place, in an institutional voice, by elites.”(Wæver 1995: 57) The multiplicity of actors is largely justified by the School with the relative novelty of the securitization of the environment. “The discourses, power struggles, and securitizing moves in the other sectors are reflected by and have sedimented over time in concrete types of organizations - notably states...nations (identity configurations), and the UN system,”(Buzan, Wæver and Wilde 1998: 71) however, this is not the case with the environment: “It is as yet undetermined what kinds of political structures environmental concerns will generate.”(Buzan, Wæver and Wilde 1998: 71). In this way a tension appears since the attempts to securitize the environment are described as having a transforming potential, requiring and calling for new institutions. Within the environmental sector securitization moves seem to have a transformative intent that contrasts with the conservative one, that characterizes other sectors. The third peculiarity is that many securitizing moves result in politicization. This is problematic for the School, which argues that “transcending a security problem by politicising it cannot happen through thematization in security terms, only away from such terms.”(Wæver 1995: 56) For the School, once the enemy logic has been inscribed in a context, it is very difficult to return to an open debate. Nevertheless the various politicizations of environmental issues that followed the appeal to security – those the CopS dismissed as failed securitizations - seem to reinforce the argument, suggested by Edkins, that there is a tendency to politicize issues through their securitization. (Edkins 1999: 11) This represents another signal that **securitization**, within the environmental sector, **can take a different form, and that the problematic aspects of evoking security are not so evident.** Securitization theory, for the CopS, is meant to be descriptive, however the environmental sector suggests that some of its aspects prevent it from providing an adequate instrument for analysis. To understand why this occurs, it is necessary to explore in more detail the conceptualization of security by Wæver, who has introduced securitization within the School and is the strongest opponent of any attempt to securitize the environment.

#### Perm: do the plan and [insert alt text/explanation]

#### Alternative increases inequality and violence.

McCormack10 **—** Tara, is Lecturer in International Politics at the University of Leicester and has a PhD in International Relations from the University of Westminster. 2010, (Critique, Security and Power: The political limits to emancipatory approaches, page 137-138)

In chapter 7 I engaged with the human security framework and some of the problematic implications of ‘emancipatory’ security policy frameworks. In this chapter I argued that the shift away from the pluralist security framework and the elevation of cosmopolitan and emancipatory goals **has served to** enforce international power inequalities rather than lessen them. Weak or unstable states are subjected to greater international scrutiny and international institutions and other states have greater freedom to intervene, but the citizens of these states have **no way of controlling or influencing** these international institutions or powerful states. This shift away from the pluralist security framework has not challenged the status quo, which may help to explain why major international institutions and states can easily adopt a more cosmopolitan rhetoric in their security policies. As we have seen, the shift away from the pluralist security framework has entailed a shift towards a more openly hierarchical international system, in which states are differentiated according to, for example, their ability to provide human security for their citizens or their supposed democratic commitments. In this shift, the old pluralist international norms of (formal) international sovereign equality, non-intervention and ‘blindness’ to the content of a state are overturned. Instead, international institutions and states have more freedom to intervene in weak or unstable states in order to ‘protect’ and emancipate individuals globally. Critical and emancipatory security theorists argue that the goal of the emancipation of the individual means that security must be reconceptualised away from the state. As the domestic sphere is understood to be the sphere of insecurity and disorder, the international sphere represents greater emancipatory possibilities, as Tickner argues, ‘if security is to start with the individual, its ties to state sovereignty must be severed’ (1995: 189). For critical and emancipatory theorists there must be a shift towards a ‘cosmopolitan’ legal framework, for example Mary Kaldor (2001: 10), Martin Shaw (2003: 104) and Andrew Linklater (2005). For critical theorists, one of the fundamental problems with Realism is that it is unrealistic. Because it prioritises order and the existing status quo, Realism attempts to impose a particular security framework onto a complex world, ignoring the myriad threats to people emerging from their own governments and societies. Moreover, traditional international theory serves to obscure power relations and omits a study of why the system is as it is: [O]mitting myriad strands of power amounts to exaggerating the simplicity of the entire political system. Today’s conventional portrait of international politics thus too often ends up looking like a Superman comic strip, whereas it probably should resemble a Jackson Pollock. (Enloe, 2002 [1996]: 189) Yet as I have argued, contemporary critical security theorists seem to show a marked lack of engagement with their problematic (whether the international security context, or the Yugoslav break-up and wars). **Without concrete engagement and analysis**, however, **the critical project is** undermined **and critical theory becomes** nothing more than a request that people behave in a nicer way to each other. Furthermore, whilst contemporary critical security theorists argue that they present a more realistic image of the world, through exposing power relations, for example, **their lack of concrete analysis of the problematic considered renders them actually unable to engage with existing power structures** and the way in which power is being exercised in the contemporary international system. For critical and emancipatory theorists the central place of the values of the theorist mean that it cannot fulfil its promise to critically engage with contemporary power relations and emancipatory possibilities. Values must be joined with engagement with the material circumstances of the time.

#### Aff-inclusive critiques are a voting issue — they are unpredictable and infinitely regressive, eliminating education and clash.

#### Epistemology and ontology don’t come first — the alternative cedes the political.

Jarvis 2K — (D.S.L., Lecturer n Government - U of Sydney, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE CHALLENGE OF POSTMODERNISM, p. 128-9)

Certainly it is rightand properthat weponder the depths of our theoretical imaginations**,** engage in epistemological and ontological **debate**, and analyze the sociology of our knowledge. **But to suppose** that **this is the only task** of international theory, **let alone the most important one,** smacks of intellectual elitism and **displays** a certain **contempt for** those who search for guidance in their **daily struggles** as actors in international politics. What does Ashley's project his deconstructive efforts, or valiant tight against positivism say to the truly marginalized, oppressed and destitute? **How does it help solve** the plight of the poor, the displaced refugees, **the casualties of war,** or the emigres of death squads**?** Does it in any way speak to those whose actions and thoughts comprise the policy and practice of international relations? On all these questions one must answer no. This is not to say, of course, that all theory should be judged by its technical rarionality and problem-solving capacity as Ashley forcefully argues. But **to suppose that problem-solving** technical theory **is** not necessary—oris in some, way **bad—**is a contemptuous position that **abrogates any hope of solving** some of the **nightmarish realities** that millions confront daily. Holsti argues, **we need ask** of these theorists and these theories tne ultimate question, “**So what?”** **to what purpose do they** deconstruct **problematize, destabilize**, undermine, ridicule, and belittle modernist and rationalist approaches? **Does this** get us any further**, make the world any better,** or enhance the human condition? In what sense can this "debate toward [a] bottomless pit of epistemology and metaphysics" be judgedpertinent relevant helpful, or cogent to anyone other than those foolish enough to be scholastically excited by abstract and recondite debate.

#### No impact — threat construction doesn’t cause conflict.

Kaufman 9 — (Prof Poli Sci and IR – U Delaware, ‘9 (Stuart J, “Narratives and Symbols in Violent Mobilization: The Palestinian-Israeli Case,” Security Studies 18:3, 400 – 434)

Even when hostile narratives, group fears, and opportunity are strongly present, war occurs only if these factors are harnessed. Ethnic narratives and fears must combine to create significant ethnic hostility among mass publics. Politicians must also seize the opportunity to manipulate that hostility, evoking hostile narratives and symbols to gain or hold power by riding a wave of chauvinist mobilization. Such mobilization is often spurred by prominent events (for example, episodes of violence) that increase feelings of hostility and make chauvinist appeals seem timely. If the other group also mobilizes and if each side's felt security needs threaten the security of the other side, the result is a security dilemma spiral of rising fear, hostility, and mutual threat that results in violence. A virtue of this symbolist theory is that symbolist logic explains why ethnic peace is more common than ethnonationalist war. Even if hostile narratives, fears, and opportunity exist, severe violence usually can still be avoided if ethnic elites skillfully define group needs in moderate ways and collaborate across group lines to prevent violence: this is consociationalism.17 War is likely only if hostile narratives, fears, and opportunity spur hostile attitudes, chauvinist mobilization, and a security dilemma.

**2AC – A2: Pan/China Securitization**

#### Pan is reductionist and the alt fails — can never generate a meaningful relationship with China.

Jones 14 — David Martin Jones, Professor of Politics at University of Glasgow, PhD from LSE, Australian Journal of Political Science, February 21, 2014, 49:1, "Managing the China Dream: Communist Party politics after the Tiananmen incident ", Taylor and Francis Online

Notwithstanding this Western fascination with China and the positive response of former Marxists, such as Jacques, to the new China, Pan discerns an Orientalist ideology distorting Western commentary on the party state, and especially its international relations (6). Following Edward Said, Pan claims that such Western Orientalism reveals ‘not something concrete about the orient, but something about the orientalists themselves, their recurring latent desire of fears and fantasies about the orient’ (16). In order to unmask the limits of Western representations of China’s rise, Pan employs a critical ‘methodology’ that ‘draws on constructivist and deconstructivist approaches’ (9). Whereas the ‘former questions the underlying dichotomy of reality/knowledge in Western study of China’s international relations’, the latter shows how paradigmatic representations of China ‘condition the way we give meaning to that country’ and ‘are socially constitutive of it’ (9). Pan maintains that the two paradigms of ‘China threat’ and ‘China opportunity’ in Western discourse shape China’s reality for Western ‘China watchers’ (3). These discourses, Pan claims, are ‘ambivalent’ (65). He contends that this ‘bifocal representation of China, like Western discourses of China more generally, tell us a great deal about the west itself, its self -imagination, its torn, anxious, subjectivity, as well as its discursive effects of othering’ (65). **This is a large claim.** Interestingly, **Pan fails to note** that after the Tiananmen incident in 1989, **Chinese new left scholarship** also **embraced Said’s critique** of Orientalism in order **to reinforce** both **the party state and** a **burgeoning** sense of **Chinese nationalism**. To counter Western liberal discourse, academics associated with the Central Party School promoted an ideology of Occidentalism to deflect domestic and international pressure to democratise China. In this, they drew not only upon Said, but also upon Foucault and the post-1968 school of French radical thought that, as Richard Wolin has demonstrated, was itself initiated in an appreciation of Mao’s cultural revolution. In other words, the critical and deconstructive methodologies that came to influence American and European social science from the 1980s had a Maoist inspiration (Wolin 2010: 12–18). Subsequently, in the changed circumstances of the 1990s, as American sinologist Fewsmith has shown, young Chinese scholars ‘adopted a variety of postmodernist and critical methodologies’ (2008: 125). Paradoxically, these scholars, such as Wang Hui and Zhang Kuan (Wang 2011), had been educated in the USA and were familiar with fashionable academic criticism of a postmodern and deconstructionist hue that ‘demythified’ the West (Fewsmith 2008: 125–29). This approach, promulgated in the academic journal Dushu (Readings), deconstructed, via Said and Foucault, Western narratives about China. Zhang Kuan, in particular, rejected Enlightenment values and saw postmodern critical theory as a method to build up a national ‘discourse of resistance’ and counter Western demands regarding issues such as human rights and intellectual property. **It is through its affinity with this self-strengthening**, Occidentalist **lens, that Pan’s critical study should perhaps be critically read.** Simply put, Pan identifies a political economy of fear and desire that informs and complicates Western foreign policy and, **Pan asserts**, tells us more about the West’s ‘self-imagination’ than it does about Chinese reality. Pan attempts to sustain this claim via an analysis, in Chapter 5, of the self-fulfilling prophecy of the China threat, followed, in Chapters 6 and 7, by exposure of the false promises and premises of the China ‘opportunity’. Pan certainly offers a provocative insight into Western attitudes to China and their impact on Chinese political thinking. In particular, he demonstrates that China’s foreign policy-makers react negatively to what they view as a hostile American strategy of containment (101). In this context, Pan contends, accurately, that Sino–US relations are mutually constitutive and the USA must take some responsibility for the rise of China threat (107). **This latter point, however, is one** that Australian **realists** like Owen Harries, whom Pan cites approvingly, **have made consistently since the late** 19**90s.** In other words, **not all Western analysis uncritically endorses the view that China’s rise is threatening. Nor is all Western perception of this rise reducible to the threat scenario advanced by recent US administrations.** Pan’s subsequent argument that the China opportunity thesis leads to inevitable disappointment and subtly reinforces the China threat paradigm **is**, also, somewhat **misleading**. On the one hand, Pan notes that Western anticipation of ‘China’s transformation and democratization’ has ‘become a burgeoning cottage industry’ (111). Yet, on the other hand, Pan observes that Western commentators, such as Jacques, demonstrate a growing awareness that the democratisation thesis is a fantasy. That is, Pan, like Jacques, argues that China ‘will neither democratize nor collapse, but may instead remain politically authoritarian and economically stable at the same time’ (132). To merge, as Pan does, the democratisation thesis into its authoritarian antithesis in order to evoke ‘present Western disillusionment’ (132) with China **is** somewhat **reductionist**. Pan’s contention that we need a new paradigm shift ‘to free ourselves from the positivist aspiration to grand theory or transcendental scientific paradigm itself’ (157) **might be admirable, but this will not be achieved by a constructivism that would ultimately meet with the approval of** what Brady terms **China’s thought managers** (Brady: 6).

## 1AR – Blocks

### 1AR – Not Securitization

#### The K confuses riskification and securitization – riskification of climate change is good – mobilizes the public and governments to take cooperative, peaceful action

Corry 12 – Olaf Corry, Olaf Corry researches international environmental politics at Cambridge University Judge Business School. He has a PhD in International Relations from the University of Copenhagen and has taught International Relations and security theory at Copenhagen University and Cambridge University, 2012 (“Securitisation and ‘Riskification’: Second-order Security and the Politics of Climate Change,” Millennium Journal of International Studies, Available online at <http://mil.sagepub.com/content/40/2/235.full.pdf+html>, Accessed 6-24-2016, SAA)

Whereas a securitisation legitimates the defence of a valued referent object against an existential threat, a riskification renders an issue one of governing a valued referent object to control conditions of possibility for harm against it. Like threat discourses, riskifications, it was argued above, deal with potential harm, but they do so in terms of conditional causality – a kind of second-order security politics that focuses on the conditions of possibility for harm rather than on direct causes of harm. Theorising riskification like this maintains the integrity of the concept of securitisation and identifies a different mentality of governing that can be treated separately. Climate change may indeed one day become more securitised, for example if the idea that greenhouse emissions are an ‘act of aggression’ against climate-vulnerable societies is successful in defining the politics of climate change. This appeared to be the line Osama bin Laden was taking when he once remonstrated with Americans who he said ‘have destroyed nature with your industrial waste and gases more than any other nation in history. Despite this, you refuse to sign the Kyoto agreement so that you can secure the profit of your greedy companies and industries’, thereby linking climate change with violent assaults on Islam.116 However, such a securitisation is not currently the prevailing discourse on climate and security, even in military institutions – at least not in the sources often quoted as evidence of securitisations of climate change. A very different logic of political action ensues from current constructions of climate change as a riskissue. This means that calls to de-securitise climate change may unwittingly be having a very different effect, in effect shifting climate change away from a risk-paradigm towards a normalising or non-politicised logic. This has happened because, hitherto, risk-security writing has tended to see ‘risk’ as a securitisation multiplier such that ‘securitisation’ rather than having a well-defined meaning, has come to be used to cover not just existential threat-based security politics but all forms of appeals to danger and harm. Trombetta117 and Brauch118 identify what they see as a conundrum in terms of ‘securitisation’ of the environment not leading to exceptional means and violence, but they still decide to include risk-politics in the concept of securitisation rather than preserve the Copenhagen School stipulations of existential threats and exceptional means. This conundrum is explicable if, with a more pluralistic lens, the complex field of security politics is not viewed as a grand dispositif of risk where risk simply expands securitisation. If we move beyond the dichotomy of ‘normal’ de-securitised politics versus ‘emergency’ securitised politics, policy implications from analysis of political logics can be more fine-grained and appropriate. The panoply of reactions to climate change can be seen in terms of both securitisation and riskification, highlighting separate logics. In terms of normative implications, risk theorists would claim that risk is just as insidious as traditional securitisation, if not more as it allows ‘securitisation’ on the basis of less-than-existential and merely potential dangers. While it may not necessarily lead to full-scale military attacks on an external enemy, it may be argued that riskification legitimates extensive and permanent measures, discrimination of those profiled as risky, and potentially oppressive governance of populations in the name of removing conditions of possibility for harm.119 However, this evaluation builds on risk being associated closely with securitisation – or indeed as a radicalisation of securitisation – which need not necessarily be the case. It is possible that riskification can coexist with securitisations leading to hyperbolic securitisation, but there has been a tendency to assume that any invocation of danger is ‘a securitisation’ and hence a bad thing politically. This touches on a much wider debate about what types of governance are emancipatory and when different logics are appropriate – a question relevant to processes of politicisation, securitisation and riskification alike. The normative implications have yet to be fully explored in part because there has been a conflation of the latter two. The intention here is not to suggest that riskification is by definition benign and securitisation malign. Either may obviously be judged inappropriate or necessary according to different criteria and situations. But while there are dangers in riskifications (the permanence of governance justified in relation to curbing danger is potentially abused by security professionals and politicians), most evaluations of risk-security discourse such as that on the securitisation of climate change have hitherto been made without any clear distinction between risk and threat-based security. Furthermore, risk-security ideas were often developed via case studies of the War on Terror120 where a traditional security logic of existential threats arguably remains dominant. Much criticism of the War on Terror has been directed at how it constructed an external enemy (terrorists or rogue states) rather than focusing on the background conditions of possibility of harm (radicalisation, globalisation and unsolved political conflicts), paving the way for traditional wars, such as the 2003 attack on Iraq. In other words, the War on Terror was too much of a securitisation and not enough a riskification (something we cannot even discuss without first having separated the two) with too little focus on the root causes. With climate change, riskification appears to be dominant and thus a different set of criteria for judging such discourse needs to come to the fore. Riskification does not involve the same danger of creating unhelpful friend–enemy logics or legitimising exceptional means, but it does run the risk of legitimising extensive governance programmes of the valued reference object itself. Without denying pitfalls in risk politics (even normal politics can have its dangers), this illustrates the dangers of conflating a politics of risk with securitisation (analytically and empirically) overshadowing the idea of a risk-oriented logic which focuses on conditions of possibility of harm. Riskifications pertain to vulnerability, resilience and tend to be more permanent and long-term in their nature than acute efforts to thwart or defeat a threat.

### 1AR – Epistemology/Ontology First

#### Epistemological debate is irrelevant and fails to create knowledge. Action is essential and inevitable.

Friedrichs 9 — Jorg, Oxford politics lecturer, “From positivist pretense to pragmatic practice: Varieties of pragmatic methodology in IR scholarship. International Studies Review 11(3): 645–648)

As Friedrich Nietzsche ([1887] 1994:1; cf. Wilson 2002) knew, the knower isstrangely unknown to himself. In fact, it is much morehazardous to contemplate theway how we gain knowledge than to gain such knowledge in the ﬁrst place. This is not to deny that intellectuals are a narcissistic Kratochwil lot, with a penchant for omphaloskepsis. The typical result of their navel-gazing, however, is not increased self-awareness. Scholars are more likely to come up with ex-post-facto rationalizations of how they would like to see their activity than with accurate descriptions of how they go about business. As a result, in science there is a paradoxical divide between positivist pretenseand pragmatic practice. Many prominent scholars proceed pragmatically in gen-erating their knowledge, only to vest it all in a positivist cloak when it comes topresenting results. In the wake of Karl Popper (1963), fantasies about ingeniousconjectures and inexorable refutations continue to hold sway despite the muchmore prosaic way most scholars grope around in the formulation of their theo-ries, and the much less rigorous way they assess the value of their hypotheses. In proposing pragmatism as a more realistic alternative to positivist idealiza-tions, I am not concerned with the original intentions of Charles Peirce. Theseare discussed and enhanced by Ryto¨ vuori-Apunen (this forum). Instead, Ipresent various attempts to make pragmatism work as a methodology for IR scholarship. This includes my own preferred methodology, the pragmaticresearch strategy of abduction. As Fritz Kratochwil and I argue elsewhere, abduction should be at the center of our efforts, while deduction and induction areimportant but auxiliary tools (Friedrichs and 2009).Of course, one does not need to be a pragmatist to proceed in a pragmatic way. Precisely because it is derived from practice, pragmatic commonsense is a sold as the hills. For example, James Rosenau (1988:164) declared many yearsago that he coveted ‘‘a long-held conviction that one advances knowledge most effectively by continuously moving back and forth between very abstract and very empirical levels of inquiry, allowing the insights of the former to exert pressurefor the latter even as the ﬁndings of the latter, in turn, exert pressure for the for-mer, thus sustaining an endless cycle in which theory and research feed on eachother.’’ This was shortly before Rosenau’s turn to postmodernism, while he wasstill touting the virtues of behaviorism and standard scientiﬁc requisites, such asindependent and dependent variables and theory testing. But if we take his state-ment at face value, it appears that Rosenau-the-positivist was guided by a sort of pragmatism for all but the name. While such practical commonsense is certainly valuable, in and by itself, it does not qualify as scientiﬁc methodology. Science requires a higher degree of methodological awareness. For this reason, I am not interested here in pragma-tism as unspoken commonsense, or as a pretext for doing empirical researchunencumbered by theoretical and methodological considerations. Nor am I con-cerned with **pragmatism as an excuse for staging yet another epistemological debate**. Instead, I am interested in pragmatism as an instrument to go about research with an appropriate degree of epistemological and methodologicalawareness. Taking this criterion as my yardstick, the following three varieties of pragmatist methodology in recent IR scholarship are worth mentioning: theory synthesis, analytic eclecticism (AE), and abduction.Theory synthesis is proposed by Andrew Moravcsik (2003), who claims that theories can be combined as long as they are compatible at some unspeciﬁedfundamental level, and that data will help to identify the right combination of theories. He does not explicitly invoke pragmatism but vests his pleading in apositivist cloak by using the language of theory testing. When looking closer,however, it becomes apparent that his theoretical and methodological noncha-lance is far more pragmatic than what his positivist rhetoric suggests. Moravcsiksees himself in good company, dropping the following names: Robert Keohane,Stephen Walt, Jack Snyder, Stephen Van Evera, Bary Buzan, Bruce Russett, John O’Neal, Martha Finnemore, and Kathryn Sikkink. With the partial excep-tion of Finnemore, however, none of these scholars explicitly links his or herscholarship to pragmatism. They employ pragmatic commonsense in theirresearch, but devoutly ignore pragmatism as a philosophical and methodologicalposition. As a result, it is fair to say that theory synthesis is only on a slightly higher level of intellectual awareness than Rosenau’s statement quoted above. Analytic eclecticism, as advertized by Peter Katzenstein and Rudra Sil, links acommonsensical approach to empirical research with a more explicit commit-ment to pragmatism (Sil and Katzenstein 2005; Katzenstein and Sil 2008).The 7 Even the dean of critical rationalism, Karl Popper, is ‘‘guilty’’ of lapses into pragmatism, for example when hestates that scientists, like hungry animals, classify objects according to needs and interests, although with the impor-tant difference that they are guided in their quest for ﬁnding regularities not so much by the stomach but ratherby empirical problems and epistemic interests (Popper 1963:61–62). 646 Pragmatism and International Relations idea is to combine existing research traditions in a pragmatic fashion and thusto enable the formulation and exploration of novel and more complex sets of problems. The constituent elements of different research traditions are trans-lated into mutually compatible vocabularies and then recombined in novel ways.This implies that most scholars must continue the laborious process of formulat-ing parochial research traditions so that a few cosmopolitan colleagues will beenabled to draw upon their work and construct syncretistic collages. 8 In additionto themselves, Katzenstein and Sil cite a number of like-minded scholars such asCharles Tilly, Sidney Tarrow, Paul Pierson, and Robert Jervis. 9 The ascription isprobably correct given the highly analytical and eclectic approach of these schol-ars. Nevertheless, apart from Katzenstein and Sil themselves none of these schol-ars has explicitly avowed himself to AE.My preferred research strategy is abduction, which is epistemologically asself-aware as AE but minimizes the dependence on existing research traditions.The typical situation for abduction is when we, both in everyday life and as socialscientists, become aware of a certain class of phenomena that interests us for somereason, but for which we lack applicable theories. We simply trust, although we donot know for certain, that the observed class of phenomena is not random. Wetherefore start collecting pertinent observations and, at the same time, applyingconcepts from existing ﬁelds of our knowledge. Instead of trying to impose anabstract theoretical template (deduction) or ‘‘simply’’ inferring propositions fromfacts (induction), we start reasoning at an intermediate level (abduction). Abduction follows the predicament that science is, or should be, above all amore conscious and systematic version of the way by which humans have learnedto solve problems and generate knowledge in their everyday lives. As it iscurrently practiced, science is often a poor emulator of what we are able toachieve in practice. This is unfortunate because human practice is the ultimatemiracle. In our own practice, most of us manage to deal with many challenging situations. The way we accomplish this is completely different from**,** and far moreefﬁcient than, **the way knowledge is generated** according to standard scientiﬁc methods. If it is true that in our own practice we proceed not so much by induction or deduction but rather by abduction, then science would do well tomimic this at least in some respects. 10 Abduction has been invoked by numerous scholars, including Alexander Wendt, John Ruggie, Jeffrey Checkel, Martin Shapiro, Alec Stone Sweet, andMartha Finnemore. While they all use the term abduction, none has ever thor-oughly speciﬁed its meaning. To make up for this omission, I have developedabduction into an explicit methodology and applied it in my own research oninternational police cooperation (Friedrichs 2008). Unfortunately, it is impossi-ble to go into further detail here. Readers interested in abduction as a way toadvance international research and methodology can also be referred to my recent article with Fritz Kratochwil (Friedrichs and Kratochwil 2009).On a ﬁnal note, we should be careful not to erect pragmatism as the ultimateepistemological fantasy to caress the vanity of Nietzschean knowers unknown tothemselves, namely that they are ingeniously ‘‘sorting out’’ problematic situa-tions. Scientiﬁc inquiry is not simply an intimate encounter between a researchproblem and a problem solver. It is a social activity taking place in communitiesof practice (Wenger 1998). Pragmatism must be neither reduced to the utility of results regardless of their social presuppositions and meaning, nor to the 8 Pace Rudra Sil (this forum), the whole point about eclecticism is that you rely on existing traditions to blendthem into something new. There is no eclecticism without something to be eclectic about. 9 One may further expand the list by including the international society approach of the English school (Ma-kinda 2000), as well as the early Kenneth Waltz (1959). 10 Precisely for this reason, abduction understood as ‘Inference to the Best Explanation’ plays a crucial role inthe ﬁeld of Artiﬁcial Intelligence. 647 The Forum fabrication of consensus among scientists. **Pragmatism as the practice of dis-cursive communities and pragmatism as a device for the generation of useful knowledge are two sides of the same coin**

### 1AR – A2: Pan/China Securitization

#### Turn — China threat reps are essential to avoid conflict and engage China.

**Friedberg 1** —(Aaron L. Friedberg, Princeton University Woodrow Wilson School Professor of Politics and International Affairs, “News Post”, Commentary, Vol. 111, No. 2, February 2001, <https://lists.lsit.ucsb.edu/archives/gordon-newspost/2001-May/001274.html>, 10/17/12, atl)

Is it possible, finally, that merely by talking and perhaps even by thinking about a full-blown SinoAmerican rivalry we may increase the probability of its actually coming to pass? This is the clear implication of Michael Swaine ’s letter. Mr. Swaine worries that “ordinary observers,” unable to distinguish between descriptions of present reality and “hair-raising scenarios” of the future, will conclude that “an intense geostrategic rivalry is virtually inevitable, and . . . respond accordingly.” While I am flattered by the thought that my article could somehow change the course of history, I very much doubt that it, or a hundred more like it, will have any such effect. On the other hand, I am disturbed by the suggestion that we ought to avoid discussing unpleasant possibilities for fear that someone (presumably our political representatives and “ordinary” fellow citizens) might get the wrong idea. Acknowledging real dangers is a necessary first step to avoiding them, as well as to preparing to cope with them if they should nevertheless come to pass. Refusing or neglecting to do so, it seems to me, is a far more likely formula for disaster.

#### Our knowledge of China is accurate—their authors have flawed information.

**Chan 4** —(Steve, UCB Professor and Chair of the Department of Political Science, “Extended Deterrence in the Taiwan Strait: Learning from Rationalist Explanations in International Relations”, Asian Affairs, Vol 31, No. 3 (Fall, 2004), 10/17/12, atl)

Rationalist interpretations do not imply that people are omnipotent in their ability to procure and process information. We know all too well that people are subject to a variety of cognitive and perceptual errors (for example, Jervis 1976; Levy 1997; Kahneman and Tversky 2000; Tversky and Kahneman 1977). This recognition of limits to rationality, however, hardly warrants general attributions of naiveté , even stupidity, to government leaders. On the contrary, it seems sensible to start from the premise that officials know their counterparts far better than scholars may wish to acknowledge. Washington, Beijing, and Taipei, for instance, invest enormous time, effort, and resources in trying to gain an accurate understanding of each other. Academics have a hard time claiming any special insight or unique source of wisdom, whether it is based on mastery of the other side's language, intimate familiarity with its culture, or access to timely and sensitive information with restricted distribution. If anything, they are usually at a considerable disadvantage on these scores when compared to diplomats, intelligence analysts, and even journalists and business people. Indeed, academics in fields such as history and political science typically operate in the realm of common knowledge, outdated information, and mundane data. This confession in turn implies that at least for some of us, our individual and collective forte lies with the analysis of persistent empirical patterns and the formulation of general models of foreign policy conduct.

**No self-fulfilling prophecy — threat language prevents conflict.**

Rachman 96 **—** (Gideon Rachman, Asia editor of the Economist, ’96 (Washington Quarterly, “Containing China”, ln)

Let us start with the self-fulfilling prophecy. This argument, often advanced by Sinologists, stresses Chinese paranoia. For historical reasons, the Chinese leadership is said to be deeply suspicious of the outside world. It assumes that outsiders will inevitably try to frustrate growing Chinese prosperity and power, however that power is used. Objecting to Chinese threats, protesting about human rights abuses, meeting the Taiwanese, attempting to leave Hong Kong with workable, democratic institutions, using words like containment: any and all of this will simply be interpreted by China as a plot to undermine Chinese stability. It may well be that the Chinese think like this. So what? The point is to respond to Chinese actions, not to try to fathom Chinese thought processes. If policymakers insist on playing the psychologist, perhaps they should model themselves on B. F. Skinner, rather than Freud. In other words rather than trying to divine the sources of Chinese behavior by analyzing old traumas, they should concentrate on behavior modification. A basic tenet of behavior therapy is not to reward behavior that you wish to discourage: giving in to threats is not generally regarded as sound practice. Ah, reply some Sinologists, but the Chinese are different. China, in the words of Henry Kissinger, "tends to react with neuralgia to any perceived slight to its dignity." n7 Well, perhaps. But it is a myth that the Chinese never back down when put under pressure. There are recent examples that suggest the opposite. In February 1995, the Chinese gave considerable ground over intellectual property rights when threatened with sanctions by the United States. The Chinese released Harry Wu, the Chinese-American human rights activist, when it became clear that imprisoning him would gravely damage U.S.-Chinese relations. After its display of public fury over the Lee Teng-hui visit, China quietly returned its ambassador to Washington and moved to patch up relations with the United States, despite failing to extract a public promise that Lee would never again be granted a U.S. visa. China also seems likely to give substantial ground in negotiations over accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO). Believers in the self-fulfilling prophecy have got the argument the wrong way around. It is certainly true that American, and indeed Asian, policies toward China could be a lot better thought out. But the West is not the source of friction: the real sources of the current tensions are Chinese actions, particularly Chinese threats to use force to assert claims over Taiwan and the South China Sea. The Chinese insist that they have never been an expansionist power. But China has very expansive ideas of where its legitimate borders lie. Because weak Chinese governments have always been especially prickly on issues of sovereignty, instability after the death of Deng Xiaoping may only heighten Chinese assertiveness.

**A2: Endless War Impact**

#### No risk of endless warfare — checks and balances.

Gray 7 — Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies and Professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies at the University of Reading, graduate of the Universities of Manchester and Oxford, Founder and Senior Associate to the National Institute for Public Policy, formerly with the International Institute for Strategic Studies and the Hudson Institute (Colin, July, “The Implications of Preemptive and Preventive War Doctrines: A Reconsideration”, <http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/ssi10561/ssi10561.pdf>)

7. A policy that favors preventive warfare expresses a futile quest for absolute security. It could do so. Most controversial policies contain within them the possibility of misuse. In the hands of a paranoid or boundlessly ambitious political leader, prevention could be a policy for endless warfare. However, the American political system, with its checks and balances, was designed explicitly for the purpose of constraining the executive from excessive folly. Both the Vietnam and the contemporary Iraqi experiences reveal clearly that although the conduct of war is an executive prerogative, in practice that authority is disciplined by public attitudes. Clausewitz made this point superbly with his designation of the passion, the sentiments, of the people as a vital component of his trinitarian theory of war. 51 It is true to claim that power can be, and indeed is often, abused, both personally and nationally. It is possible that a state could acquire a taste for the apparent swift decisiveness of preventive warfare and overuse the option. One might argue that the easy success achieved against Taliban Afghanistan in 2001, provided fuel for the urge to seek a similarly rapid success against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. In other words, the delights of military success can be habit forming. On balance, claim seven is not persuasive, though it certainly contains a germ of truth. A country with unmatched wealth and power, unused to physical insecurity at home—notwithstanding 42 years of nuclear danger, and a high level of gun crime—is vulnerable to demands for policies that supposedly can restore security. But we ought not to endorse the argument that the United States should eschew the preventive war option because it could lead to a futile, endless search for absolute security. One might as well argue that the United States should adopt a defense policy and develop capabilities shaped strictly for homeland security approached in a narrowly geographical sense. Since a president might misuse a military instrument that had a global reach, why not deny the White House even the possibility of such misuse? In other words, constrain policy ends by limiting policy’s military means. This argument has circulated for many decades and, it must be admitted, it does have a certain elementary logic. It is the opinion of this enquiry, however, that the claim that a policy which includes the preventive option might lead to a search for total security is **not at all convincing**. Of course, folly in high places is always possible, which is one of the many reasons why popular democracy is the superior form of government. It would be absurd to permit the fear of a futile and dangerous quest for absolute security to preclude prevention as a policy option. Despite its absurdity, this rhetorical charge against prevention is a stock favorite among prevention’s critics. It should be recognized and dismissed for what it is, a debating point with little pragmatic merit. And strategy, though not always policy, **must be nothing if not pragmatic**.

**A2: Alternity/Other Link**

#### No impact — “alterity” and “otherness” are vague buzzwords that have zero political value or predictive power

Mwajeh 5 — [Z Al-Mwajeh, Indiana University of Pennsylvania The School of Graduate Studies and Research Department of English, “CRITIQUE OF POSTMODERN ETHICS OF ALTERITY VERSUS EMBODIED (MUSLIM) OTHERS”, August 2005, <https://dspace.iup.edu/bitstream/handle/2069/23/Ziad%20Al-Mwajeh.pdf?sequence=1>]

However, I also think that key postmodernism tenets of radical alterity, incommensurability and undecidability cannot be easily thematized in writing, nor can they be **realized in praxis**. They are aporiatic. The only way to explicate their meanings and possibilities is through using modernist vocabulary they initially oppose and deconstruct. Sometimes, thematizing these aporiatic concepts, one lapses into cryptic and even incantational figurative language**, a practice that exposes the practical limitation** and limited accessibility of such cherished concepts (or non-concepts). **As a result, their translation into, or coextension with, lived realities become basically hypothetical, too.** Consequently, the abstract and idealized postmodern concepts verge on, and intersect with, **mystic**, (sometimes Biblical) **allusions** and traditions, a situation that **problematizes their political value and descriptive power in the realm of action**. For example, in Levinasian thought, knowing the other is incompatible with preserving its alterity. All representational endeavors reduce, or fail to capture, what they supposedly represent not only due to imperfect linguistic mediums, but also due to the fact that representation itself is a logocentric institution. It represents the other or the object from the perspective of the Same, usually a priori reducing its uniqueness or sublimity to the known, quantifiable and predictable. To curb such modernist reductive practices, Levinas’s alterity escapes all modernist categories as it is an Other not in a relational or quantifiable way. Rather, it is an Other in the sense of eliding comprehension and representation. Such Other resembles Levinas’s (Biblical) conception of God as absolute Alterity where our epistemological categories or mind cannot contain or represent Him. More important, **the ethics of alterity usually soars above urgent concrete issues that involve politically and economically charged self-other transactions.** Levinas’s other is ‘disembodied,’ not in Dr. Laing’s sense (e.g. The Divided Self). Rather, Levinas’s **alterity cannot be substantiated.** Defining or embodying the other violates its alterity and sublimity. Hence, any grand appeal such ethics may initially spark becomes questionable when **juxtaposed to our existing realities** and the factors that regulate self/other different modes of relations. 6¶ Statement of the Problem, Limitations of the Study and Methods ¶ In this study, I attempt to dislodge postmodern ethics from its speculative and elitist tendencies through turning to self-other ethical relations in various literary, discursive and political situations. I focus on bridging the gaps between theory and practice in order to expose the rifts and blind spots in postmodern ethics of alterity. I think that the demands that ‘alterity’ as a generalized abstract term exert differ from those raised by placed and temporalized others. For example, there is an urgent need to know how well Levinas’s concept of ‘absolute alterity’ or Derrida’s concept of ‘undecidability’ fares in political situations. In other words, to argue for prioritizing alterity as a new ethical turn is not the same as to motivate and effect such prioritization. While I agree that Levinas’s “infinite obligation to the other” sounds uplifting, realizing/effecting such a formula is a different story. Theoretically speaking, alterity is embraceable, but in lived realities, others fall on a spectrum of difference (sometimes opposition) from self according to various criteria. Actually, there is a general tendency to posit self and others in terms of difference and opposition, when in fact these are relative and operational terms. Polarizing self and other risks ossifying them into rigid negatively defining entities at the expense of their interdependence and mutual constitution. The terms other and self do not only designate metaphysical figures or linguistic relations, they also describe ontological realities. The metaphor of the ‘embrace’ may in it turn conceal a whole repertoire of idealism, philanthropy, and logocentrism/humanism. Worse, sometimes Levinasian ethics seems so good to be true or realizable, at least if taken literally. For the demand to meet the other on a neutral ground, pre-ontologically, looks more like an aesthetic ideal/condition that cannot be achieved as we always meet the other in context with our conceptions, motivations and values. Blaming Western Metaphysics, or ontology, for the imbalanced self-other relations somehow **brackets subject’s role and agency in the self-other various equations.**7 ¶ Moreover, we may indulge alterity ethics in closed and limited contexts that favor our train of thought and take that for a sufficient action. We may embrace the other or theorize about embracing and preserving alterity as ethics per se, but we may still live according to dialectical ‘alterity-blind’ institutions and practices. In such cases, we are either, consciously or subconsciously, acknowledging and maintaining theory/practice divisions, or we know that acting ethically toward the other entails more than theorizing about what form the most ethical relation should take. **Acting ethically demands sharing power and taking risks.** More problematically, the theoretical formulas may not function in the first place as **the roots of ‘unethical’ self-other relations cannot be automatically corrected by theoretically replacing modernist self**-centered by alterity-centered ethics. ¶ Furthermore, most of the writings about postmodernism—engage strenuous debates and often deploy elitist jargon, a practice that limits their accessibility and descriptive value. Very often philosophical and theoretical elitist debates alienate larger audiences and may even thrive at the expense of addressing concrete self-other transactions. To a certain degree, these debates are **inflated and divorced** from the stakes involved in political self-other lived transactions. **Once one crosses the threshold of speculating about self-other relations into considering them in light of indispensable concrete constituencies of race, gender, nationality, power grid, and other variables, cherished postmodern key terms—such as undecidability, alterity, and non-judgmentalism—become anomalous**. Hard lived realities demand resolutions and involve recalcitrant stakes. To solely dwell on the linguistic/discursive as the origin of self/other imbalance is to overlook the complex and intricate relations among discourses and actions. To put it differently, there has to be some mutual trafficking between metaphysics and lived realities, but **one cannot be reduced to the other in any straight predictable manner**. Nor are their relations reducible to cause-effect ones where Western Metaphysics’ privileging the subject and reducing the other/object is the causer, while racism, sexism, and colonial exploitation are the effects. This does not deny that there exists a ‘cause-effect’ relation between thought and lived realities, however. ¶ Alterity-centered postmodernism shows how modernist epistemology has failed to establish self-other relations as basically ethical by relegating the other to the status of a hierarchically inferior object or difference. But the downside to such critique is the transformation of the modernist individual/self into postmodernist subject. The postmodernist subject may not be more than a node or a surface/cite constructed by linguistic, economic and media systems. Thus, **the ethical turn toward alterity loses its halo when one considers the diminutive role played by human agency and intentionality**. Emphasizing the negative side of constructivism—being constructed by external or upper systems—postmodernism glosses over the subjects’ other various roles in sustaining and continuing, sometimes disrupting, dominant epistemological, economic and political systems. In other words, modernist subjects are primarily products of metaphysically pre-ordained itineraries **sidestepping other senses such as being a subject by initiating and performing actions by choice.** If subject primarily means subjected to, the ethics, responsibility and obligations, all become paradoxical. ¶ Furthermore, Levinas’s dictum to pre-ontologically encounter alterity makes sense; he thinks that the ethical should, or actually does, precede the ontological. But practically, such divisions may be divisions of convenience rather than of actuality as if the political and ethical belonged to different modes of living. I think that we do not need to submit to modernist disciplinary divisions of convenience nor do we need to separate the ethical from the political or from the ontological. I believe that ethics is not a formula or a prescription we choose to apply or we choose to leave behind. Ethics is intrinsic to action. Levinas’s move, however, has to be contextualized. It is his desire to remove self other relations from under modernist epistemological reductions and pragmatic/utilitarian arrangements that he wants to go back to a pure self-other encounter—before self-other dialectics. He wants to encounter the other before reductive logic moves in. Yet **such a move ends in an impasse**. Leaping back into the pre-ontological stems from Levinas’s ontological or epistemological consciousness. The irony is that one just cannot exit the ontological and still use its structures and vocabularies. Still, Levinas’s ethical dictum exposes the working of unconscious ethnocentrism or conscious bias in our self-other relations, systems and existence, unless we always foreground alterity. Consequently, alterity ethics is both a meta-ethical argument, or for some it constitutes a ‘moral principle,’ or a basic revelation about our human conditions: We are always in relation to—indebted to—the other. We may choose to elide such a realization, but we cannot change it.

**A2: Heg Link**

#### We control uniqueness — violence is at its lowest level in history because hegemony and economic growth are essential proximate checks against conflict.

Owen 11 **—** John M. Owen Professor of Politics at University of Virginia PhD from Harvard "DON’T DISCOUNT HEGEMONY" Feb 11 [www.cato-unbound.org/2011/02/11/john-owen/dont-discount-hegemony/-](http://www.cato-unbound.org/2011/02/11/john-owen/dont-discount-hegemony/-)

\*War is at its lowest level in history because of US primacy---best statistical studies prove heg solves war because it makes democratic peace resilient globalization sustainable---it’s the deeper cause of proximate checks against war

Andrew Mack and his colleagues at the Human Security Report Project are to be congratulated. Not only do they present a study with a striking conclusion, driven by data, free of theoretical or ideological bias, but they also do something quite unfashionable: they bear good news. Social scientists really are not supposed to do that. Our job is, if not to be Malthusians, then at least to point out disturbing trends, looming catastrophes, and the imbecility and mendacity of policy makers. And then it is to say why, if people listen to us, things will get better. We do this as if our careers depended upon it, and perhaps they do; for if all is going to be well, what need then for us? Our colleagues at Simon Fraser University are brave indeed. That may sound like a setup, but it is not. I shall challenge neither the data nor the general conclusion that violent conflict around the world has been decreasing in fits and starts since the Second World War. When it comes to violent conflict among and within countries, things have been getting better. (The trends have not been linear—Figure 1.1 actually shows that the frequency of interstate wars peaked in the 1980s—but the 65-year movement is clear.) Instead I shall accept that Mack et al. are correct on the macro-trends, and focus on their explanations they advance for these remarkable trends. With apologies to any readers of this forum who recoil from academic debates, this might get mildly theoretical and even more mildly methodological. Concerning international wars, one version of the “nuclear-peace” theory is not in fact laid to rest by the data. It is certainly true that nuclear-armed states have been involved in many wars. They have even been attacked (think of Israel), which falsifies the simple claim of “assured destruction”—that any nuclear country A will deter any kind of attack by any country B because B fears a retaliatory nuclear strike from A. But the most important “nuclear-peace” claim has been about *mutually* assured destruction, which obtains between two robustly nuclear-armed states. The claim is that (1) rational states having second-strike capabilities—enough deliverable nuclear weaponry to survive a nuclear first strike by an enemy—will have an overwhelming incentive not to attack one another; and (2) we can safely assume that nuclear-armed states are rational. It follows that states with a second-strike capability will not fight one another. Their colossal atomic arsenals neither kept the United States at peace with North Vietnam during the Cold War nor the Soviet Union at peace with Afghanistan. But the argument remains strong that those arsenals did help keep the United States and Soviet Union at peace with each other. Why non-nuclear states are not deterred from fighting nuclear states is an important and open question. But in a time when calls to ban the Bomb are being heard from more and more quarters, we must be clear about precisely what the broad trends toward peace can and cannot tell us. They may tell us nothing about why we have had no World War III, and little about the wisdom of banning the Bomb now. Regarding the downward trend in *international* war, Professor Mack is friendlier to more palatable theories such as the “democratic peace” (democracies do not fight one another, and the proportion of democracies has increased, hence less war); the interdependence or “commercial peace” (states with extensive economic ties find it irrational to fight one another, and interdependence has increased, hence less war); and the notion that people around the world are more anti-war than their forebears were. Concerning the downward trend in *civil* wars, he favors theories of economic growth (where commerce is enriching enough people, violence is less appealing—a logic similar to that of the “commercial peace” thesis that applies among nations) and the end of the Cold War (which end reduced superpower support for rival rebel factions in so many Third-World countries). These are all plausible mechanisms for peace. What is more, none of them excludes any other; all could be working toward the same end. That would be somewhat puzzling, however. Is the world just lucky these days? How is it that an array of peace-inducing factors happens to be working coincidentally in our time, when such a magical array was absent in the past? The answer may be that one or more of these mechanisms reinforces some of the others, or perhaps some of them are mutually reinforcing. Some scholars, for example, have been focusing on whether economic growth might support democracy and vice versa, and whether both might support international cooperation, including to end civil wars. We would still need to explain how this charmed circle of causes got started, however. And here let me raise another factor, perhaps even less appealing than the “nuclear peace” thesis, at least outside of the United States. That factor is what international relations scholars call hegemony—specifically American hegemony. A theory that many regard as discredited, but that refuses to go away, is called hegemonic stability theory. The theory emerged in the 1970s in the realm of international political economy. It asserts that for the global economy to remain open—for countries to keep barriers to trade and investment low—one powerful country must take the lead. Depending on the theorist we consult, “taking the lead” entails paying for global public goods (keeping the sea lanes open, providing liquidity to the international economy), coercion (threatening to raise trade barriers or withdraw military protection from countries that cheat on the rules), or both. The theory is skeptical that international cooperation in economic matters can emerge or endure absent a hegemon. The distastefulness of such claims is self-evident: they imply that it is good for everyone the world over if one country has more wealth and power than others. More precisely, they imply that it has been good for the world that the United States has been so predominant. There is no obvious reason why hegemonic stability theory could not apply to other areas of international cooperation, including in security affairs, human rights, international law, peacekeeping (UN or otherwise), and so on. What I want to suggest here—suggest, not test—is that American hegemony might just be a deep cause of the steady decline of political deaths in the world. How could that be? After all, the report states that United States is the third most war-prone country since 1945. Many of the deaths depicted in Figure 10.4 were in wars that involved the United States (the Vietnam War being the leading one). Notwithstanding politicians’ claims to the contrary, a candid look at U.S. foreign policy reveals that the country is as ruthlessly self-interested as any other great power in history. The answer is that U.S. hegemony might just be a deeper cause of the proximate causes outlined by Professor Mack. Consider economic growth and openness to foreign trade and investment, which (so say some theories) render violence irrational. American power and policies may be responsible for these in two related ways. First, at least since the 1940s Washington has prodded other countries to embrace the market capitalism that entails economic openness and produces sustainable economic growth. The United States promotes capitalism for selfish reasons, of course: its own domestic system depends upon growth, which in turn depends upon the efficiency gains from economic interaction with foreign countries, and the more the better. During the Cold War most of its allies accepted some degree of market-driven growth. Second, the U.S.-led western victory in the Cold War damaged the credibility of alternative paths to development—communism and import-substituting industrialization being the two leading ones—and left market capitalism the best model. The end of the Cold War also involved an end to the billions of rubles in Soviet material support for regimes that tried to make these alternative models work. (It also, as Professor Mack notes, eliminated the superpowers’ incentives to feed civil violence in the Third World.) What we call globalization is caused in part by the emergence of the United States as the global hegemon. The same case can be made, with somewhat more difficulty, concerning the spread of democracy. Washington has supported democracy only under certain conditions—the chief one being the absence of a popular anti-American movement in the target state—but those conditions have become much more widespread following the collapse of communism. Thus in the 1980s the Reagan administration—the most anti-communist government America ever had—began to dump America’s old dictator friends, starting in the Philippines. Today Islamists tend to be anti-American, and so the Obama administration is skittish about democracy in Egypt and other authoritarian Muslim countries. But general U.S. material and moral support for liberal democracy remains strong.

#### No root cause — deterrence and hegemony reduce conflict.

Sharp 8 — Assoc. Dep. General Counsel for Int’l Affairs @ DOD & Adjunct Prof. of Law @ Georgetown (Former Dir. Of Research at the Law Library of Congress, Democracy and Deterrence: Foundations for an Enduring World Peace, Air University Press, Maxwell Air Force Base, May, 2008, Dr. Walter Gary Sharp Sr.) http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA493031&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf

Moore concludes in Solving the War Puzzle that war arises from the interaction of all three Waltzian levels (individual, state or national, and international), whereas some proponents of the democratic peace principle focus only on government structures to explain war and some traditional realists focus only on the international system. Both realists and democratic peace proponents tend to emphasize institutions and systems, whereas Moore reminds us that people—leaders—decide to pursue war: Wars are not simply accidents. Nor, contrary to our ordinary language, are they made by nations. Wars are made by people; more specifically they are decided on by the leaders of nation states—and other nonnational groups in the case of terrorism—who make the decision to commit aggression or otherwise use the military instrument. These leaders make that decision based on the totality of incentives affecting them at the time of the decision. . . . . . . [Incentive theory] tells us that we simply have a **better chance of predicting war**, and fashioning **forms of intervention to control it**, if we focus squarely on the effect of variables from all levels of analysis in **generating incentives affecting the actual decisions** **made by those with the power to decide on war**.42 Incentive theory focuses on the **individual decisions that lead to war** and explains the synergistic relationship between the absence of effective deterrence and the absence of democracy. Together these three factors—the decisions of leaders made without the restraining effects of deterrence and democracy— are the cause of war: War is not strictly caused by an absence of democracy or effective deterrence or both together. Rather **war is caused by the human leadership decision to employ the military instrument**. The absence of democracy, the **absence of effective deterrence**, and most importantly, the synergy of an absence of both are **conditions** or factors **that predispose to war**. An absence of democracy likely predisposes by [its] effect on leadership and leadership incentives, and an absence of effective deterrence likely predisposes by its effect on incentives from factors other than the individual or governmental levels of analysis. To understand the cause of war is **to understand the human decision for war**; that is, major war and democide . . . are the consequence of **individual decisions responding to a totality of incentives**.43

**A2: Prior Questions**

#### Prior questions are infinite — prioritizing action essential to marginalized groups.

Cochran 99 **—** Molly, Assistant Professor of International Affairs at Georgia Institute for Technology, “Normative Theory in International Relations”, 1999, pg. 272

To conclude this chapter, while modernist and postmodernist debates continue, while we are still unsure as to what we can legitimately identify as a feminist ethical/political concern, while we still are unclear about the relationship between discourse and experience**, it is** particularly **important** for feminists **that we proceed with analysis of** both **the material** (institutional and structural) as well as the discursive. This holds not only for feminists, but for all theorists oriented towards the goal of extending further moral inclusion in the present social sciences climate of epistemological uncertainty. **Important** ethical/**political concerns hang in the balance. We cannot afford to wait for the meta-theoretical questions to be conclusively answered**. Those answers may be unavailable. Nor can we wait for a credible vision of an **alt**ernative institutional order to appear before an emancipatory agenda can be kicked into gear. Nor do we have before us a chicken and egg question of which comes first: sorting out the metatheoretical issues or working out which practices contribute to a credible institutional vision. The two questions can and should be pursued together, and can be via moral imagination. Imagination can help us think beyond discursive and material conditions which limit us, by pushing the boundaries of those limitations in thought and examining what yields. In this respect, I believe international ethics as pragmatic critique can be a useful ally to feminist and normative theorists generally.

#### Prior questions eliminate empirical validity — problem-driven approaches are essential.

Owen 2 — (David, Southampton political theory reader, “Re-orienting International Relations: On Pragmatism, Pluralism and Practical Reasoning”, Millennium 31.3, SAGE)

Commenting on the ‘philosophical turn’ in IR, Wæver remarks that ‘[a] frenzy for words like “epistemology” and “ontology” often signals this philosophical turn’, although he goes on to comment that these terms are often used loosely.4 However, loosely deployed or not, it is clear that debates concerning ontology and epistemology play a central role in the contemporary IR theory wars. In one respect, this is unsurprising since it is a characteristic feature of the social sciences that periods of disciplinary disorientation involve recourse to reflection on the philosophical commitments of different theoretical approaches, and there is no doubt that such reflection can play a valuable role in making explicit the commitments that characterise (and help individuate) diverse theoretical positions. Yet, such a philosophical turn is not without its dangers and I will briefly mention three before turning to consider a confusion that has, I will suggest, helped to promote the IR theory wars by motivating this philosophical turn. The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over **explanatory and/or interpretive power** as if the latter two were **merely a simple function of the former.** But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice **theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful** in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems, **rational choice theory may provide the best account** available to us**.** In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most importantkind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because **prioritisation of ontology** and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action**,** event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, ‘theory-driven work is part of a **reductionist program’** in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‘whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry’.6 Moreover, **this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity.** The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the Highlander view’—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises.

**A2: Rana**

#### Rana’s claim is too sweeping — the alt inevitably fails.

Cole 12 — David, professor of law at Georgetown, “Confronting the Wizard of Oz: National Security, Expertise, and Secrecy” 44 Conn. L. Rev. 1617-1625 (2012), <http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/1085>)

Rana is right to focus our attention on the assumptions that frame modern Americans’ conceptions about national security, but his assessment raises three initial questions. First, it seems **far from clear** that there ever was a “golden” era in which national security decisions were made by the common man, or “the people themselves,” as Larry Kramer might put it.8 Rana argues that neither Hobbes nor Locke would support a worldview in which certain individuals are vested with superior access to the truth, and that faith in the superior abilities of so-called “experts” is a phenomenon of the New Deal era.9 While an increased faith in scientific solutions to social problems may be a contributing factor in our current overreliance on experts,10 I doubt that national security matters were ever truly a matter of widespread democratic deliberation. Rana notes that in the early days of the republic, every able-bodied man had to serve in the militia, whereas today only a small (and largely disadvantaged) portion of society serves in the military.11 But serving in the militia and making decisions about national security are two different matters. The early days of the Republic were at least as dominated by “elites” as today. Rana points to no evidence that decisions about foreign affairs were any more democratic then than now. And, of course, the nation as a whole was far less democratic, as the majority of its inhabitants could not vote at all.12 Rather than moving away from a golden age of democratic decision-making, it seems more likely that we have simply replaced one group of elites (the aristocracy) with another (the experts). Second, to the extent that there has been an epistemological shift with respect to national security, it seems likely that it is at least in some measure **a response to objective conditions**, not just an ideological development. If so, it’s not clear that we can solve the problem merely by “thinking differently” about national security. **The world has, in fact,** become more interconnected and dangerous than it was when the Constitution was drafted. At our founding, the oceans were a significant buffer against attacks, weapons were primitive, and travel over long distances was extremely arduous and costly. The attacks of September 11, 2001, or anything like them, would have been inconceivable in the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries. Small groups of non-state actors can now inflict the kinds of attacks that once were the exclusive province of states. But because such actors do not have the governance responsibilities that states have, they are less susceptible to deterrence. The Internet makes information about dangerous weapons and civil vulnerabilities far more readily available, airplane travel dramatically increases the potential range of a hostile actor, and it is not impossible that terrorists could obtain and use nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons.13 The knowledge necessary to monitor nuclear weapons, respond to cyber warfare, develop technological defenses to technological threats, and gather intelligence is **increasingly specialized**. The problem is **not just how we think about security** threats; it is also at least in part objectively based.

### A2: Reps Cause War

#### Reps don’t cause war — prefer empirical assessments.

Reiter 95 — DAN REITER is a Professor of Political Science at Emory University and has been an Olin post-doctoral fellow in security studies at Harvard “Exploring the Powder Keg Myth” International Security v20 No2 Autumn 1995 pp 5-34 JSTOR

A criticism of assessing the frequency of preemptive wars by looking only at wars themselves is that this misses the non-events, that is, instances in which preemption would be predicted but did not occur. However, excluding non-events should bias the results in favor of finding that preemptive war is an important path to war, as the inclusion of non-events could only make it seem that the event was less frequent. Therefore, if preemptive wars seem infrequent within the set of wars alone, then this would have to be considered strong evidence in favor of the third, **most skeptical view of preemptive war**, because even when the sample is rigged to make preemptive wars seem frequent (by including only wars), they are still rare events. Below, a few cases in which preemption did not occur are discussed to illustrate factors that constrain preemption.¶ The rarity of preemptive wars offers preliminary support for the third, most skeptical view, that the preemption scenario does not tell us much about how war breaks out. Closer examination of the three cases of preemption, set forth below, **casts doubt** on the validity of the two preemption hypotheses discussed earlier: that **hostile images of the enemy** increase the chances of preemption, and that belief in the dominance of the offense increases the chances of preemption. In each case there are motives for war aside from fear of an imminent attack, indicating that such fears may not be sufficient to cause war. In addition, in these cases of war the two conditions hypothesized to stimulate preemption—hostile images of the adversary and belief in the military advantages of striking first—are **present to a very high degree**. This implies that these are insubstantial causal forces, as they are associated with the outbreak of war only when they are present to a very high degree. **This reduces even further the significance of these forces as causes of war.** To illustrate this point, consider an analogy: say there is a hypothesis that saccharin causes cancer. Discovering that rats who were fed a lot of saccharin and also received high levels of X-ray exposure, which we know causes cancer, had a higher risk for cancer does not, however, set off alarm bells about the risks of saccharin. Though there might be a relationship between saccharin consumption and cancer, this is not demonstrated by the results of such a test.

**A2: Representations First**

#### Representations not first — assuming they are means we never take action to prevent violence.

Tuathail 96 — (Gearoid, Department of Geography at Virginia Polytechnic Institute, Political Geography, 15(6-7), p. 664, science direct)

While theoretical debates at academic conferences are important to academics, the discourse and concerns of foreign-policy decisionmakers are quite different, so different that they constitute a distinctive problemsolving, theory-averse, policy-making subculture. There is a danger that academics assume that the discourses they engage are more significant in the practice of foreign policy and the exercise of power than they really are. This is not, however, to minimize the obvious importance of academia as a general institutional structure among many that sustain certain epistemic communities in particular states. In general, I do not disagree with Dalby’s fourth point about politics and discourse except to note that his statement-‘Precisely because reality could be represented in particular ways political decisions could be taken, troops and material moved and war fought’-evades the important question of agency that I noted in my review essay. The assumption that it is representations that make action possible is inadequate by itself. Political, military and economic structures, institutions, discursive networks and leadership are all crucial in explaining social action and should be theorized together with representational practices. Both here and earlier, Dalby’s reasoning inclines towards a form of idealism. In response to Dalby’s fifth point (with its three subpoints), it is worth noting, first, that his book is about the CPD, not the Reagan administration. He analyzes certain CPD discourses, root the geographical reasoning practices of the Reagan administration nor its public-policy reasoning on national security. Dalby’s book is narrowly textual; the general contextuality of the Reagan administration is not dealt with. Second, let me simply note that I find that the distinction between critical theorists and poststructuralists is a little too rigidly and heroically drawn by Dalby and others. Third, Dalby’s interpretation of the reconceptualization of national security in Moscow as heavily influenced by dissident peace researchers in Europe is highly idealist, an interpretation that ignores the structural and ideological crises facing the Soviet elite at that time. Gorbachev’s reforms and his new security discourse were also strongly selfinterested, an ultimately futile attempt to save the Communist Party and a discredited regime of power from disintegration. The issues raised by Simon Dalby in his comment are important ones for all those interested in the practice of critical geopolitics. While I agree with Dalby that questions of discourse are extremely important ones for political geographers to engage, there is a danger of fetishizing this concern with discourse so that we neglect the institutional and the sociological, the materialist and the cultural, the political and the geographical contexts within which particular discursive strategies become significant. Critical geopolitics, in other words, should not be a prisoner of the sweeping ahistorical cant that sometimes accompanies ‘poststructuralism nor convenient reading strategies like the identity politics narrative; it needs to always be open to the patterned mess that is human history.

#### Reps don’t come first — discourse fails to explain historical examples of violence.

Rodwell 5 — Manchester Metropolitan University PhD candidate, 2005 (Jonathan, “Trendy But Empty: A Response to Richard Jackson”, <http://www.49thparallel.bham.ac.uk/back/issue15/rodwell1.htm>)

In this response I wish to argue that the Post-Structural analysis put forward by Richard Jackson is inadequate when trying to understand American Politics and Foreign Policy. The key point is that this is an issue of methodology and theory. I do not wish to argue that language is not important, in the current political scene (or indeed any political era) that would be unrealistic. One cannot help but be convinced that the creation of identity, of defining ones self (or one nation, or societies self) in opposition to an ‘other’ does indeed take place. Masses of written and aural evidence collated by Jackson clearly demonstrates that there is a discursive pattern surrounding post 9/11 U.S. politics and society. [i] Moreover as expressed at the start of this paper it is a political pattern and logic that this language is useful for politicians, especially when able to marginalise other perspectives. Nothing illustrates this clearer than the fact George W. Bush won re-election, for whatever the reasons he did win, it is undeniable that at the very least the war in Iraq, though arguable far from a success, at the absolute minimum did not damage his campaign. Additionally it is surely not stretching credibility to argue Bush performance and rhetoric during the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks also strengthened his position. However, having said that, the problem is Jackson’s own theoretical underpinning, his own justification for the importance of language. If he was merely proposing that the understanding of language as one of many causal factors is important that would be fine. But he is not. The epistemological and theoretical framework of his argument means the ONLY thing we should look at is language and this is the problem.[ii] Rather than being a fairly simple, but nonetheless valid, argument, because of the theoretical justification it actually becomes an almost nonsensical. My response is roughly laid out in four parts. Firstly I will argue that such methodology, in isolation, is fundamentally reductionist with a theoretical underpinning that does not conceal this simplicity. Secondly, that a strict use of post-structural discourse analysis results in an epistemological cul-de-sac in which the writer cannot actually say anything. Moreover the reader has no reason to accept anything that has been written. The result is at best an explanation that remains as equally valid as any other possible interpretation and at worse a work that retains no critical force whatsoever. Thirdly, possible arguments in response to this charge; that such approaches provide a more acceptable explanation than others are, in effect, both a tacit acceptance of the poverty of force within the approach and of the complete lack of understanding of the identifiable effects of the real world around us; thus highlighting the contradictions within post-structural claims to be moving beyond traditional causality, re-affirming that rather than pursuing a post-structural approach we should continue to employ the traditional methodologies within History, Politics and International Relations. Finally as a consequence of these limitations I will argue that the post-structural call for ‘intertextuals’ must be practiced rather than merely preached and that an understanding and utilisation of all possible theoretical approaches must be maintained if academic writing is to remain useful rather than self-contained and narrative. Ultimately I conclude that whilst undeniably of some value post-structural approaches are at best a footnote in our understanding . The first major problem then is that historiographically discourse analysis is so capacious as to be largely of little use. The process of inscription identity, of discourse development is not given any political or historical context, it is argued that it just works, is simply a universal phenomenon. It is history that explains everything and therefore actually explains nothing. To be specific if the U.S. and every other nation is continually reproducing identities through ‘othering’ it is a constant and universal phenomenon that fails to help us understand at all why one result of the othering turned out one way and differently at another time. For example, how could one explain how the process resulted in the 2003 invasion of Iraq but didn’t produce a similar invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 when that country (and by the logic of the Regan administrations discourse) the West was threatened by the ‘Evil Empire’. By the logical of discourse analysis in both cases these policies were the result of politicians being able to discipline and control the political agenda to produce the outcomes. So why were the outcomes not the same? To reiterate the point how do we explain that the language of the War on Terror actually managed to result in the eventual Afghan invasion in 2002? Surely it is impossible to explain how George W. Bush was able to convince his people (and incidentally the U.N and Nato) to support a war in Afghanistan without referring to a simple fact outside of the discourse; the fact that a known terrorist in Afghanistan actually admitted to the murder of thousands of people on the 11h of Sepetember 2001. The point is that if the discursive ‘othering’ of an ‘alien’ people or group is what really gave the U.S. the opportunity to persue the war in Afghanistan one must surly wonder why Afghanistan. Why not North Korea? Or Scotland? If the discourse is so powerfully useful in it’s own right why could it not have happened anywhere at any time and more often? Why could the British government not have been able to justify an armed invasion and regime change in Northern Ireland throughout the terrorist violence of the 1980’s? Surely they could have just employed the same discursive trickery as George W. Bush? Jackson is absolutely right when he points out that the actuall threat posed by Afghanistan or Iraq today may have been thoroughly misguided and conflated and that there must be more to explain why those wars were enacted at that time. Unfortunately that explanation cannot simply come from the result of inscripting identity and discourse. On top of this there is the clear problem that the consequences of the discursive othering are not necessarily what Jackson would seem to identify. This is a problem consistent through David Campbell’s original work on which Jackson’s approach is based[iii]. David Campbell argued for a linguistic process that ‘always results in an other being marginalized’ or has the potential for ‘demonisation’[iv]. At the same time Jackson, building upon this, maintains without qualification that the systematic and institutionalised abuse of Iraqi prisoners first exposed in April 2004 “is a direct consequence of the language used by senior administration officials: conceiving of terrorist suspects as ‘evil’, ‘inhuman’ and ‘faceless enemies of freedom creates an atmosphere where abuses become normalised and tolerated”[v]. The only problem is that the process of differentiation does not actually necessarily produce dislike or antagonism. In the 1940’s and 50’s even subjected to the language of the ‘Red Scare’ it’s obvious not all Americans came to see the Soviets as an ‘other’ of their nightmares. And in Iraq the abuses of Iraqi prisoners are isolated cases, it is not the case that the U.S. militarily summarily abuses prisoners as a result of language. Surely the massive protest against the war, even in the U.S. itself, is also a self evident example that the language of ‘evil’ and ‘inhumanity’ does not necessarily produce an outcome that marginalises or demonises an ‘other’. Indeed one of the points of discourse is that we are continually differentiating ourselves from all others around us without this necessarily leading us to hate fear or abuse anyone.[vi] Consequently, the clear fear of the Soviet Union during the height of the Cold War, and the abuses at Abu Ghirab are unusual cases. To understand what is going on we must ask how far can the process of inscripting identity really go towards explaining them? As a result at best all discourse analysis provides us with is a set of universals and a heuristic model.

**A2: Structural Vio 1st**

#### Extinction outweighs structural violence.

Bostrom 12 — (Nick, Professor of Philosophy at Oxford, directs Oxford's Future of Humanity Institute and winner of the Gannon Award, Interview with Ross Andersen, correspondent at The Atlantic, 3/6, “We're Underestimating the Risk of Human Extinction”, <http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/03/were-underestimating-the-risk-of-human-extinction/253821/>)

Bostrom, who directs Oxford's Future of Humanity Institute, has argued over the course of several papers that human extinction risks are poorly understood and, worse still, **severely underestimated by society**. Some of these existential risks are fairly well known, especially the natural ones. But others are obscure or even exotic. Most worrying to Bostrom is the subset of existential risks that arise from human technology, a subset that he expects to grow in number and potency over the next century.¶ Despite his concerns about the risks posed to humans by technological progress, Bostrom is no luddite. In fact, he is a longtime advocate of transhumanism---the effort to improve the human condition, and even human nature itself, through technological means. In the long run he sees technology as a bridge, a bridge we humans must cross with great care, in order to reach new and better modes of being. In his work, Bostrom uses the tools of philosophy and mathematics, in particular probability theory, to try and determine how we as a species might achieve this safe passage. What follows is my conversation with Bostrom about some of the most interesting and worrying existential risks that humanity might encounter in the decades and centuries to come, and about what we can do to make sure we outlast them.¶ Some have argued that we ought to be directing our resources toward humanity's existing problems, rather than future existential risks, because many of the latter are highly improbable. You have responded by suggesting that **existential risk mitigation may in fact be a dominant moral priority over the alleviation of present suffering**. Can you explain why? ¶ Bostrom: Well suppose you have a moral view that counts future people as being worth as much as present people. You might say that fundamentally it doesn't matter whether someone exists at the current time or at some future time, just as many people think that from a fundamental moral point of view, it doesn't matter where somebody is spatially---somebody isn't automatically worth less because you move them to the moon or to Africa or something. A human life is a human life. If you have that moral point of view that future generations matter in proportion to their population numbers, then you get this **very stark implication that existential risk mitigation has a much higher utility than pretty much anything else that you could do**. There are so many people that could come into existence in the future if humanity survives this critical period of time---we might live for billions of years, our descendants might colonize billions of solar systems, and there could be billions and billions times more people than exist currently. **Therefore, even a very small reduction in the probability of realizing this enormous good will tend to outweigh even immense benefits like eliminating poverty or curing malaria**, which would be tremendous under ordinary standards.

#### We control uniqueness — structural violence declining and not inevitable.

Beauchamp 13 — Zack Beauchamp 12/11/13, “5 Reasons Why 2013 Was The Best Year In Human, Reporter/Blogger for ThinkProgress.org. He previously contributed to Andrew Sullivan’s The Dish at Newsweek/Daily Beast, and has also written for Foreign Policy and Tablet magazines, holds B.A.s in Philosophy and Political Science from Brown University and an M.Sc in International Relations from the London School of Economics, http://thinkprogress.org/security/2013/12/11/3036671/2013-certainly-year-human-history/#

Between the brutal civil war in Syria, the government shutdown and all of the deadly dysfunction it represents, the NSA spying revelations, and massive inequality, it’d be easy to for you to enter 2014 thinking the last year has been an awful one. But you’d be wrong. We have every reason to believe that **2013 was**, in fact, **the best year on the planet** for humankind. Contrary to what you might have heard, virtually all of the most important forces that determine what make people’s lives good — the things that determine how long they live, and whether they live happily and freely — are trending in an extremely happy direction. While it’s possible that this progress **could be reversed** by something like runaway climate change, the effects will have to be dramatic to overcome the extraordinary and growing progress we’ve made in making the world a better place. Here’s the five big reasons why. 1. Fewer people are dying young, and more are living longer. The greatest story in recent human history is the simplest: we’re winning the fight against death. “There is not a single country in the world where infant or child mortality today is not lower than it was in 1950,” writes Angus Deaton, a Princeton economist who works on global health issues. The most **up-to-date numbers** on global health, the 2013 World Health Organization (WHO) statistical compendium, confirm Deaton’s estimation. Between 1990 and 2010, the percentage of children who died before their fifth birthday dropped by almost half. Measles deaths declined by 71 percent, and both tuberculosis and maternal deaths by half again. HIV, that modern plague, is also being held back, with deaths from AIDS-related illnesses down by 24 percent since 2005. In short, fewer people are dying untimely deaths. And that’s **not only** true in rich countries: life expectancy has gone up between 1990 and 2011 in every WHO income bracket. The gains are even more dramatic if you take the long view: global life expectancy was 47 in the early 1950s, but had risen to 70 — a 50 percent jump — by 2011. For even more perspective, the average Briton in 1850 — when the British Empire had reached its apex — was 40. The average person today should expect to live almost twice as long as the average citizen of the world’s wealthiest and most powerful country in 1850. In real terms, this means millions of fewer dead adults and children a year, millions fewer people who spend their lives suffering the pains and unfreedoms imposed by illness, and millions more people spending their twilight years with loved ones. And the trends are all positive — “progress has accelerated in recent years in many countries with the highest rates of mortality,” as the WHO rather bloodlessly put it. What’s going on? Obviously, it’s fairly complicated, but the most important drivers have been technological and political innovation. The Enlightenment-era advances in the scientific method got people doing high-quality research, which brought us modern medicine and the information technologies that allow us to spread medical breakthroughs around the world at increasingly faster rates. Scientific discoveries also fueled the Industrial Revolution and the birth of modern capitalism, giving us more resources to devote to large-scale application of live-saving technologies. And the global spread of liberal democracy made governments accountable to citizens, forcing them to attend to their health needs or pay the electoral price. We’ll see the enormously beneficial impact of these two forces, technology and democracy, repeatedly throughout this list, which should tell you something about the foundations of human progress. But when talking about improvements in health, we shouldn’t neglect foreign aid. Nations donating huge amounts of money out of an altruistic interest in the welfare of foreigners is historically unprecedented, and while not all aid has been helpful, health aid has been a huge boon. Even Deaton, who wrote one of 2013′s harshest assessments of foreign aid, believes “the case for assistance to fight disease such as HIV/AIDS or smallpox is strong.” That’s because these programs have demonstrably saved lives — the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), a 2003 program pushed by President Bush, paid for anti-retroviral treatment for over 5.1 million people in the poor countries hardest-hit by the AIDS epidemic. So we’re outracing the Four Horseman, extending our lives faster than pestilence, war, famine, and death can take them. That alone should be enough to say the world is getting better. 2. Fewer people suffer from extreme poverty, and the world is getting happier. There are fewer people in abject penury than at any other point in human history, and middle class people enjoy their highest standard of living ever. We haven’t come close to solving poverty: a number of African countries in particular have chronic problems generating growth, a nut foreign aid hasn’t yet cracked. So this isn’t a call for complacency about poverty any more than acknowledging victories over disease is an argument against tackling malaria. But make no mistake: as a whole, the world is much richer in 2013 than it was before. 721 million fewer people lived in extreme poverty ($1.25 a day) in 2010 than in 1981, according to a new World Bank study from October. That’s astounding — a decline from 40 to about 14 percent of the world’s population suffering from abject want. And **poverty rates are declining in every national income bracket**: even in low income countries, the percentage of people living in extreme poverty ($1.25 a day in 2005 dollars) a day gone down from 63 in 1981 to 44 in 2010. We can be fairly confident that these trends are continuing. For one thing, they survived the Great Recession in 2008. For another, the decline in poverty has been fueled by global economic growth, which looks to be continuing: global GDP grew by 2.3 percent in 2012, a number that’ll rise to 2.9 percent in 2013 according to IMF projections. The bulk of the recent decline in poverty comes form India and China — about 80 percent from China \*alone\*. Chinese economic and social reform, a delayed reaction to the mass slaughter and starvation of Mao’s Cultural Revolution, has been the engine of poverty’s global decline. If you subtract China, there are actually more poor people today than there were in 1981 (population growth trumping the percentage declines in poverty). But we shouldn’t discount China. If what we care about is fewer people suffering the misery of poverty, then it shouldn’t matter what nation the less-poor people call home. Chinese growth should be celebrated, not shunted aside. The poor haven’t been the only people benefitting from global growth. Middle class people have access to an ever-greater stock of life-improving goods. Televisions and refrigerators, once luxury goods, are now comparatively cheap and commonplace. That’s why large-percentage improvements in a nation’s GDP appear to correlate strongly with higher levels of happiness among the nation’s citizens; people like having things that make their lives easier and more worry-free. Global economic growth in the past five decades has dramatically reduced poverty and made people around the world happier. Once again, we’re better off. 3. War is becoming rarer and less deadly. APTOPIX Mideast Libya CREDIT: AP Photo/ Manu Brabo Another massive conflict could overturn the global progress against disease and poverty. But it appears war, too, may be losing its fangs. Steven Pinker’s 2011 book The Better Angels Of Our Nature is the gold standard in this debate. Pinker brought a treasure trove of data to bear on the question of whether the world has gotten more peaceful, and found that, in the long arc of human history, both war and other forms of violence (the death penalty, for instance) are on a centuries-long downward slope. Pinker summarizes his argument here if you don’t own the book. Most eye-popping are the numbers for the past 50 years; Pinker finds that “the worldwide rate of death from interstate and civil war combined has juddered downward…from almost 300 per 100,000 world population during World War II, to almost 30 during the Korean War, to the low teens during the era of the Vietnam War, to single digits in the 1970s and 1980s, **to less than 1 in the twenty-ﬁrst century**.” Here’s what that looks like graphed: Pinker CREDIT: Steven Pinker/The Wall Street Journal So it looks like the smallest percentage of humans alive since World War II, and in all likelihood in human history, are living through the horrors of war. Did 2013 give us any reason to believe that Pinker and the other scholars who agree with him have been proven wrong? **Probably not.** The academic debate over the decline of war really exploded in 2013, but the “declinist” thesis has fared pretty well. Challenges to Pinker’s conclusion that battle deaths have gone down over time have not withstood scrutiny. The most compelling critique, a new paper by Bear F. Braumoeller, argues that if you control for the larger number of countries in the last 50 years, war happens at roughly the same rates as it has historically. There are lots of things you might say about Braumoeller’s argument, and I’ve asked Pinker for his two cents (update: Pinker’s response here). But most importantly, if battle deaths per 100,000 people really has declined, then his argument doesn’t mean very much. If (percentage-wise) fewer people are dying from war, then what we call “war” now is a lot less deadly than “war” used to be. Braumoeller suggests population growth and improvements in battle medicine explain the decline, but that’s not convincing: tell me with a straight face that the only differences in deadliness between World War II, Vietnam, and the wars you see today is that there are more people and better doctors. There’s a more rigorous way of putting that: today, we see many more civil wars than we do wars between nations. The former tend to be less deadly than the latter. That’s why the other major challenge to Pinker’s thesis in 2013, the deepening of the Syrian civil war, isn’t likely to upset the overall trend. Syria’s war is an unimaginable tragedy, one responsible for the rare, depressing increase in battle deaths from 2011 to 2012. However, the overall 2011-2012 trend “fits well with the observed long-term decline in battle deaths,” according to researchers at the authoritative Uppsala Conflict Data Program, because the uptick is not enough to suggest an overall change in trend. We should expect something similar when the 2013 numbers are published. Why are smaller and smaller percentages of people being exposed to the horrors of war? There are lots of reasons one could point to, but two of the biggest ones are the spread of democracy and humans getting, for lack of a better word, better. That democracies never, or almost never, go to war with each other is not seriously in dispute: the statistical evidence is ridiculously strong. While some argue that the “democratic peace,” as it’s called, is caused by things other than democracy itself, there’s good experimental evidence that democratic leaders and citizens just don’t want to fight each other. Since 1950, democracy has spread around the world like wildfire. There were only a handful of democracies after World War II, but that grew to roughly 40 percent of all by the end of the Cold War. Today, a comfortable majority — about 60 percent — of all states are democracies. This freer world is also a safer one. Second — and this is Pinker’s preferred explanation — people have developed strategies for dealing with war’s causes and consequences. “Human ingenuity and experience have gradually been brought to bear,” Pinker writes, “just as they have chipped away at hunger and disease.” A series of human inventions, things like U.N. peacekeeping operations, which nowadays are very successful at reducing violence, have given us a set of social tools increasingly well suited to reducing the harm caused by armed conflict. War’s decline isn’t accidental, in other words. It’s by design. 4. Rates of murder and other violent crimes are in free-fall. Britain Unrest CREDIT: Akira Suemori/AP Photos Pinker’s trend against violence isn’t limited just to war. It seems likes crimes, both of the sort states commit against their citizens and citizens commit against each other, are also on the decline. Take a few examples. Slavery, once commonly sanctioned by governments, is illegal everywhere on earth. The use of torture as legal punishment has gone down dramatically. The European murder rate fell 35-fold from the Middle Ages to the beginning of the 20th century (check out this amazing 2003 paper from Michael Eisner, who dredged up medieval records to estimate European homicide rates in the swords-and-chivalry era, if you don’t believe me). The decline has been **especially marked** in recent years. Though homicide crime rates climbed back up from their historic lows between the 1970s and 1990s, reversing progress made since the late 19th century, they have collapsed worldwide in the 21st century. 557,000 people were murdered in 2001 — almost three times as many as were killed in war that year. In 2008, that number was 289,000, and the homicide rate has been declining in 75 percent of nations since then. Statistics from around the developed world, where numbers are particularly reliable, show that it’s not just homicide that’s on the wane: it’s almost all violent crime. US government numbers show that violent crime in the United States declined from a peak of about 750 crimes per 100,000 Americans to under 450 by 2009. G7 as a whole countries show huge declines in homicide, robbery, and vehicle theft. So even in countries that aren’t at poor or at war, most people’s lives are getting safer and more secure. Why? We know it’s not incarceration. While the United States and Britain have dramatically increased their prison populations, others, like Canada, the Netherlands, and Estonia, reduced their incarceration rates and saw similar declines in violent crime. Same thing state-to-state in the United States; New York imprisoned fewer people and saw the fastest crime decline in the country. The Economist’s deep dive into the explanations for crime’s collapse provides a few answers. Globally, police have gotten better at working with communities and targeting areas with the most crime. They’ve also gotten new toys, like DNA testing, that make it easier to catch criminals. The crack epidemic in the United States and its heroin twin in Europe have both slowed down dramatically. Rapid gentrification has made inner-city crime harder. And the increasing cheapness of “luxury” goods like iPods and DVD players has reduced incentives for crime on both the supply and demand sides: stealing a DVD player isn’t as profitable, and it’s easier for a would-be thief to buy one in the first place. But there’s one explanation The Economist dismissed that strikes me as hugely important: the abolition of lead gasoline. Kevin Drum at Mother Jones wrote what’s universally acknowledged to be the definitive argument for the lead/crime link, and it’s incredibly compelling. We know for a fact that lead exposure damages people’s brains and can potentially be fatal; that’s why an international campaign to ban leaded gasoline started around 1970. Today, leaded gasoline is almost unheard of — it’s banned in 175 countries, and there’s been a decline in lead blood levels by about 90 percent. Drum marshals a wealth of evidence that the parts of the brain damaged by lead are the same ones that check people’s aggressive impulses. Moreover, the timing matches up: crime shot up in the mid-to-late-20th century as cars spread around the world, and started to decline in the 70s as the anti-lead campaign was succeeding. Here’s close the relationship is, using data from the United States: Lead\_Crime\_325 Now, non-homicide violent crime appears to have ticked up in 2012, based on U.S. government surveys of victims of crime, but it’s very possible that’s just a blip: the official Department of Justice report says up-front that “the apparent increase in the rate of violent crimes reported to police from 2011 to 2012 was not statistically significant.” So we have no reason to believe crime is making a come back, and every reason to believe the historical decline in criminal violence is here to stay. 5. There’s less racism, sexism, and other forms of discrimination in the world. Nelson Mandela CREDIT: Theana Calitz/AP Images Racism, sexism, anti-Semitism, homophobia, and other forms of discrimination remain, without a doubt, extraordinarily powerful forces. The statistical and experimental evidence is overwhelming — this irrefutable proof of widespread discrimination against African-Americans, for instance, should put the “racism is dead” fantasy to bed. Yet the need to combat discrimination denial shouldn’t blind us to the good news. Over the centuries, humanity has made extraordinary progress in taming its hate for and ill-treatment of other humans on the basis of difference alone. Indeed, it is very likely that **we live in the least discriminatory era in the history of modern civilization.** It’s not a huge prize given how bad the past had been, but there are still gains worth celebrating. Go back 150 years in time and the point should be obvious. Take four prominent groups in 1860: African-Americans were in chains, European Jews were routinely massacred in the ghettos and shtetls they were confined to, women around the world were denied the opportunity to work outside the home and made almost entirely subordinate to their husbands, and LGBT people were invisible. The improvements in each of these group’s statuses today, both in the United States and internationally, are incontestable. On closer look, we have reason to believe the happy trends are likely to continue. Take racial discrimination. In 2000, Harvard sociologist Lawrence Bobo penned a comprehensive assessment of the data on racial attitudes in the United States. He found a “national consensus” on the ideals of racial equality and integration. “A nation once comfortable as a deliberately segregationist and racially discriminatory society has not only abandoned that view,” Bobo writes, “but now overtly positively endorses the goals of racial integration and equal treatment. There is no sign whatsoever of retreat from this ideal, despite events that many thought would call it into question. The magnitude, steadiness, and breadth of this change should be lost on no one.” The norm against overt racism has **gone global**. In her book on the international anti-apartheid movement in the 1980s, Syracuse’s Audie Klotz says flatly that “the illegitimacy of white minority rule led to South Africa’s persistent diplomatic, cultural, and economic isolation.” The belief that racial discrimination could not be tolerated had become so widespread, Klotz argues, that it united the globe — including governments that had strategic interests in supporting South Africa’s whites — in opposition to apartheid. In 2011, 91 percent of respondents in a sample of 21 diverse countries said that equal treatment of people of different races or ethnicities was important to them. Racism obviously survived both American and South African apartheid, albeit in more subtle, insidious forms. “The death of Jim Crow racism has left us in an uncomfortable place,” Bobo writes, “a state of laissez-faire racism” where racial discrimination and disparities still exist, but support for the kind of aggressive government policies needed to address them is racially polarized. But there’s reason to hope that’ll change as well: two massive studies of the political views of younger Americans by my TP Ideas colleagues, John Halpin and Ruy Teixeira, found that millenials were significantly more racially tolerant and supportive of government action to address racial disparities than the generations that preceded them. Though I’m not aware of any similar research of on a global scale, it’s hard not to imagine they’d find similar results, suggesting that we should have hope that the power of racial prejudice may be waning. The story about gender discrimination is very similar: after the feminist movement’s enormous victories in the 20th century, structural sexism still shapes the world in profound ways, but the cause of gender equality is making progress. In 2011, 86 percent of people in a diverse 21 country sample said that equal treatment on the basis of gender was an important value. The U.N.’s Human Development Report’s Gender Inequality Index — a comprehensive study of reproductive health, social empowerment, and labor market equity — saw a 20 percent decline in observable gender inequalities from 1995 to 2011. IMF data show consistent global declines in wage disparities between genders, labor force participation, and educational attainment around the world. While enormous inequality remains, 2013 is looking to be the worst year for sexism in history. Finally, we’ve made astonishing progress on sexual orientation and gender identity discrimination — largely in the past 15 years. At the beginning of 2003, zero Americans lived in marriage equality states; by the end of 2013, 38 percent of Americans will. Article 13 of the European Community Treaty bans discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation, and, in 2011, the UN Human Rights Council passed a resolution committing the council to documenting and exposing discrimination on orientation or identity grounds around the world. The public opinion trends are positive worldwide: all of the major shifts from 2007 to 2013 in Pew’s “acceptance of homosexuality” poll were towards greater tolerance, and young people everywhere are more open to equality for LGBT individuals than their older peers. best\_year\_graphics-04 Once again, **these victories are** partial and **by no means inevitable**. Racism, sexism, homophobia, and other forms of discrimination aren’t just “going away” on their own. They’re losing their hold on us because people are working to change other people’s minds and because governments are passing laws aimed at promoting equality. Positive trends don’t mean the problems are close to solved, and certainly aren’t excuses for sitting on our hands. That’s true of everything on this list. The fact that fewer people are dying from war and disease doesn’t lessen the moral imperative to do something about those that are; the fact that people are getting richer and safer in their homes isn’t an excuse for doing more to address poverty and crime. But too often, the worst parts about the world are treated as **inevitable**, the prospect of radical victory over pain and suffering dismissed as utopian fantasy. The overwhelming force of the evidence shows that to be false. As best we can tell, the reason humanity is getting better is because humans have decided to make the world a better place. We consciously chose to develop lifesaving medicine and build freer political systems; we’ve passed laws against workplace discrimination and poisoning children’s minds with lead. So far, these choices have more than paid off. It’s up to us to make sure they continue to.

#### We control causality — war is the root cause of structural violence.

Goldstein 1 — Joshua, Int’l Rel Prof @ American U, 2001, War and Gender, p. 412

First, peace activists face a dilemma in thinking about causes of war and working for peace. Many peace scholars and activists support the approach, “if you want peace, work for justice.” Then, if one believes that sexism contributes to war one can work for gender justice specifically (perhaps among others) in order to pursue peace. This approach brings strategic allies to the peace movement (women, labor, minorities), but rests on the assumption that injustices cause war. The evidence in this book suggests that causality runs at least as strongly the other way. War is not a product of capitalism, imperialism, gender, innate aggression, or any other single cause, although all of these influence wars’ outbreaks and outcomes. Rather, war has in part fueled and sustained these and other injustices.9 So,”if you want peace, work for peace.” Indeed, if you want justice (gender and others), work for peace. Causality does not run just upward through the levels of analysis, from types of individuals, societies, and governments up to war. It runs downward too. Enloe suggests that changes in attitudes towards war and the military may be the most important way to “reverse women’s oppression.” The dilemma is that peace work focused on justice brings to the peace movement energy, allies, and moral grounding, yet, in light of this book’s evidence, the emphasis on injustice as the main cause of war seems to be empirically inadequate.